DISSENT

Jean Bloch-Michel

FRANCE

A New Kind of Rebellion

A First-Hand Report on the Political Upheaval in France Which Pitted Students and Workers Against de Gaulle and the Communists

George Lichtheim

SOCIALISM AND THE JEWS

A Major Scholarly Study of the Relationship Between the Socialist Movement and the Problem of Anti-Semitism

JOSEPH BUTTINGER
Peace Negotiations In Paris

ARNOLD KAUFMAN
Selective Objection To the Draft

VACLAV HOLESOVSKY
Czechoslovakia

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A Cri de Coeur

JULY-AUGUST 1968 $1

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JULY–AUGUST 1968

DISSENT is a journal devoted to radical ideas and the values of socialism and democracy. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

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A Direct Report from Paris:

France – a New Kind of Rebellion

Jean Bloch-Michel

June 6, 1968

IT ALL BEGAN in Nanterre. Those who were surprised by the events of May 1968 would do well to visit the spot where the conflagration broke out. There, between a shantytown perched on a low plateau and low-cost housing developments, extends a great wasteland of empty lots and newly plowed fields. This is the surrounding of the "university complex," the lecture halls, residence halls, and annexes—buildings without style, set amidst one of the most sinister urban landscapes imaginable. There is not a single café, bistro, or restaurant in the area, nor a single park; only Nanterre with its suburban homes, its factories, shantytown, and sad-looking housing projects.

Paris, of course, is not far away. But how to get there, and above all, how to get back? There is no bus to Nanterre after nine o'clock in the evening, and the last train for "La Folie Complexe Universitaire" (what a name!) leaves Paris from St. Lazare Station before midnight—too early to enable one to see a movie and return to Nanterre. Then to get back from the station to the residence halls, one must pass through the shantytown and empty lots. What one sees on this walk is enough to make one understand why the students who live in Nanterre become *enragés*.

Nanterre is the very model of the kind of blunder that defines a society and a system of government; the lack of foresight, the contempt for people were bound to lead, sooner or later, to rebellion. The population explosion and the sudden increase in the number of students have now brought to a head problems that have existed for 20 years without any attempt to solve them. Now they cry out for solution. After 20 years of thoughtlessness and negligence these problems have become only too real, especially for Nanterre's 4,000 students who must squeeze into lecture halls designed to accommodate 100.

The "university complex" was built at Nanterre because land was available.* No one foresaw what would happen. No one considered the consequences of imposing a university on the area's social life. Moreover, at the very core of the "university complex" an explosive and artificial milieu was created. Nanterre got students from the western sector of Paris, Auteuil and Passy, the richest and most bourgeois parts of the city. And so the "complex" served two distinct categories of students: young people of wealthy families, arriving in the morning and leaving in the evening in their own private cars, and the resident students who live isolated in this desert. The student's life is further warped because there is only the single faculty of letters at Nanterre. Thus they are cut off from all contact with students in the sciences—the sort of contact that, in the Latin Quarter, is easily found in university cafeterias, the streets, and leisure-time activities. And so everything was done to create a false milieu, a life that is artificial and hard to bear.

One must also speak of the methods of instruction at Nanterre, which vary according to the subject. There are 10 assistants to help instruct 150 ethnology students who work in groups of 15; but a professor of psychology has to lecture to 4,000 students. The physical layout of Nanterre points up all the social and intellectual distortions; everything happens in broad daylight and out in the open. One must bear this in mind when one tries to analyze the recent events. Nanterre symbolizes the attitude of a certain technocracy: the indiffer-

* The "university complex" at Nanterre was built in 1964. Like the Sorbonne, it is part of the University of Paris.

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ence, the disregard for human needs, ignorance of the nature of man, and a contempt that does violence to the individual. Here more than anywhere else this contempt, this violence was felt by people who were particularly ready to be resentful. To anyone who knows Nanterre it should come as no surprise that the resident students at Nanterre became *enragés* and that here the revolt began.

BUT WHAT actually happened at Nanterre? Very little really, if one looks back at the sequence of events. A few minor rows, more violent perhaps than others but minor rows all the same. Daniel Cohn-Bendit injured a cabinet minister last December during the inauguration of a swimming pool that remained dry for another six months. And a few professors had trouble giving their courses.

The rows spread to the Sorbonne, and one day the rector of the university, faced with the prospect of yet more serious troubles, called in the police. Who was responsible for this decision? The rector? The cabinet minister? At this time, we still don't know. But one thing is certain: this move caused the situation to explode. There is a profound irony in the observation that by this decision, perhaps simply a stupid blunder, a university authority has placed France in a revolutionary situation such as the country has not experienced for almost 100 years. From the start, the government exhibited the brutality of the weak and the weakness of those who understand nothing. And so within a few days an old system of higher education crumbled to dust, and the contagion spread.

Every institution every authority was called into question and for a moment disappeared altogether: there was no sovereign power no more state, no more government, and there were no more political parties. On the barricades of the Rue Gay-Lussac Cohn-Bendit made a historic speech: "I call upon the working class to join our struggle!" And the working class seemed to respond to this young man whom *L'Humanité* and *Minute* (the Communists and Fascists) described as a "German Jewish agitator."

On May 13—against the party that claimed to represent it, against the trade-union organization that up to now had represented it best—the working class threw itself into a 24-hour strike. But this was only a prelude to another strike—a strike such as France had never seen. Joining the students who sought "student power" in the heart of the universities, the workers refused to limit their demands solely to material betterment. Despite the CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail) which resisted as much as possible, the workers demanded "worker power" in the factories. This is revolution!

But this revolution corresponds to none of the classical forms of revolt bequeathed to us by the nineteenth century. Those have taught us that revolutions are the phenomena marking the transition from one socioeconomic stage to another, permitting a social group to gain access to an economic position heretofore closed to it, or to achieve some other goal. But the revolution of May 1968 was launched by students, a social group that did not and could not make any economic demands. Then the revolution got the support of the workers, and the workers now were faced with a choice: either to maintain their present standard of living, and to accept the existing structure of the society—realizing that this structure would be constantly modified, in order to eliminate, without revolutions, the most shocking inequalities; or to call into question the structure of the present society, which would result in lowering a living standard that is the product of the society and also the result of working-class victories won over the past century.

IT IS possible that the very nature of political power as it has been exercised in France since the war is at the root of these events. In the aftermath of the war and the occupation, the great reforms of 1945 were obtained and implemented without the help of a truly democratic process. It was simply that the conservative forces, which might have opposed them, were too discredited to fight them effectively. Afterwards, the country experienced political instability during a period of rapid economic development. The urgent problem the parliamentary democracy of the Fourth Republic could not solve was that of decolonization. Attempts to deal with that problem collided simultaneously with nationalism on the Right and a certain Jacobinism on the Left. The call to deGaulle began with the jolting realization that decolonization could only be accomplished by an authoritative figure that was unassailable

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from the point of view of classical nationalism.

And so deGaulle established a government that corresponded in fact to what those who had installed him as President had expected of him. Since decolonization could not come about except by forcing the hand of party leaders on the Right and Left, Gaullism developed a mode of government which holds that all political activity is detrimental to the community. This belief gave rise to a constitution and to an exercise of power that had as its basic goal the suppression of all political life in the country. This included even groups supporting Gaullism; they had to suffer the same contempt shown toward non-Gaullist groups. Instead of enlarging the democratization of government—in national politics as well as on the level of local administration, in business, in the management of public services such as radio and the social security system—power has gradually become concentrated to such an extent that all discussion, all debate, all participation (the word is very fashionable) is now impossible.

DeGaulle's denial of all freedom of judgment and discussion, even to his own supporters, has assumed unexpected proportions and has given rise to unexpected consequences. These are exemplified by the reform of the Sécurité Sociale (social security regulations), a reform whose repeal the strikers are demanding.

The permanent deficit in certain sectors of the Sécurité Sociale had for a long time called for some action. I will not discuss here the merits of the measures proposed by the government. Let us merely recall that these proposals include changes in the management of the system's funds that would make it less democratic (since those who pay into the system would no longer have any voice regarding the benefits they receive).

But it is important here to recall the circumstances under which those regulations were issued. Although all indications were that, in taking those necessarily unpopular decisions, the government would have secured, at the very least, the support of its own majority. And this majority, to the extent that it was ever able to express itself, was only too willing to give its support. But the government denied it this opportunity and took what steps it deemed necessary by means of administrative decrees. Why? Because the majority was torn by divisive factions; many Gaullists were critical of the government. In order to reestablish its hold over the majority, the government then decided, over the objections of parliament, to refuse discussion on these ordinances. It thereby provoked the opposition to introduce a motion of censure and so endangered the seats of the Gaullist deputies, since a vote for the motion would have led to the dissolution of the chamber. Now the majority was compelled, by a sort of *coup de force,* to vote for the decrees. In this way, the government demonstrated what it called authority; by these authoritarian measures it set up one of the traps into which it was to fall.

TEN YEARS of this kind of guile and of servility by the majority sufficed to achieve one of the objectives of Gaullism: the suppression of all political life in the country, at least in that institutional setting where it would normally take place.

This Gaullist technique of forcing the hand of the deputies and of the voters (by means of a referendum) brought about the political dichotomy once envisioned by Malraux: the final split of the country into two camps—Gaullists and Communists. But here Gaullism found an ally: the Communist party. The political strategy of crushing the center and liquidating the Social Democrats, of reducing all political activity and confrontations between the forces of progress and reaction, fits exactly into the traditional framework of the Communist party. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Communist party had to wage a campaign against a government with whose foreign policy it was in complete agreement. But at the same time this helped its campaign against the Center and the Left whose "Atlanticism" and Europeanism it found as repugnant as did de Gaulle.

The situation continued to develop in a kind of underground manner until one day the students and the workers rebelled. Then something new came to light, something that had perhaps played a role in the birth of this revolt: the Communist party was shown to be so strongly tied to the government that it began to seem like some sort of official institution—the government's ally and accomplice, which all of a

(continued on page 363)

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Politics and Murder

June 12, 1968

WE DO NOT KNOW why the United States has been subject in the last few years to a wave of political assassinations. Nor do we think anyone else knows.

There is the conspiracy theory, convenient for those who like their disasters neat; but thus far, this theory cannot be entirely dismissed for the same reason it cannot be at all substantiated: the lack of evidence. There is the "contagion" theory, more sophisticated in approach, but less an explanation of the outburst of assassinations than a description of the ways in which they occurred.

What brings the killings into an apparent sequence is the fact that all the victims have been prominent men identified in the public mind with active leadership in or sympathy toward the Negro cause. This lends the accumulation of tragedies a peculiarly sinister cast, for to large numbers of black citizens the causes seem to matter less than the consequences—and who, in this regard, is to say they are wholly wrong? Yet it is quite possible that the link between, say, the assassination of Dr. King and that of Senator Kennedy is "atmospheric"—the same encompassing atmosphere of social disarray and violence enables different persons to act from, or act out, sharply different motives. We may discover that the murder of Dr. King was planned by a group of fanatic white racists; we may discover that the killer of Senator Kennedy had entirely different aims yet that somehow—and the *somehow* is just what is so difficult to pin down—he was enabled to act upon his murderous fantasies because he was living in a social atmosphere that had been shaped by the previous killings and by the violence attendant on racial struggle.

There is no reason to doubt that deranged people—paranoid, fanatic, alienated, or whatever—have been drifting on the margins of our social life for a period of time much longer than that of the recent assassinations. What we need to know is why such people feel encouraged to act upon their hatreds as they did not in the past. Is the notion that we have become a more violent nation an adequate explanation? I doubt it. I doubt that the U.S. is today more violent than it was in the 1930's, when we had at least as much social injustice and brutality as today but not the same kind of political assassinations. In the 1930's this country was torn apart by social struggle; violence occurred in strikes, protest marches, farmers' demonstrations; yet the country did not suffer from the crisis of collective values, the sense of a vague but ominous malaise, in quite the way it does today.

And besides, is "violence" a category that lends itself to easy measurement? How do you determine whether an entire nation is more violent than it was in the past? For that matter, what does it mean or does it mean anything at all to speak of the violence of an entire nation? Is the United States as a nation more violent than the Irish? the French? the Nigerians?

I think it would be good if intellectuals were to resist the kind of generalizations—the generalizations of side-show psychiatrists and telephone sociologists—which can be quoted in the *New York Times* the morning after a disaster. We are told, for example, that our troubles stem from the frontier tradition of lawless individualism. Why then does this tradition operate so much more urgently in 1968 than it did in 1928? And what precisely is the connection between Jesse James and the Jordanian immigrant charged with Senator Kennedy's murder? We are told that the American people (all 200 million) is sick. What discernable meaning can such a statement have, and to what significant consequences can lead? To exercises in collective guilt which will leave our social evils unchallenged (if we are all "sick," how can it

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help to tear down slums or provide decent jobs to Negro youth . . .) but will provide affluent intellectuals with a moral purgation?

There are problems here to study, and they are the kinds of problems that will take close investigation, subtle analysis, patient accumulation of data. But right now, as we draw close to the 1968 election, there are more immediate urgencies.

The murder of Senator Kennedy is not only a tragedy in its own right; it seems likely, at this moment, to make it much easier for the Administration forces to capture the Democratic nomination and thereby confront us with the dismal prospect of a Humphrey-Nixon choice. By late May it began to seem that Humphrey and all he represents could be defeated at the Convention only if both Kennedy and McCarthy were to stay in the race, to work out some partial cooperation, and then join forces at the Convention. That possibility has now been removed, and the probable result is a Humphrey victory. Yet there remains a small chance—and we must all work to make it a large chance—that the supporters of McCarthy, who have already done so many astonishing things, will this time be able to arouse so large and determined an expression of the popular will, that there will be major repercussions within the organizational apparatus of the Democratic party. Unlikely? I suppose so. But that is what has to be tried. And the first prerequisite for such an attempt is that the supporters of Senator McCarthy make certain he is encouraged to keep campaigning independently, without paying attention to the "unity" bait that is likely to be forthcoming from the Humphrey people.

At least as important is the need to keep together in some sort of movement, perhaps as a formal organization, those thousands of young people who threw themselves into the McCarthy campaign and brought new life to American politics. No matter who is elected, we will need the continuing presence and pressure of these young people who form, whether they know it or not, the basis for a new politics of the democratic Left.

It's a bad moment, right now. The air is heavy with death. Withdrawal and despair are predictable consequences. But we think the political struggle is too important to allow for such responses; we think the fight must continue for a politics that will quickly end the Vietnam War; that will sharply realign our social priorities; that will undertake, along the lines of the Freedom Budget, a major campaign to rebuild the cities and bring hope to the ghettos.—I. H.

•

There follows a dispatch from DISSENT editor Arnold Kaufman, who has been active in the McCarthy campaign in California. He wrote his report just as the primaries were closing but before Senator Kennedy was killed. In one sense, therefore, it is sadly dated; but in a more important sense—in its stress upon the need for continuing to fight politically—his article remains entirely to the point. (The Comments by B. J. Widick and Stanley Plastrik were also written before the assassination of Senator Kennedy.)

Arnold S. Kaufman

California Primaries: Disarray Before the Assassination

June 5, 1968

THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE story two days after the Oregon primary was entitled "How McCarthy 'Caught Fire' in Oregon" (through his sharp attacks on Bobby Kennedy, it conjectured). Next to this report, another headline read, "Humphrey Enjoys Oregon—and Counts Delegates."

As a charter member of the Dump-Johnson movement, a principal organizer of the Michigan McCarthy for President Committee, I had understandably mixed feelings as I continued to turn the pages. I came to a full-page McCarthy ad. It was all about Vietnam; how the slaughter must cease; that there had been reports that top military brass had ordered the war to be won "within three months." Very good, I thought. At least the McCarthy ad focuses on a basic issue. It maintains vital pressure on the negotiating process. Above all, it does not emulate the mawkish sentimentality of the half-hour TV plug for Kennedy that I saw in Los Angeles a few nights ago, whose lack of reference to issues and use of the "sainted President's" memo-

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ry had made me ill. McCarthy's staff, it seemed, was not succumbing to campaign madness. And then I read:

> Kennedy was part of the original commitment. He was directly involved in the disaster of the Bay of Pigs. And, as a member of the National Security Council, he must bear a part of the responsibility for our original—and fundamentally erroneous—decision to interfere in Vietnam.
>
> Both Humphrey and Kennedy (and Nixon, Reagan and Rockefeller too) are part and parcel of the kind of thinking about America's role in the world that is leading us on to catastrophe.

This made me mad. Why the hell did the McCarthy people have to lie, just like all the others? Oh, not a bald-faced lie; just one of those subtle lies of implication.

I remembered the Congressional anti-Vietnam lobby that had been organized in Washington in April of 1965. It was little more than a month after the escalation began, little less than a month before the National Teach-in. Robert Kennedy had encouraged the groups that invited him to press on with their work. I remembered the hard-hitting antiwar speeches he began to make in 1965, long before McCarthy spoke out. I remembered that McCarthy had not even shown up when the first Fulbright-Rusk confrontation took place in early fall of 1965. A member of the Foreign Relations Committee, McCarthy supported the President's policy at that time. I remembered also that Robert Kennedy had publicly accepted his share of the responsibility for the disaster in Vietnam, had confessed to error.

Robert Kennedy is not my ideal, I thought; but neither is Eugene McCarthy. His vanity and pride are just as capable of wrecking us as Kennedy's ambition and insensitivity. Yet both men could make good Presidents. There is reason to hope that either would redirect American energies away from pursuits of war, away from the arms race, and toward the building of a better America.

Personally, I think McCarthy would make the better President. He displayed courage when he responded to the call for a candidate. I like his air of calm reason, his intellectual grasp of complex issues, the hint of burning moral passion that occasionally slips through his intellectual guard. And I disliked the crude way in which Kennedy decided to enter the race. But despite McCarthy's superior virtues, either man would be vastly superior to Humphrey—not just because of what each is, *but because of what each represents in terms of prevailing social forces.*

I reread a clipping my friend Jack Gore had sent from Colorado. "McCarthy, RFK Coalition "Stops" Drive for Hubert," was the headline. Gore and the head of the McCarthy campaign in Colorado, George Williams, had organized, with Kennedy people, a group effort, precinct by precinct—together they had shut out the Humphrey forces in the first balloting. In Denver, three McCarthy and three Kennedy delegates had been elected. None for Humphrey. They also did very well in subsequent balloting. McCarthy and Kennedy leaders in Colorado kept their perspective. But that state sends only 35 delegates to the Convention. In Pennsylvania and Ohio, Hubert was raking them up.

The next day, in the *Los Angeles Times,* I read that McCarthy had said he would not bow out of the race regardless of what happened in the California primary or in the period before the Convention. He had, he explained, made commitments to those who asked him to run. Moreover, on the Sunday news program after the "great debate" he said that, between Humphrey and Kennedy, he at present had no preference.

I remembered the meeting Zolton Ferency, Al Lowenstein, and I had in my home in Ann Arbor just before Al went off to Washington to ask McCarthy to run. I remembered our discussion of what we called "The Kennedy Problem." We decided it would not be a bad thing to have that problem on our hands. Our aim was to stop the war and to re-order national priorities. And of course we never supposed that Johnson would drop out.

I looked at the photo of the first airport demonstration for McCarthy that we organized in Detroit's Metropolitan airport in early November. There was my wife holding a McCarthy for President sign. We were a lonely band. We had had one devil of a time rounding up all of a hundred people. And I thought, Dammit, she had never asked him to continue to run no matter what. Nor had Zolton or Al. Nor had any of the 50 state Democratic leaders who met and

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formed the first McCarthy organization on November 11. We had asked the Senator to try to stop Johnson, to try to stop the war, to try to re-order national priorities, to breathe new life into the American political process. We had never requested that he pursue the Presidency regardless of consequences, regardless of contingencies. Rather we hoped and expected that he would pursue it *as long as it was useful to do so in behalf of the aims and values we shared.*

Certainly, SANE's National Board, when it became the first independent organization to support McCarthy, offered its help in that spirit.

If by some miracle, McCarthy wins the nomination, those of us who feel as I do will be elated. We'll work our hearts out for him. But if Kennedy takes the nomination, we'll be no less energetic. That this is so is something we have somehow failed to communicate to McCarthy. And our failure is a measure of the electoral disaster that impends.

Our problem—those of us who are against the Johnson Administration and its heirs—is to make sure that anxieties about the consequences of an endless McCarthy-Kennedy battle are stilled. Humphrey can perhaps still be stopped. The problem is not very different from the one facing the peace insurgency in New Hampshire—to convince the pros that they can't win with an Administration candidate. Our opponents are only slightly different: Johnson then, Humphrey now. The difficulties are a bit greater with Humphrey because he has somewhat more credibility, certainly fewer enemies, than Johnson. By the same token, however, he has less power and must make the fight under a very considerable handicap: that he has slavishly and joyously served as the Administration's chief salesman.

The one thing Humphrey and his supporters must be made to understand is that—come what may, no matter who wins the nomination and the election—those of us who have made surprising things happen in the recent past will continue to make them happen in the future. Out of the debacle of the Johnson Administration is rising a new breed of indefatigable radical-liberals—people who'd rather be right than winners but who have the will, energy, and savvy to be both.

Joseph Buttinger

Can the Negotiations Bring Peace to Vietnam?

THE REALITIES of the Vietnam War, long disregarded by Washington, are at last beginning to assert themselves. That the other side—the NLF and Hanoi—could not achieve a military victory has long been clear. The surprising strength displayed by the enemy in the Tet offensive, and the military, political, and psychological advantages gained through it, have not altered this fact. But the Tet offensive has once more demonstrated that the war cannot be won by the "allies" either.

This, so it seems, President Johnson has at last begun to realize. His longing for peace has no doubt always been genuine, as was his desire to bring it about through negotiations. But until very recently his idea of peace was a political settlement based on a military victory. Unless we believe that the President's steps to bring about negotiations, and his announced retirement, are merely the first moves of a colossal political fraud, then we must speak of a new situation. Even excessive caution, well advised in judging this man, would allow the conclusion that Johnson is now at least *considering* the abandonment of the course he has pursued in Vietnam since the summer of 1964.

What came to one's mind when Johnson's new proposal for negotiations was accepted by Hanoi was the question of responsibility for the failure of all previous attempts to reach this point. It would be absurd to conclude that the Hanoi government has finally been brought to its knees. At no time since U.S. military intervention began has the enemy been in a stronger position than today. Why, then, is he now ready to talk, after his alleged rejection of so many previous offers? I am convinced that the evidence of U.S. responsibility for all previous failures to bring about talks will soon come to light. In the meantime, we can safely base our belief that it was Johnson who kept Hanoi from coming to the conference table on the fact that Hanoi came as soon as Johnson no longer made it impossible for them to do so—as soon as he indicated that he no longer expected them to negotiate the conditions of

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their surrender. It was Johnson's change of policy, foreshadowed in his refusal to send another 200,000 U.S. soldiers to Vietnam, that created the basis for the beginning of talks. Without better assurances than those contained in all previous "peace" offers, Hanoi would undoubtedly not have gone to Paris.

For this reason it is correct to assume, as quite a few people in Washington do, that the President, in announcing his new readiness to seek peace through negotiations, had some "foreknowledge" that this time Hanoi would agree. It was up to Johnson, as it had always been, whether peace talks would come about. Ho Chi Minh must have become convinced that Johnson is finally ready to compromise.

This readiness has now removed the obstacle which, even if talks had started, would have doomed them in advance. But this does not mean that these talks will necessarily produce results. They will probably not break up soon. The talks could open only after a long, secret struggle over procedures and even perhaps over substantial matters, matters that had to be settled if the feeble prospect of success was to survive the expected initial barrage of propaganda and recriminations.

ALTHOUGH THE SUCCESS of the talks will require a willingness to compromise by both sides, *the prospects for peace will in the end depend almost entirely on the attitude of the United States.* Washington will have to agree to an unconditional cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam. The prospect of achieving this aim brought the Hanoi delegation to Paris, and unless Hanoi's expectation is fulfilled, no serious negotiations can take place.

Once serious negotiations begin, there will be a chance of producing a settlement only if Washington realizes that the U.S., although militarily undefeated, has suffered an irreparable political defeat which peace, whenever it comes, will have to sanction. The aim of the United States, pursued long before there was any kind of "aggression" against South Vietnam, was to determine the character of the South Vietnamese government and to prevent, in disregard of the letter and spirit of the Geneva agreements, the unification of the country. Since the Vietcong cannot be defeated, and since Hanoi cannot be forced to desert the Vietcong, the U.S. can no longer hope to attain this unrealistic goal. This means that sooner or later, but certainly in the course of any serious negotiations, the Thieu-Ky government, even in its new "broadened" form, will have to be dropped. This government was the political instrument of the U.S. as long as Washington pursued a policy of military victory and of the exclusion of the NLF from power. If the President's speech of March 31 marked a turn from the policy of military victory to one of political compromise, then the present Saigon regime must be regarded as doomed.

The progress of negotiations, however, does not require that the Thieu-Ky government be immediately replaced by one composed of representatives of the present regime and some members of the NLF—the so-called coalition that strikes such terror into the hearts of the men in Washington who claim that the presence of even a few NLF members (who are said to lack popular support) in such a government would quickly lead to a Communist takeover. The truth is that on this and other issues the NLF and Hanoi are both more able and willing to compromise than Washington. The NLF cannot and will not insist that a coalition government conduct the negotiations for South Vietnam, let alone on its being the "sole representative" of the South Vietnamese people in such negotiations. Its demand is to be represented in Paris together with spokesmen of a non-Communist Saigon government that no longer stands for a military solution and for a total denial of NLF representation in any *future* government.

The coalition government issue therefore will not be an obstacle to meaningful negotiations; but unless Washington moves toward political compromise, it will certainly be the major obstacle to any meaningful agreement. It could be said that there is only one question for which the proper answer has to be found in negotiations: What kind of South Vietnam should emerge from the conflict? Reduced to its simplest terms, the NLF's only war aim has been participation in political power—precisely what U.S. military intervention attempted to prevent. *The condition of peace, therefore, is acceptance by Washington of this demand.* Unless Johnson fully realizes this, the talks are bound to fail. It is the political trump card of the NLF that it

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can quite easily agree to cease the armed struggle in favor of free elections, but it will agree to elections only if they are conducted under a government of national union. The NLF cannot and will not accept elections organized by a government in which it is not represented, a government determined to prevent the Front from gaining what it has fought for—a share in power.

Elections, of course, can be held only after negotiations have produced a cease-fire and agreement on the four issues that have to be settled if peace is to come to Vietnam: the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the demobilization of the Vietcong military forces, the right of the NLF parties to participate freely in the political life of South Vietnam, and the terms under which South and North will eventually be reunified. In all these respects, the position of the Front is stronger than that of its opponents, since it can make concessions without compromising its ultimate aims. Neither the NLF nor Hanoi insists any longer on an immediate and complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces as a condition for a settlement. This, they now say, cannot be done overnight. From statements by delegates of the Front and Hanoi made earlier this year at a conference at Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, it is clear that they accept a gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces, as well as supervision of the cease-fire by an international police force supplied "by a number of powers." (See the article by the Vietnamese journalist Tran Van Ky in the March 1968 issue of *War/Peace Report.*) The withdrawal of the North Vietnamese soldiers fighting in the South can proceed without damage to the position of the Front once the U.S. has ceased its military operations: their troops would never have been needed if the war had not been "Americanized" in 1965.

A MORE DIFFICULT problem will be the demobilization of the Vietcong military units. It can come about only after the armed forces of the present regime cease to be controlled by a government determined to deny legal existence to the NLF, and instead will be controlled by a government with NLF representation.

Far less difficult should be an agreement on the issue of reunification. The leaders of the Front, for obvious propagandistic reasons, stress their independence from Hanoi—which in this context means that unification must come about through a decision of the people of South Vietnam without outside (Hanoi) interference, and that in the meantime a separate state of South Vietnam is acceptable to them. I do not doubt that they will agree, as will Hanoi, to postpone a decision on this issue for at least five years, provided the United States pledges not to interfere with the results of a referendum, if, as seems likely, this should lead to a reunified Vietnam dominated by Hanoi and its allies in the South. The latitude for concessions enjoyed by the Communists in regard to this issue will make it easy for them to compromise. The force of nationalism, generally recognized as prevailing over all others in contemporary power struggles, is on the side of the NLF and Hanoi. The fusion of nationalism and Communism in Vietnam, which could perhaps have been dissolved by a genuine social revolution in the South, continues to operate to the detriment of the anti-Communist forces. Time was once on the side of the latter, but time was wasted and finally became an ally of their enemies, who will know how to use it as soon as the contest of arms ends and peaceful competition for support of the people begins.

Because these are the true prospects for the political evolution of South Vietnam, the Communists and their allies can go far in offering democratic safeguards that lessen the fear of an early take-over by a pro-Hanoi regime. They can easily risk the verdict of elections, even if they should know that they cannot hope to win them. If international supervision and a balance of power in the government between pro-Communist, anti-Communist, and neutralist forces lead to truly free elections, the NLF can be sure of a strong representation in a new parliament and claim its rightful share in a government established through democratic process.

It is then that the specter of a united Vietnam under Communist leadership will arise. But not because the Communists and their allies will try to take power in a coup. The means at their disposal, and the conditions of the country, make it possible for them to dispense with a technique necessary only where conditions doom Communists to remain a minority, and possible only under the shield of a friendly occupation army. The Communists can safely

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rely on their own strength to gain power, as well as on the political deficiencies of their opponents. The number of dedicated people in their ranks far surpasses those willing to work selflessly for the groups behind the present Saigon regime. No one doubts their superior organizational ability, nor that the prospect of achieving the dream of national unity will continue to be identified with their movement. The attraction of Vietnamese anti-Communism, identified with foreign intervention against national unity, will continue to decline. Corruption and political disarray will increase under the present Saigon regime, up to the moment when less discredited yet hardly more capable spokesmen of anti-Communism will be called upon to represent Saigon at the conference table, in a predictable mood of defeatism—a mood that has been taking hold of broad circles of South Vietnamese anti-Communists ever since President Johnson's historic speech of March 31.

IF THESE are the prospects, how can we expect Johnson, even if we believe that he would like to end the war before leaving office, to ratify a peace that will lead to "another victory of Communism"? If he obtains the compromise that I believe Hanoi and the NLF can afford, I hold the President capable of "proving" that the U.S. has achieved its purpose, since it has forced the Communists to abandon their attempt to impose themselves on the people of South Vietnam by force. The settlement, Johnson will say, that we achieved through our intervention will oblige the Communists henceforth to pursue their aims by peaceful means, in democratic competition with all other political groups and parties of the South. Not only insurrection but also "aggression from abroad" was defeated: Hanoi has to withdraw its troops and let the people of South Vietnam decide for themselves whether and when they want to be united with the North. In short, American intervention has led to the triumph of the principle of self-determination, which has always been America's only aim.

In a more sophisticated vein, a new Administration in Washington could base its acceptance of a compromise that sanctions America's political defeat on a realistic rereading of recent Vietnamese history. Such a rereading would show that Vietnam was already lost to Communism at the end of World War II, four years before China became Communist, and without the presence of a single soldier of the Red Army; that the war waged by France to reestablish her colonial regime in Indochina must be regarded as the first attempt to undo the fact of Communist supremacy in Vietnam; that the loss of this war by France, and the Geneva agreements, reconfirmed the victory of Communism; and that it would have been wise for America to recognize this historical fact instead of making another attempt to undo it. There really never was any good reason why the U.S. should want to control the political evolution of South Vietnam.

A final and deep concern of all Americans who are ready to accept a compromise settlement, even if it leads to an eventual victory of Hanoi, is the fate of those who have sided with the U.S. and are thought to be in danger once the Americans withdraw. There should be no question that some people have a right to expect American assistance in seeking asylum. There are also many in the government, the army, and the strange business community of South Vietnam who liked the war because it made them rich, and who already now have begun to gravitate toward their fat bank accounts abroad; they will know how to save themselves in good time. But it cannot be denied that more than 20 years of war and civil war have created hatreds and desires for revenge that are likely to claim numerous victims, even if the victors, as is to be hoped, will see their political advantages in curbing further bloodshed. Indeed, the very conditions of a compromise settlement make it most unlikely that the assumption of power by the NLF, if and when it occurs, would lead to a bloodbath. It may be years before a government of national union will be replaced by one under Communist control: years during which the desire to gain the support of former opponents will militate against the wish to settle old political accounts, and probably also years before the international police force needed to supervise the cease-fire will be withdrawn. During these years, it will be more important for the Communists to win the political support of the Catholics (for instance) than to antagonize them by threatening

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the lives of their leaders. It is safe to assume that even under the worst of circumstances a Communist victory will claim fewer victims than a single month of continued war.

It depends now on America, much more than on Hanoi and the NLF, whether the war will be brought to an end in the Paris negotiations. It is possible that these negotiations will succeed. One hopes no need will arise to discuss the consequence that would result from their failure.

B. J. Widick

The Split Deepens In the Trade Unions

SCHISMS WITHIN the trade unions reflect the fragmentation of American politics. Sooner or later policy differences, personal ambitions, and personality antagonisms were bound to set George Meany and Walter Reuther on a collision course. Working within the framework of an AFL–CIO hierarchy dominated by Meany has been as frustrating to Reuther as life is for Bobbie Kennedy under the Johnson Administration.

The May convention of the UAW gave its leaders carte blanche to go it alone. By 1969, barring a completely unexpected turn of events, there will be three power centers in the trade unions. The UAW's 1.6 million members will be bolstered by another 500,000 unonists almost immediately. The rubber workers, chemical workers, and the American Federation of Government Employees might also join Reuther. A second focal point will be the 1.9 million members of the teamsters' union, its growth unimpaired by being cast out from the AFL–CIO. The two largest and perhaps most significant unions would then be outside the AFL–CIO.

Fluidity will replace the monolithic facade of American labor and will seriously challenge George Meany's claim that he speaks as the voice of unionism.

This is more than a mere power struggle. During the past decade Meany has totally isolated Reuther in the AFL–CIO hierarchy, which is another way of saying that Reuther was foiled in every attempt, whether adequate or not, to recast the AFL–CIO in a more liberal and dynamic direction.

In temperament, outlook, and philosophy George Meany fits into the Johnson camp. Reuther, by contrast, belongs more naturally to the Kennedy wing of the Democratic party. For Meany "unconditional support" of President Johnson's war policies wasn't debatable, and AFL–CIO conventions were dominated by that theme. On the other hand, Reuther called for an end to the bombing of North Vietnam. Meany, a few years ago, demanded that the U.S. resume nuclear testing, while Reuther missed the meeting of the AFL–CIO council which adopted that policy.

While Reuther seeks a probing dialogue with delegations from Eastern European countries and UAW officials explore contacts with restive unionists behind the Iron Curtain, Meany bristles with hostility over any such ideas. Meany downgrades efforts to seek feelers in the East, while Reuther understands why Western European unions want to lessen cold-war hostilities.

On the American scene Reuther has viewed with tolerance some peace movements, including labor's Assembly for Peace in which Emil Mazey, secretary-treasurer of the UAW, and Victor Reuther, head of the UAW's international affairs department, have been active. Meany, in a ghastly statement, denounced the November meeting of over 500 American trade unionists as "Hanoi-inspired."

GENUINE UNITY BETWEEN Meany and Reuther is impossible for many reasons, but the basic one is a difference in judgment on the role of American trade unions. For Meany, the AFL—CIO is "a more vital, more vigorous and effective force for progress today than ever before in its history."

In Reuther's analysis the AFL-CIO has become "the comfortable, complacent custodian of the status quo." Nor has Reuther forgotten how Meany and the AFL-CIO council refused to endorse the historic March on Washington in 1963, just one of the major decisions Meany made against Reuther's pleas for more sensitivity and support to the struggles of Negroes.

After resigning from the AFL-CIO council Reuther remarked, "I couldn't do anything in that prison. Now I am a free agent. I can say what I choose and do what I choose. I tried for 11 years to persuade them to march and I couldn't. Now I am talking to the whole labor movement." (*Detroit Free Press*, May 10, 1967).

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America's trade unions now have a voice of dissent, one that is too powerful to be dismissed or ignored. The challenge of Reuther's programs or ideas can no longer be buried beneath votes of the AFL-CIO council.

It was in keeping with Reuther's character and views that he would march in Memphis after Dr. King's assassination, and aid the garbage strikers, while Meany simply sent an assistant to represent him. It was natural for Reuther to provide substantial help to the agricultural workers long before the AFL-CIO leaders recognized the valuable work of Cesar Chavez.

Not that unionism as usual, the Meany approach, has been unsuccessful. The unions are richer, have better contracts, and are more thoroughly integrated into the working of society than ever in the past. But in times of change, this isn't enough: new social forces and problems appear, with which the old-line unionists are ill-equipped to deal, and therefore the sympathies which the unions once found among students, intellectuals, and middle-class liberals are all but evaporated. Reuther feels this acutely; Meany hardly cares. There is the difference.

The unions are in far more disarray than Meany is willing to concede—although it must be said that the political action report at the 1967 AFL-CIO convention candidly discussed why labor's role in the 1968 elections would be more difficult than in previous elections. The report cited three factors:

1. Unless there is a dramatic change in the situation in Vietnam, the war will continue to be a divisive issue. (Labor leaders, including Reuther, really thought Senator McCarthy would get only 10 to 15 per cent of the New Hampshire vote, a reflection of how distant they have become from grass-roots attitudes. And Kennedy's entry into the Presidential race has shaken them up even more.)

2. Public hostility toward legitimate civil-rights progress will almost certainly stiffen as a result of urban violence. Slowing or discounting such progress can, in turn, only increase the desperation and alienation of impoverished minorities.

3. In the big population states, where there are decisive blocs of electoral votes, important statewide elections, and a considerable number of close House races, there is a good deal of lethargy and factionalism within the unions.

More than nuances are involved in the different approaches to the Democratic-party Presidential race. No one was more shocked by the abdication by President Johnson than the AFL-CIO leaders. By contrast, the UAW stance of "neutrality" was calculated to give Kennedy indirect encouragement. The UAW invited McCarthy, Kennedy, Humphrey, and Nelson Rockefeller to address the recent convention—a good democratic idea. The Meany forces wouldn't consider such a proposal. Meany is for Humphrey, and that settles that. For Humphrey is considered a man in Johnson's political camp, and Meany believes firmly in all the Johnson policies, including those which made the President so unpopular.

The combination of Southern Democrats (it's not considered polite to call them Dixiecrats anymore), the trade-union bureaucracy, the party machinery and delegates are supposed to be the basis of Humphrey's nomination. However, the excellent showing Kennedy made in working-class areas in Indiana and Nebraska suggests that the union leaders have even less political influence among the ranks than before. The winds of discontent upon which Kennedy seeks to capitalize are just those Reuther sees as driving toward a new direction in American politics and in the trade unions.

It's a pity that Senator McCarthy turned down the invitation to speak to nearly 3,000 UAW delegates, for it indicates a blind spot in his understanding of American politics. To ignore unions with millions of members is to neglect one of the most powerful forces in American society. Even a simple calculation in respect to the Michigan delegation should have persuaded McCarthy that it was worth his time talking to a convention of the largest and most progressive trade union in the country. As it happens, both Humphrey and Kennedy did poorly when they spoke, and McCarthy might have been able to make some unexpected political gains.

IF WALTER REUTHER uses his new independence to revitalize and strengthen the liberal wing of the Democratic party; if his programmatic challenges to AFL-CIO complacency shakes up the union movement; if he continues his aid to agricultural and other low-paid workers—then his split with Meany may release some of the potential in the unions for both social renewal and organizational growth.

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Clearly this is his aim. Perhaps the high point of the UAW convention—revealing the difference between the UAW and most other unions–came when Reuther fervently replied to some white racists within the UAW who criticized him for marching in Memphis and giving the garbage workers $50,000 for their strike fund. Reuther denounced the local unions who threatened a walk-out because companies had placed the American flag at half-mast to mourn Rev. Martin Luther King's death.

Reuther's vigorous statement in support of the poor, the exploited, and of the Negro struggle for human rights and jobs was given a standing ovation by the delegates. It was a refreshing incident in these times of race polarization and hysteria. I don't think something quite like this could happen at any other large union convention, with delegates from shops throughout America. A more typical AFL-CIO reaction would be first to deny the extent of racism, and then to handle the issue more cautiously.

Unquestionably, most of the votes in the AFL-CIO belong to George Meany. But the future, if labor is again to play a vigorous social role, may belong to the man from Detroit.

Stanley Plastrik

ADA Takes a Step Toward the Left

PERHAPS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT thing to be said about the May 1968 convention of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) was its revived spirit and liveliness, particularly impressive to one who had witnessed the factional bickering of the previous year's convention. ADA has proved to itself that an act of political courage and imagination, even if timidly undertaken, can convert a largely moribund organization into one with some semblance of life and a possible future. The February executive board's decision, by a vote of 65 to 47, to endorse Senator McCarthy for President, had not only proven a worthwhile risk but had brought a measure of self-confidence to the several hundred delegates.

The punitive withdrawal from ADA of the ILGWU and other labor organizations after the February endorsement of McCarthy has certainly not proved fatal up to this point. All regretted this withdrawal, yet most delegates felt ADA has passed the test of its inner political crisis. Delegates were delighted by reports that the organization had recruited many thousands of new, younger, individual members; that new chapters and groups had been started and, perhaps most astonishing of all, that ADA's treasury was solvent and its bills were paid. Most felt that John Kenneth Galbraith, elected chairman of ADA at the previous convention, was providing responsible leadership.

The keynote address of the new national chairman was poorly reported in the national press. Most stress was placed on those sections of the Galbraith speech dealing with the election campaign and particularly on the section that, while urging reendorsement of McCarthy, expressed the wish that the door to an eventual support of Kennedy be kept open. The more thoughtful and thematic content of the speech was largely lost. Galbraith is a sensitive political man who recognizes that we have entered a dimly-lit phase in history where great events will be, so to speak, our daily experience, and where hopes for a democratic future are coupled with equally great dangers. Pointing out that historians will "celebrate these last months as a time of brilliant change," Galbraith emphasized that support for the war in Vietnam had evaporated once the opposition channelized its efforts in the political arena.

But, added Galbraith,

> More than support of the Vietnam war has been a casualty of this season of discontent. The mood of questioning has been worldwide. *Perhaps not since* 1848 *has there been anything so universal.* It extends from New York to Paris and on to Rome, Berlin, Prague, Warsaw and Moscow. No industrial community is exempt. Let us not suppose because goals are confused or reactions extreme that nothing is wrong. The labor movement was born out of the confessed objectives of anarchists, socialists, and reformist trade unions . . .
>
> I would sense that there is a revolt against conformity—against the comfortable man of well-padded mind . . . It is a revolt against what may one day be called the politics of convenience . . .

Warning that foreign policy is "the ambush

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of American liberalism," Galbraith pointed out that "there is, in fact, no practical difference between the conservative reaction in foreign policy and reactionary conservatism in domestic policy." (One of the themes harped upon at the convention was the need for a completely new Administration, a theme evincing great hostility to support for Humphrey except as a final hapless alternative).

Galbraith clearly rejected the premises of American foreign policy since 1945, this observer would say, including those that motivated the Kennedy Administration. Galbraith urged his organization to realize that the universal "revolution" he foresaw would mean that liberals must be prepared to enter "new areas of activity." It seemed an appropriate note in view of the Poor People's march then assembling in Resurrection City, the college upheaval, and the urban-ghetto crisis.

ADA HAS GENERALLY SHOWN a particular awareness of domestic issues and problems; in fact, during the period of its relative success in influencing policies and decisions, it was precisely ADA's ability to offer concrete domestic legislation that probably accounted for such success. In line with this, the current convention showed its sensitivity to the "urban crisis"—the key issue in American life—by the intensity of its discussion on such matters as guaranteed annual wage, negative income tax, ghetto housing, family subsidies, community control over education, and the legalization of "pot." The domestic agenda for the next 1 or 20 years clearly will be dominated by these issues; any movement failing to place them on its priority list is bound to miss the boat. My own sense of the discussion which took place was not so much an appreciation of its level or depth—in fact, it was rather skimpy and superficial—but rather that ADA had taken the first step away from the traditional liberal center. This is all to the good and welcome.

Finally, Vietnam. A last-ditch fight by the Administration defenders in the Foreign Policy Commission came to naught; the Commission voted them down by 19 to 3. Reiterating ADA opposition to the war in a brief preamble, the resolution urged the immediate resignation of Dean Rusk and other officials who had opposed negotiations. More important, the resolution proposed a series of actions to be taken by our government:

1) Immediate and unconditional cessation of bombing and any offensive actions against North Vietnam.

2) A proposal at Paris for immediate ceasefire; no more American troops to be sent and an end to all military actions.

3) Participation by *all* parties (U.S., South and North Vietnam, NLF) in the negotiations; formation of a representative coalition government in the South.

Other proposals deal with long-range reconstruction efforts, steps toward eventual reunification of the country, etc. Essentially, this is the program Senator McCarthy has been pushing throughout the country.

One swallow doesn't make a summer, nor one convention a renewed movement. But I think it fair to say that ADA has taken a step forward, away from its sojourn in official and uncombative liberalism, and toward that renewal of liberal-radicalism or radical-liberalism that is so essential for this country. There's still a long way to go, but a step *has* been taken.

Vaclav Holesovsky

The Struggle Continues In Czechoslovakia

AS OF LATE JUNE the Czechoslovak democratic revolution has managed to survive the first attempts at its liquidation. It has become clear that the revolutionary process cannot be brought down by Soviet military threats. The Dubcek leadership has not yielded to any "persuasion" Kosygin used during his peculiar Karlsbad cure last May. As if to dramatize its resistance, the Central Committee of the Communist party was busy suspending Antonin Novotny and a few of his followers even as Soviet army units were entering Czechoslovakia, ahead of schedule, for Warsaw-Pact maneuvers.

Right now one can conclude that

1) the Soviet Union finds a quick and brutal suppression unsuitable;
2) the Dubcek leadership has been sufficiently

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involved in the revolutionary process so that he and his allies now find their future dependent on the democratic forces;

3) Dubcek has weapons of counterpressure and blackmail at his disposal and can use them efficiently;

4) Czechoslovakia is in for a war of nerves that may continue for a number of years. The possibility of sudden reversals is still a real one.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary process in Czechoslovakia begins to follow a historical pattern. It is leaving the initial stage of spontaneity and the massive release of pent-up tensions. It is entering the next stage, marked by struggle for legal and institutional consolidation of *de facto* democratic conquests. The population is asking for guarantees for the unhampered exercise of basic democratic freedoms. True, there has been relatively little interference with freedom of expression on the printed page and with the upsurge of political activity outside the established framework. However, the censors have not been fired; legislation governing publications has not been abolished; legislation forbidding unsupervised associations remains on the books; the future political role of non-Communists—who have created a network of "Clubs of Committed Non-Party Men"—is being handled gingerly and with obvious embarrassment on the part of Communist officials, including the "liberals." The raw and boundless political energy of the population has so far prevented any backsliding toward even partial reconsolidation of the old oppression, and *not* any decision of the top government officials.

What has free speech been free about these last months? Only one major topic has been taboo, or almost taboo: international ties to Warsaw Pact countries, and to the Soviet Union in particular. Otherwise, every aspect of past and present is being reexamined. The horrors and monstrosities of the defunct system are being uncovered, case by case. Grizzly experiences of citizens, victims of the secret police, are being told for the first time. Here is a typical story from a flood of "letters to the editor":

> After the war I returned to Czechoslovakia, having served in the Czechoslovak Army unit in the Soviet Union. I took a job with the State Security Police in Kosice. After years of struggles and suffering I was bitterly disappointed to see the injustices being perpetrated on the population. When I was on duty guarding prisoners, for instance, I received the order to push a prisoner off the window sill while he was cleaning windows and to report his fall as suicide. Because I did not obey I was accused of unreliability and fired. Then, after a lengthy search for a job I was given a farm for which I had to pay 15,000 crowns. Soon I was made to understand, by insinuation, that I had fought in the Soviet Union only in order to save my life. In 1951 I had to hand my farm over to a state farm, and declare that I was giving it up voluntarily. (—*Zemedelske noviny*, April 2, 1968.)

Unshackeled journalists have been uncovering details on the secret machinery of the totalitarian state. The prosecutor of the show trials of the fifties, Urvalek, is being subjected to interviews on his role; his answers are taken apart and can be compared with the memoirs of Rudolf Slansky's wife. Readers of the trade-union daily *Prace* (May 4) are treated to an exact description of mail inspection:

> Employees called it the X-ray room. Those who worked there, behind a door without a handle, bound by a strict vow never to reveal what they knew, called it the "special room." Special it was—until March 26. That day marks its disappearance down to the small window, covered by a black wooden screen, under which four employees of the secret department of the post office passed to unknown hands behind the wall as many letters as the hands asked for.

Rude pravo, the Party organ, requests a full investigation not only of past crimes but of the current number and status of political prisoners and penal institutions, with the aim of abolishing the notion of political crime altogether. It is apparent that the call for liberty has not been a general slogan but a multi-level and practical operation, conducted by society for the elimination of instruments of terror.

THE QUESTION has often been asked whether Alexander Dubcek is an *apparatchik* hoisted by the force of historical circumstances into an essentially uncongenial role, or a *bona fide* democrat and revolutionary, hatched by the *apparat* and deliberately subverting the totalitarian system from his position within that system. The right answer may be that he has gone through a transformation from the former into something resembling the latter. The former stage, that of a tool of historical circumstances, has

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been well summarized by Paul Barton, writing in *New Politics*:

> The extent to which the Dubcek leadership asserts its authority depends entirely on its recognition of the breakdown of the Party apparatus. By tolerating the disrespect of censorship, by stating that the Party would no longer interfere with the management of factories, by proclaiming that the task of the unions is to defend workers' interests, by promising a speedy investigation and revision of political trials, the new leadership creates, more or less, the illusion that it is busy dismantling the totalitarian power apparatus. What it is really doing is publicly accepting the *consequences* of its breakdown.

However, there are signs that in the course of this process the leading actors have been playing their role more and more willingly. After having tasted the fruits of freedom, they seem to be enjoying it, together with the rest of the population. They see that freedom and safety for Communists is inseparable from the freedom and safety of everybody else. The spontaneous exuberance of the May Day parade, with happy improvised exchanges between the marching men and the main reviewing stand, was profoundly symbolic. *"Of our own free will—for the first time!"* read one banner. *"Don't let it freeze over!"* called an unknown marcher. Dubcek, using his hand as megaphone, called back: *"How could we, as long as you keep stirring it up!"*

Whatever the subjective mood of the Dubcek leadership, the decisive factor for the future will remain the strength of the democratic transformation of social institutions. The reconstruction of a free and authentic trade union movement, within or next to the ruins of the totalitarian pseudo-unions, has been a good sign. During early spring there was uncertainty as to workers' attiudes. The intellectual spokesmen of the revolution seemed unsure as to whether the working class understood its stake in the reconquest of democratic freedoms. This uncertainty seems to have been fed by the attempts of conservative Communists to provoke a little pogrom against intellectuals among factory workers. No doubt, the spring events created a crisis in the thinking of workers, confused by 20 years of exploitation combined with flattery about being the "ruling class." Nevertheless, the response of labor to the suspension of totalitarian controls was the classic one: *a powerful drive for the reestablishment of autonomous organizations fitted to the specific interests of the workers.* This trend is apparent in the practical elimination from power of the old trade-union confederation, strengthening the independence of industrial and craft federations, founding of completely new trade-union federations by representatives convened from the entire territory of a state, and a series of well-organized local strikes for well-defined objectives.

In a long perspective, the issue in Czechoslovakia has been the reconquest of political democracy by society, i.e., the legal state—a necessary prerequisite for the solution of society's problems at other levels. What is happening in Czechoslovakia is but another in the long chain of revolts and revolutions, from Kronstadt 1921 through the present, which has been the labor of oppressed humanity seeking to unblock the road to progress from the consequences of the October Revolution.

In Forthcoming Issues:

PORTRAIT IN EBONY — by Walter Goodman

LEARNING HOW TO LEARN — by Deborah Meier

THE OTHER ECONOMY — by Barry Bluestone

THE UNIVERSITY CRISIS:

COLUMBIA — by Albert Fried

STONY BROOK — by Thomas Brooks

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Arnold S. Kaufman

Selective Objection to War

THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION to particular wars agitates thoughtful Americans as never before. In its report to the President, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service unanimously sustained the present system of granting exemptions to absolute pacifists, but by majority vote overruled proposals to exempt selective conscientious objectors. My aim is to show that neither in logic nor morality is there a basis for this judgment. Either legal exemption ought to be widened to embrace *all* who conscientiously oppose killing in a given war, or the legal right ought to be abolished altogether.

This conclusion will not satisfy those who, like myself, believe that *all* conscientious objectors ought to be exempted. Though I suggest a general defense of this position, I do not develop the argument in this essay. Yet something is gained if those already convinced that absolute pacifists ought to be legally recognized will admit that there is no longer a reasoned basis for refusing the same status to selective conscientious objectors.

The Commission Majority's Arguments

THE COMMISSION'S MAJORITY offers four basic arguments against legal exemption of selective conscientious objectors:

1. THE MAJORITY SAYS:

> *It is one thing to deal in law with a person who believes he is responding to a moral imperative outside of himself when he opposes all killing. It is another to accord a special status to a person who believes there is a moral imperative which tells him he can kill under some circumstances and not kill under others.*

While the meaning of this is not entirely clear, the operative expression seems to be "moral imperative outside of himself." The most plausible interpretation of the majority's intention is that it tries to distinguish between principles that, because they are *outside*, could be *objective*, and those that can only be *subjective*. Only principles, it is suggested, whose validity can be established by appeal to external authority or evidence can be objectively known.

Assuming this interpretation is correct—and no other makes much sense—then the majority seems to believe that only those who are opposed to all killing, absolute pacifists, can base their conviction on such principles. Moreover, their remarks also seem to suggest that if an absolute pacifist *does not* appeal to "a moral imperative outside of himself," he ought not to be granted exemption from military service. But these views are indefensible.

First, there is no reason at all to suppose that a selective conscientious objector is unable to base his conviction on moral imperatives that are "outside" and objective. For example, suppose a selective conscientious objector sincerely believes that a class of wars—unjust wars—can be objectively established to be unjust by an appeal to objectively valid moral imperatives; suppose he also sincerely believes that an objective and absolute moral prohibition against fighting in unjust wars exists. Nor are these mere conjectures; I am describing the sincerely held beliefs of tens of thousands of young Americans who today actively oppose the Vietnam War. There is no rational basis for supposing that only absolute pacifists can appeal to objectively establishable principles.

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As far as the first argument goes, the majority ought to have joined the minority in recommending legal recognition of selective conscientious objectors.

The majority does make one comment that may be intended as a counter to the position defended above. They say that "the question of 'classical Christian doctrine' on the subject of just and unjust wars is one which would be interpreted in different ways by different Christian denominations and therefore not a matter upon which the Commission could pass judgment." Let us assume that the majority had not only Christian doctrine in mind, but any comparable doctrine—Muslim, Jewish, humanist, etc. In any case, the cogency of their argument escapes me.

For if the majority must accept the interpretation of doctrine proposed by a conscientious objector, then it should recommend that the exemption for absolute pacifists be rescinded. For the majority quite plainly *does not* agree with, say, the Christian absolute pacifist's interpretation of scriptural text—for example, "turn the other cheek." But it is really inconceivable that the case for or against conscientious objection, either absolute or selective, should be made to rest on the vagaries of exegesis performed by members of a Presidential Advisory Committee.

Second, there is no justification for restricting the exemption of absolute pacifists to those who believe that their views are objectively valid. The appropriate test is the *conscientiousness* of their belief. While conscientiousness has much to do with thoughtfulness, sincerity, and authenticity, it has nothing to do with objectivity. At least, the majority offers no reason to suppose that it does; and I can think of none that would help their argument.

Some absolute pacifists are conscientiously committed because they think their moral principle can be objectively established. Others believe with equal conscientiousness that, though objectivity in moral matters is not possible, still, all killing is wrong. As between the two forms of absolute pacifism, no moral basis for drawing a legal distinction exists—a position the Supreme Court acknowledged when, in the Seeger case, it held that absolute pacifists need only have a belief "that is sincere and meaningful (and) occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for exemption." Many believe in God on the basis of faith and reject the idea that their belief is objectively provable.

2. THE MAJORITY ARGUES THAT:

> *. . . so-called selective pacifism is essentially a political question of support or nonsupport of a war and cannot be judged in terms of special moral imperatives. Political opposition to a particular war should be expressed through recognized democratic processes and should claim no special right of exemption from democratic decisions.*

This sharp distinction between moral and political questions, though frequently made, is baffling. I suppose it is equally true that the following questions are political: support of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party at the last Democratic National Convention, of World War II, of fair housing ordinances, famine aid to India, urban renewal, the use of a nuclear deterrent, and of the War on Poverty. Each of these political issues is plainly also a moral one. For sound judgment in any of these cases requires appeal to "special moral imperatives." Indeed, it can safely be claimed that all important political questions are also moral questions. For each requires judgments about what *ought* to be done, to which principles of morality are relevant. The claim that selective pacifists ought (morally) to be exempted from military service cannot coherently be dismissed on the grounds that support of a particular war is (merely) a political question.

The tendency to ignore the moral dimen-

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sions of political questions is one of the most repugnant aspects of one of the most characteristic American political styles; the style of those whom I elsewhere call "pseudo-realists."[1] For in the name of greater *realism* and *responsibility* the pseudo-realists actually abandon their deeply serious responsibility to assess the *morality* of political acts and policies. And in their irresponsible flight from moral issues, they sabotage realistic efforts to achieve values to which they give lip service on Sundays and on ceremonial occasions.

Perhaps, however, the majority's distinction between the moral and the political is simply designed to call attention to the appropriateness of political opposition to the war—to its being permissible, even obligatory, to express opposition "through recognized democratic processes." But it does not follow from the fact that someone may or should express opposition through political channels, that one may not also claim exemption on grounds of conscientious objection. As American citizens, absolute pacifists quite properly express political opposition to the Vietnam War; but as morally sovereign human beings they also claim a special right of exemption as well. The two, political action and the claim of special right of exemption as a conscientious objector, simply do not preclude one aonther.

3. THE MAJORITY FEELS THAT

> *a legal recognition of selective pacifism could be disruptive to the morale and effectiveness of the Armed Forces. A determination of the justness or unjustness of any war could only be made within the context of that war itself. Forcing upon the individual the necessity of making that distinction—which would be the practical effect of taking away the government's obligation of making it for him—would put a burden heretofore unknown on the man in uniform and even on the brink of combat, with results that could well be disastrous to him, to his unit, and to the entire military tradition. No such problem arises for the conscientious objector, even in uniform, who bases his moral stand on killing in all forms, simply because he is never trained for nor assigned to combat duty.*

The majority's reasoning is, to put it mildly, extraordinary.

Their argument rests on the validity of two central claims. First, they simply assume that the government is obligated to decide *for at least certain individuals*, those in military service or eligible for military service, which wars are just, which unjust. Second, they believe that if people are, perforce, compelled to decide for themselves, *or even encouraged to do so*, the results could prove militarily disastrous.

The idea that the government has an obligation to decide *for anyone* which wars are just, which unjust, comes as a revelation to anyone who supposes that our system is predicated on the conviction that *every* citizen has the right and the obligation to make reasoned judgments about most matters of public policy, and certainly about all fateful public issues—such as issues affecting war and peace. Once someone has made the reflective judgment that a particular war is unjust, then, provided the government has acted in a constitutionally legitimate way, that citizen has a problem. His problem is intensified if he is draft eligible. It *may* be right for the government to circumscribe the dissenter's sphere of action so that he does not collide with established public policy. But the point at issue in this discussion is precisely whether the government has a right to interfere with an individual's sincere determination to refuse service in a particular war. To argue that the government has the right to forestall such conflict by making sure that draft eligibles and men in service do not question the justice of the war is profoundly subversive of democracy as most Americans should understand it.

[1] In my book, *The Radical Liberal: New Man in American Politics* (New York: Atherton, 1968), Chapter 3, pp. 32–43.

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The majority's suggestion does indeed conjure an even more sinister possibility. How can the government effectively discourage draft eligibles from exploring the issues of war and peace without going some way toward destroying the general right of dissent? For how can a highly integrated portion of the population be made the target of the necessary manipulations without also making many others the targets of the same manipulations? It is a practical impossibility —as, perhaps, officials of government are discovering.

A partial solution to the problem, but only a partial one, is to isolate those inducted into military service and attempt to brainwash them. According to certain servicemen who retain a capacity for autonomy, this is precisely what does happen. For example, Paul W. McBride, a former army officer and Vietnam war veteran, summarizes his "educational" experience in the Army in the following terms:

> I came to realize that one of the reasons for the stultification and even danger of the military mind is the closed system in which it is molded. The training at the M.P. school for officers and troops alike is hardly training at all. It is certainly not education which implies a free flow of ideas. It is propaganda, indoctrination, brainwashing. The films on geo-politics and communism shown *today* in the Army training system anachronistically stresses the existence of a Sino-Soviet conspiracy to dominate the world.
>
> What is worse, the narrowness of the military approach to world problems is forced upon the college student in ROTC. The manual 145–145 used now at the University of Georgia still refers to the danger of the "Sino-Soviet conspiracy." It is pardonable to be wrong, but when error is forced upon the civilian college system, and when the military instructors are forbidden to vary from doctrine, then the situation is intolerable in the educational context. The University must not force propaganda down the students' throats. It is bad enough when they, like me, volunteer to be brainwashed.[2]

Ultimately, the majority's stand on the issue of military indoctrination is downright undemocratic. If a democratic system is one in which those most affected by a given policy have at least some opportunity to participate reflectively in the making of that policy, then it is abhorrent to suggest that the very men who are compelled to lay their lives on the line should be systematically excluded from intelligent participation in the process. The majority's earlier contention that "Political opposition to a particular war *should* be expressed through recognized democratic processes" is simply betrayed by their subsequent qualification (author's emphasis).

The majority's second claim, that legal recognition of selective pacifism could prove militarily disastrous, is either harmless or absurd. For the probabilities of such a consequence are minuscule. In this country, belief that the President is contemptuous of full and fair democratic process undermines morale. Belief that the selective service system operates inequitably undermines morale. Belief that the country is committed to an unjust war undermines morale. Military morale is most effectively maintained by creating an equitable system for recruiting men, and committing them to battle in just wars that have been adequately debated before they are begun. If demonstrable failure in all these respects has not already destroyed the spirit of our troops in Vietnam, exempting selective conscientious objectors is most unlikely to do so.

In any event, the general opinion of Vietnam veterans who today oppose the war is that once one is in the battle area, he performs the tasks he is required to perform. Donald Duncan, one of the heroes of the Green Berets, and a militant critic of the war, has written extensively about his war experi-

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[2] From the *Red and Black* (University of Georgia student newspaper), October 24, 1967.

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ences. There is nothing in what he writes about his military life in Vietnam to suggest that his effectiveness was impaired.

Perhaps, however, the majority's views do raise a deep constitutional issue that ought to be considered—for the problems involved deserve much more extensive treatment.

During time of war fundamental tension is produced by the potential conflict between the requirements of a successful war effort and the imperatives of a free society. This is the "Nervous Nellie" problem, or, more recently, the "Quisling" problem, that so preoccupies our President. But surely the case for denying civil liberties in favor of efficient war-making is no stronger than the extent of real danger to national security. It is, however, universally agreed that defeat in the Vietnam War poses no short-term threat to national security, and the nation is deeply divided about whether defeat would result in a long-term threat. The simple-minded formula, "If we don't fight them in Southeast Asia, we will have to fight them in Honolulu and San Francisco," is accepted only by the most mindless elements in the populace. The point is, however agonizing the tension described might be in other wars, in this war there is little basis for alarm.

4. THE MAJORITY HOLDS THAT:

> *legal recognition of selective pacifism could open the doors to a general theory of selective disobedience to law, which could quickly tear down the fabric of government; the distinction is dim between a person conscientiously opposed to participation in a particular war and one conscientiously opposed to payment of a particular tax.*

It is in this argument that the majority manages to hit their stride; they commit three textbook fallacies of logic. The majority, in their desperation to find persuasive arguments, try to force open the Pandora's Box of anarchism. Men armed with even minimal intelligence and a small number of facts can force the lid firmly down again.

From the claim that legal recognition of selective conscientious objection *could* open the doors to a general theory of selective disobedience to law (which can be accepted as a logical possibility), it does not follow that it has any tendency to do so at all. And, indeed, no plausible general theory is even suggested—as careful analysis of the majority's own analogy quickly makes clear. The disanalogies between paying taxes and fighting in wars is so great that the majority's suggestion cannot stand a moment's critical examination.

When a man is compulsorily inducted into the army he is put in a position where he can be ordered to kill another human being. When he is compelled to pay taxes, he is not put in that position. Christian Bay states the underlying moral issue, and the principle of difference, cogently:

> In general, a democratic government may be entitled to obedience, but there are limits to its justifiable demands on citizens. If it orders citizens to kill or die, it comes close to the limits that even Hobbes put down around the authority of the Leviathan. Even in a proclaimed national emergency the individual's right not to kill or die for a cause he considers unjust should be respected by the government.[3]

The distinction between killing and paying does not seem dim to Bay, nor, I warrant, to any morally sensitive human being who reflects carefully on what he is saying. Certainly, many of the Nuremberg trials or the Eichmann trial would have seemed ludicrous had the Germans who were tried been charged with failing to reject Nazi orders to pay their income taxes. This is not to deny that those who pay taxes they know will be used to facilitate killing are normally implicated in the resulting deaths. But one of the fundamental achievements of human civilization is the development of criteria which enable us to grade the blameworthiness of

[3] *The Structure of Freedom* (Stanford University, 1958), p. 110.

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individuals implicated in transgression; and to allocate penalties accordingly.

Let us suppose, for purposes of argument, that a generally accepted theory of selective disobedience does emerge and is widely accepted as a result of legal recognition of selective pacifism. From this admission it does not follow that the fabric of government would quickly, or even slowly, be torn down; nor even that such an outcome is likely. In general, anarchical tendencies are the result of perceived injustice. And perceived injustice is normally the result of actual injustice. A society composed entirely of principled civil disobedients like Henry Thoreau would be the most stable imaginable, *provided* the laws and institutions were perceived as just. Those who spend energies worrying about the threat of anarchy would normally be better advised to spend their time remedying injustice. Alarms about the danger of anarchy often conceal the moral indifference that is principally responsible for whatever threat may actually exist.

The majority's third fallacy of logic is a *reductio ad absurdum*. Consider carefully the relationship between conscientious objection to a particular war and conscientious objection to a particular tax. If we accept the majority's claim that the distinction between these is "dim," then it seems to follow that the distinction between conscientious objection to *all* wars and conscientious objection to *all* taxes is not less dim. Yet the majority favors granting those who are conscientiously opposed to fighting in all wars exemption from fighting in any war. Hence, they should favor granting those who are conscientiously opposed to paying all taxes exemption from paying any taxes. But the conclusion is absurd.

Nothing would be more likely to "tear down the fabric of government" than to follow the majority in all the vagaries of its reasoning on the subject of selective conscientious objection.

On the basis of these criticisms of the majority's arguments it seems fair to conclude that the majority abandoned almost all of reason and retained precious little of morality. In a college logic class they would have been given E's, and dismissed with an admonition to try to do better. But the sphere they chose for their muddled thinking was not a classroom; it was the arena in which issues of war and peace, life, and death, are debated and decided. Many parts of the Commission's report are excellent; most of the reasoning is sound. But in their discussion of selective conscientious objection, the Commission's majority seemed to become tools of higher political powers.

The Case for Legal Recognition of Selective Conscientious Objection

I HAVE SHOWN ONLY that the Commission's majority failed to make even the beginning of a case for differential treatment of absolute and selective conscientious objectors. I now want to show that there is no basis for legal distinction. In the course of my discussion, I shall appeal to principles which provide a basis on which exemption of all conscientious objectors can be defended. But this is not my main concern. The full case for exemption of conscientious objectors, absolute and selective, deserves separate and more extended treatment.

Assume that one arrives, by some route or other, at the conviction that human life is specially sacred. Belief in the sacredness of life would quite naturally be expressed as commitment to the right to life. Assume also that this right is accorded high priority in the moral scheme of things. Finally, assume that *conscientious thought and conduct* are among the central values of civilized society. I have described my own deep convictions. But they are important here only because they are premises that are widely accepted, and on the basis of which legal exemption of absolute pacifists can plausibly be defended. Given these assumptions, the strongest kind of obligation to avoid killing others, the strongest kind of case against forcing anyone to kill against his will, can be made.

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If these assumptions are effectively challenged, the case for legal recognition of absolute pacifists cannot help but be weakened. If they are sustained, the case for extending recognition to selective conscientious objectors cannot help but be strengthened. I can think of no plausible defense of one that does not support the other: no plausible attack on one that does not throw doubt on the other.

Killing may be justified. But in a good society, government will never compel someone to become a killer unless a catastrophic threat to all values exists. But under these conditions there is no moral reason why legal distinction should be made between absolute and selective conscientious objectors.

Underlying much resistance to this basic conclusion is the suspicion that absolute pacifists are more credible and authentic than selective pacifists. But just the reverse seems generally to be true. For it is almost impossible that someone would refuse to kill in any and all conceivable circumstances—for example, if the annihilation of those he loves best is threatened by a marauder. Though an absolute pacifist may affirm his position with perfect sincerity, there is psychological basis for suspecting that he deceives himself—by contrast to the selective conscientious objector.

Moreover, as all who favor legal recognition of conscientious objection should acknowledge, the strongest possible basis for exempting an individual from military service is that he regards killing, or direct involvement in killing, as morally repugnant. But there is no reason at all to suppose that selective conscientious objectors need be less sincere than absolute pacifists when they express such repugnance during a particular war.

Though I disagree with people who insist that the conscientious objector's beliefs must have a religious basis, or be shaped by religious training or its equivalent, they are wrong if they suppose that this conviction enables them to make the distinction between absolute and selective conscientious objection. For there is no doubt at all that individuals can have religiously based objection to fighting in particular wars—wars they believe, on religious grounds, to be unjust.

The argument that everyone is equally obligated to fight in wars that protect common social values has a hollow ring, given the inequities and injustice of our present military system. Nevertheless, this objection can be met by giving conscientious objectors the legal right to discharge their obligation in alternative ways. In any event, once again there is no basis for legal distinction between absolute and selective objectors.

Those who argue that it is more difficult to establish working criteria for selective conscientious objectors than for absolute pacifists must prove that this is so. On the face of it, the objection is implausible—as anyone familiar with the arbitrariness of the present system knows. Certainly, at the level of theory it is just as easy to state criteria for selective conscientious objection as it is for absolute pacifism. In both cases the test is the *conscientiousness* of the objection.

Forcing conscientious objectors to fight and kill *may* be justified if there is a clear and present danger to the survival of all national values. The threat must be more than a mere possibility, or even a probability. There must be a very high probability of national destruction. But in these circumstances the mere fact that someone is an absolute pacifist does not give him rights the selective conscientious objector lacks; or at least I can think of no convincing argument why absolute pacifists should receive special consideration in a national emergency. In any event, given a genuine threat to national security, it is unlikely that selective conscientious objectors would become a practical problem. Cowards would find some way of shirking even just wars; conscientious men would not. And few Americans are cowards. Certainly none of the

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young men who conscientiously seek to escape service in a war they believe to be unjust do so because they are *afraid* to fight. Only those who have no understanding of these young men will regard such a claim as even plausible.

I said only that grounds *may* exist for forcing conscientious objectors to fight and kill. Even a clear and present danger to national security may not be sufficient. A society may be so bad that its destruction would restore, not destroy values. Nazi Germany was a fairly clear case.

Moreover, even when decent societies are threatened with destruction, it may be possible to afford exemptions. For given the changing technology of war, together with population growth, a modern industrial society does not rely as heavily on total manpower as used to be the case.

Yet there may be practical grounds for treating absolute pacifists differently than selective conscientious objectors. Absolute pacifists may, for example, have received the kind of upbringing which makes them unfit to fight. But then the decision to keep them away from the battlefield is a technical decision that ought to be made by military men. *All* ineffective killers ought to be kept away from where the killing is going on; even those who are ineffective for reasons other than their having had a pacifist upbringing.

It begins to appear that yesterday's mood of political despair is lifting; that the American political system is more effectively demonstrating the viability of democracy than all our armies and all our wealth. But the fact that so many of our most intelligent, patriotic, and conscientious young men refuse to serve in the Vietnam War is itself a tribute to the integrity of that democracy. Perhaps it is not too much to hope, in this season of dramatic political developments, that the government will have the wisdom and courage to enact legislation which will give selective conscientious objectors the status in law that they already possess in morality.

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As you surely know, there has been a steady rise in prices over the last year. DISSENT has felt this severely. We have tried to hold the line on our own prices, but now have no choice but to announce a small rise.

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THE EDITORS

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George Lichtheim

Socialism and the Jews

THE FOLLOWING REMARKS have been occasioned by a recent revival of interest in the topic of socialist anti-Semitism. Or, to put the matter in a different context, by a rereading of scholarly studies dealing with the role assigned in socialist theory to the problem of nationality in general and the Jewish problem in particular. Some of these writings have clearly been inspired by the rise of fascism in Europe, the aftermath of the "final solution," the revival of traditional Russian anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R., and the Arab-Jewish hostilities consequent upon the establishment of Israel in 1948. Others have concerned themselves primarily with the religious sources of anti-Semitism and the Jewish reaction thereto.

The most recent and most distinguished of these studies—here accorded special mention because it falls outside the theme of the present essay—is Professor Georges Friedmann's work published in France in 1966 under the challenging title *Fin du peuple juif?* and translated into English as *The End of the Jewish People?* (New York: Doubleday, 1967). This book presents a critical but friendly analysis of Israel and Zionism by an eminent sociologist who may fairly be described as a representative of the great tradition of French liberal humanism. For reasons that will appear later, he can also be classified as belonging to a tradition associated with Jean Jaurès, which became dominant in the French socialist movement around the turn of the century in response to the political and intellectual upheaval touched off by the Dreyfus Affair. Professor Friedmann's work is, however, marginal to the theme of the present essay which focuses upon earlier phases of the complex process whereby European socialism in general, and French socialism in particular, shed its anti-Semitic aspects.

This rather obscure chapter of European history has been investigated by distinguished historians such as Léon Poliakov, and especially by Edmund Silberner whose studies are extensively cited in the following pages. Where possible I have gone back to the sources, but for material on the early French socialists I am primarily indebted to Silberner. Other authors will be cited in passing, e.g. Professor J. L. Talmon who has given special attention to the Jewish component in the Saint-Simonian movement. For Marx there exists a mass of secondary literature (much of it in German and untranslated), and the same applies to Moses Hess and Ferdinand Lassalle.

Readers steeped in this literature will be aware of the problem of rendering the topic comprehensible to those not familiar with the Central European background. The difficulty is somewhat eased in the case of Bakunin, although socialists and anarchists alike have been markedly reluctant to dwell on the theme of his anti-Semitism. Similar considerations apply to Proudhon and his spiritual progeny in France and Belgium, down to and including Georges Sorel. A brief consideration of this latter topic concludes the essay and brings it back to its starting point. It will then, I hope, have become apparent that the anti-Jewish current in the European labor movement, before and after the 1914–18 war, was rooted in a complex of attitudes going back to the French Revolution and its impact upon traditional society.

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If it be asked why France has been singled out, the answer is: because it was the cradle of the socialist movement, German socialism having been founded in the Rhineland around 1840 by Moses Hess and others, a generation after it had come to birth in its French homeland. For different reasons no consideration is given to Anglo-American developments during or after this period. Eastern Europe appears only distantly on the horizon: principally in the person of Bakunin and his progeny, among whom the *Narodnaya Volya* distinguished itself in 1881 with an appeal for a pogrom against "the Tsar, the nobles, and the Jews," thereby inaugurating a tradition which is not yet exhausted. The Central and East European catastrophe of 1933–1945 forms the unspoken background of this study. It is not as such part of my theme, which revolves around an earlier epoch.

A BRIEF LIST of secondary sources may be useful to the reader. Most of them (though not all) will inevitably re-appear in the Notes. The exclusion of some well-known recent writings (e.g. Professor Norman Cohn's account of the origins of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*) reflects nothing more sinister than a desire to concentrate on the purpose of this essay, which is to summarize one particular chapter in the interaction between the socialist movement and the drive for Jewish emancipation.

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It need hardly be said that this short list is intended merely as a guide to the literature, and that in what follows no attempt has been made to break new ground in any particular area investigated by the specialists. My purpose has rather been to retrace the broad outlines of the story and to throw out a few general suggestions concerning the dialectic of anticapitalism and anti-Semitism. It will then, I think, become apparent that what occurred between, roughly speaking, 1800 and 1950 was a debate over a problem that has not yet lost its topical interest. This may seem a rather bloodless way of summing up a controversy whose frequently appalling violence foreshadowed early the catastrophes with which we have become familiar. But it must be borne in mind that every study of ideas—or, if one pre-

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fers it, of the interaction between ideology and politics—suffers from the same weakness: it can never be more than a pale shadow of the actual historical record. Still, within its limitations, such an account may be useful if it establishes a perspective from which the events can be seen to have possessed a logic of their own. That this logic did not manifest itself to the participants, but has to be discovered by the historian, does not mean that it was not present from the start.

I

IT NEEDS TO BE SAID at the outset that the phenomenon of socialist anti-Semitism was in its origins the poisoned root of a tree planted—alongside the more familiar tree of liberty—in the decades following the French Revolution. The anticapitalist and the anti-Jewish theme were intertwined, and it took considerable time and trouble before they could be disentangled. The confusion was not accidental, although some of the arguments supporting it were. Moreover, the philo-Semitic current which briefly prevailed after 1789, and then surfaced once more among the Saint-Simonian part of the early socialist movement, was itself a factor in provoking the hostility of rival groups, since it appeared to go with a marked indifference to certain traditional values. The philo-Semites, in fact, were suspected of being liberals even when they described themselves as socialists.

Since the dispute turned largely upon the newly prominent role of industrialists and financiers, it was inevitable that socialist dislike of bourgeois liberalism should fasten upon the Jews as the real or putative beneficiaries of a political upheaval which had unshackled the market economy. Anyone with eyes in his head could see that the new doctrines of economic liberalism favored the rich rather than the poor. This is the root core of anticapitalism in a writer like Charles Fourier (1772–1837). It does not account for his detestation of the few Jews he met (and the many whom he never encountered), but then Fourier had numerous private crotchets which rendered him an oddity even in the eyes of his followers. What matters in our context is that—unlike his fantastic cosmology, which was quietly abandoned by his disciples—his anti-Semitism took hold among them.

This was not a trifling matter, for Charles Fourier was one of the two founders of the socialist tradition in France, Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) being the other. The two men had no use for each other, and the rivalry of their respective followers carried over into a cleavage between supporters and opponents of Jewish emancipation. It is quite wrong to suppose that all "progressives" were united on this issue, with only the "reactionaries" hostile to the granting of equal rights to the Jews. Fourier did reproduce a few standard conservative arguments, but he added others of his own invention. The more offensive of them will be discussed in due course, but first some consideration must be given to an issue commonly neglected in writings on the subject: namely the logical status of *moral* principles in a debate supposedly concerned with political and economic factors.[1] (See Notes, pp. 335 ff.)

AT THE ROOT OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT—which triumphed in 1789 and to which the Jews in France, and subsequently in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, owed their emancipation—there lay an attitude toward morality which was quite new and, for its time and place, remarkably shocking. It could be summed up by saying that moral behavior is individual behavior. Individuals, being endowed (by Nature or by their Creator) with free will, are capable of behaving either morally or immorally toward each other, depending on whether or not they possess the strength of will required for the observance of certain ethical precepts: e.g. the duty to speak the truth or to respect the rights of others. Ethics has to do with the

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way in which individuals make use of this freedom. The free man is morally sovereign, obeys no external authority, and follows the commands of his conscience. Institutional morality merely sets limits to the manner in which people conduct their lives; it therefore permits any way of life not visibly harmful to others. For the rest, it leaves the individual free to pursue his private interest as he sees it. Since all reasonable people desire peace and freedom, it follows that they will so conduct themselves as not to encroach upon each other. Metaphysical beliefs are irrelevant, hence any discrimination against religious minorities is irrational, unjustified, and contrary to the doctrine of equality under the law. The grant of equal rights to Jews—or other religious nonconformists, or atheists for that matter—followed as a direct consequence of this kind of reasoning.[2]

Now the point here is that the same attitude underlay the elimination of traditional social privileges. Liberalism—whether of the Voltairian French or the utilitarian English variety—did not, of course, do away with social inequality. What it did was to remove *caste* barriers: thereby incidentally sharpening economic conflicts, since "free enterprise" meant free competition in the market place. On both counts liberalism represented a radical break with the past of a traditional (and overwhelmingly agrarian) order. It also happened to suit the emerging bourgeoisie, of which the Jewish community was an important component.

All this, from the liberal viewpoint, was natural and desirable—so much so that, for quite a long time, the more doctrinaire liberals could see in the arguments of their critics only a species of perversity. There was, however, a respectable alternative to the prevailing individualist creed: an alternative, moreover, which could draw upon the authority of Rousseau. Put briefly, it amounted to saying that man is "by nature" a social being and that in consequence an ethically meaningful existence can only be lived in a certain kind of community: one in which men cooperate rather than compete. Expressed at its simplest, this was the root of the socialist case against liberal individualism during the opening decades of the 19th century. And because the Revolution had let loose, at one and the same time, an overdue liberation from outworn constraints and an unprecedented orgy of the crudest kind of individualism, it was inevitable that part of the emotional reaction against these phenomena should be directed against the Jews—an unpopular community which seemed to have derived an altogether disproportionate advantage from the collapse of the *ancien régime*.

The anti-Semitism of Fourier, upon which historians of the socialist movement have frequently remarked, becomes comprehensible against this background. Setting aside Fourier's personal eccentricities, it amounted to saying that the Jews were among the chief beneficiaries of a way of life which was subversive of communitarian values. Fourier (who had narrowly escaped the firing squad in 1793, when an anti-Jacobin insurrection in Lyons was suppressed) was hostile to the Revolution in general. But the specific form of his hostility differed from the attitude of the conservatives in that he had no desire to revert to the *ancien régime* or to medieval authoritarianism. He wanted to go forward, not backward; this orientation turned him into one of the founders of socialism. But it did not make him more tolerant of the liberals, or of his rivals, the Saint-Simonians, who combined socialism with philo-Semitism.

Fourier had come to see Jewish emancipation as an aspect of modern society to which he was hostile: the unleashing of individualism. It is irrelevant that he also dragged up some of the standard abuse of the Jews as "parasites, merchants, usurers, etc.," whose emancipation was among "the most shameful" of all "the recent vices" of contemporary society.[3] It is equally irrelevant that in one of his last writings, *La*

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fausse industrie (1835–36), he abandoned anti-Semitism in favor of Zionism. The Jews (he now said) should be helped to escape from their persecutors in Europe by returning to Palestine "and once more become a recognized nation, with their own king, their own flag, their own consuls, and their own money." He even thought some Jewish millionaire (it was the age of the Rothschilds) might lend his aid to the project, and at the same time help the socialist cause along by financing Fourier's own communitarian projects: an "experimental phalange" (the name he gave to his proposed collective settlements) in Palestine would soon spread its fame, and that of its spiritual father, all over the globe. This was Charles Fourier in one of his more amiable moods and toward the end of his career when some of the rancor against Jews and Jacobins had gone out of him. His followers, or at any rate the more active among them, soon reverted to his earlier manner.[4]

BEFORE TURNING TO this murky subject, it is worth casting a glance in the opposite direction: at the record of the rival socialist school, that of the Saint-Simonians. The circumstance has often been noted that the followers of Saint-Simon comprised a fair proportion of youthful Jewish intellectuals, for whom the new socialist faith became a vehicle of spiritual emancipation from religious orthodoxy. What is perhaps more remarkable is the philo-Semitism of the school as such: beginning with its aristocratic founder, whose "testament" concluded on a note of religious exaltation explicitly modeled upon Jewish messianism:

> The people of God, that people which received revelations before the coming of Christ, that people which is the most universally spread over the surface of the earth, has always perceived that the Christian doctrine founded by the Fathers of the Church was incomplete. It has always proclaimed that a grand epoch will come, to which has been given the name of Messiah's Kingdom; an epoch in which religious doctrine shall be presented in all the generality of which it is susceptible; that it will regulate alike the action of the temporal and of the spiritual power; and that then all the human race will have but one religion and one organization.
>
> The imagination of the poets has placed the golden age at the cradle of the human race, among the ignorance and brutality of early times; it is rather the iron age which should be relegated to those days. The golden age of mankind is not behind us; it is before us; it is [to be found] in the perfection of the social order. Our fathers have not seen it, our children will arrive there one day; it is for us to pave the way.[5]

This stirring theme was echoed countless times in the Saint-Simonian literature of the late 1820's and early 1830's (most of it produced by non-Jews). The sect indeed went considerably beyond its founder in propagating a synthesis of Judaism and Christianity in a coming "religion of mankind." Its official writings—notably the essay collection *La religion saint-simonienne*—present variations on this topic. They range from the rationalism of Jules Lechevalier ("What is the mission of Saint-Simonism? To reconcile Judaism and Christianity")[6] to the romantic visions of Prosper Enfantin and the mystical exaltation of Émile Barrault. In the quasi-religious system of early Saint-Simonism, the emancipation of the Jews figured—along with the liberation of women and of the proletariat—among the preconditions of human emancipation in general.[7] The school was unique in bridging both the religious cleavage and the incipient conflict between liberals and socialists. Some of its founders even terminated their career as pioneers of industrialism. But that was in the prosaic 1860's, when the former visionary Enfantin had become a railway director and the economist Michel Chevalier an adviser to Napoleon III. The fact remains that the school made its principal impact upon public opinion at a time when its doc-

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trine was both socialist and tinged with mystical exaltation. At one point Enfantin and Barrault even prophesied a coming reconciliation of the Orient and the Occident, to be mediated by a female Messiah of Jewish origin.[8]

The contrast with Fourier's violent anti-Semitism is startling. It becomes somewhat less surprising when one reflects that both parties to the dispute were reacting in suitably extravagant terms to the greatest politico-ideological upheaval France and Europe had experienced for centuries: the destruction of theocratic monarchy as a system of government, and along with it the downfall of the Catholic Church. To the participants, whichever side they took, this gigantic cataclysm was a great deal more important than the economic changes preceding and following the Revolution. The emancipation of the Jews had occurred on the ruins of a structure which had stood ever since the Papacy and the Frankish monarchy made their pact in the eighth century.[9]

To a liberal grandseigneur like Saint-Simon, brought up on Voltairian anticlericalism, this was simply the belated triumph of Reason. It looked very different to the Catholic royalist, and bourgeois (or antibourgeois) novelist Honoré de Balzac in the following generation. Fourier occupies an intermediate position. As a rationalist he disliked the Church. As a representative of the solid provincial middle class (and one who had been personally ruined by the Revolution), he detested the liberal bourgeoisie which had done well out of the upheaval. In particular he detested the Jews. If he called them "the leprosy and the ruin of the body politic," and condemned the decision to grant them French citizenship,[10] he was giving expression to resentments which could be translated into either reactionary or radical-populist terms, depending on circumstances and on the orientation of the individuals concerned. His followers in the next generation denounced Jewish financiers with the same fervor with which the Saint-Simonians extolled their civilizing mission: the difference being that anti-Semitism struck a more responsive chord among a people still deeply affected by the medieval tradition which pictured the Jew in the role of usurer. Philo-Semitism could never be popular, though in time it won converts among the educated. Anti-Semitism could and did become an element of the primitive system of ideas in which the anticapitalist reaction of the 1830's and 1840's at first presented itself. That it had, in this guise, the sanction of Fourier must be counted among the accidental but important circumstances attending the birth of the socialist movement in France.[11]

II

THE ANTI-JEWISH element in the French socialist movement during the three decades following Fourier and Saint-Simon—from the 1840's to the Paris Commune of 1871—is primarily associated with three names: Alphonse Toussenel (1803–85), Pierre Leroux (1797–1871), and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–65). Proudhon's relations with Bakunin (1814–76) and with Marx (1818–83) introduce a theme which forms a separate subject. However, before briefly crossing the Rhine (and then recrossing it, for the purpose of taking a look at Proudhon's disciples and their behavior during the Dreyfus Affair at the end of the century), we must give some attention to the socialism of the 1840's. This—be it noted in passing—was the decade during which Marx composed his early political writings, under the impression of what he had seen and heard in Paris and Brussels.

It is no coincidence that these years witnessed a remarkable outburst of anti-Semitism in France, some of which spilled over into the socialist literature of the period; neither is it irrelevant that these sentiments were activated by the prominence of Jewish financiers among the oligarchy in control of the Orléanist regime of 1830–48. The fateful association of Jews with banking—a her-

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itage from an earlier epoch—encouraged a socialist variant of a litany doubly effective in a predominantly Catholic country. That French banking was largely in the hands of Protestants (of French, Swiss, or German origin) did not bother these writers. Protestantism was respectable and influential; Judaism was not. As usual in such cases, the campaigners chose the easiest target they could find: not the *haute bourgeoisie protestante,* which carried real weight in the country (in the person of Guizot it virtually ran the government under Louis Philippe), but the Rothschilds and their associates.

ALPHONSE TOUSSENEL (1803–85), who had joined the Fourierists in 1833 and from 1839 to 1843 helped to edit one of their journals, was hardly the most important member of the school after Fourier's death in 1837. That role, by general consent, devolved upon Victor Considérant who was no anti-Semite. But Toussenel was not unimportant. The first edition of his pamphlet *Les Juifs rois de l'époque* (1845) was favorably reviewed in the Fourierist journals *La Phalange* and *La Démocratie pacifique.*

Nonetheless, there must have been dissensions, for in the following year Toussenel broke with the Fourierists, and the second edition of his book (1847) opened with a personal attack on Considérant, who had refused to sanction a consistently anti-Jewish orientation.[12] Considérant, by now the official head of the school, retorted in the pages of *La Démocratie pacifique* with an expression of relief at this parting of the ways. Even so, his repudiation of anti-Semitism was somewhat halting. It was primarily motivated by what he described as Toussenel's misguided attribution of "inborn and irremediable" faults to particular peoples or races. That Considérant was far from sharing the mystical philo-Semitism of the Saint-Simonians is evident enough from his remark that Jewish messianism implied nothing more exalted than "the triumph of this people and —its rule over all the peoples of the world."[13]

Toussenel, for his part, became the pioneer of a literature which linked the medieval image of the Jew as usurer to the populism of a society suddenly plunged into the maelstrom of early capitalism. The Jews, he says, are "the kings of the epoch." They represent "industrial feudalism," newly personified by "the cosmopolitan Jew . . . Europe is entailed to the domination of Israel. This universal domination, of which so many conquerors have dreamed, the Jews have in their hands."[14] The Saint-Simonians had praised the Jews for being in the van of progress. Toussenel condemned them for personifying the element of finance capital which, like other Frenchmen of his age, he identified with capitalism in general.

The argument was echoed by the utopian communist Théodore Dézamy in his *L'Organisation de la liberté* (Paris: 1846); by Proudhon in his *Confessions d'un révolutionnaire* (Paris: 1849) where Toussenel gets favorable mention, and by Marx in his *Class Struggles in France* (1850) where Toussenel is mentioned among the pamphleteers inveighing against the financial oligarchy prominent under the Orléanist regime.[15] Marx, needless to say, treated the issue as secondary: it was, he thought, part of a subordinate quarrel between the financial plutocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie. For the rest he saw quite clearly that writers like Toussenel, who imagined themselves to be fighting capitalism, were in fact promoting it. The Jewish issue struck him as farcical. Presumably for this reason he saw no harm in giving it some encouragement.

Toussenel may be described as an anti-Semite who also happened to be a socialist. The case of Pierre Leroux (1797–1871) is rather more complex. Originally a Saint-Simonian who had quarreled with Enfantin and left the sect, he turned the liberal journal *Le Globe,* around 1830, into a socialist propaganda organ. From 1836 onward, he published an eight-volume *Encyclopédie nouvelle* largely devoted to the propagation of socialist ideas. From 1845 to 1848 he

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edited the *Revue sociale*. He was elected to the National Assembly after the Revolution of 1848, and went into exile when Louis Napoleon established his dictatorship in 1851. Returning to France in 1859 he started a new career—as a student of Judaism and of the Hebrew language, publishing translations of and commentaries on Job (1866) and Isaiah (1869). During these years he was supported by wealthy Saint-Simonists, including the banker Isaac Péreire, a notable competitor of the Rothschilds. Leroux died in April 1871, during the brief reign of the Paris Commune, and was given a solemn burial by the Communards, presumably in recognition of his long years of service to the socialist cause.[16]

Leroux forms part of the tradition of Christian socialism. During the 1840's he was active—in collaboration with the novelist and feminist George Sand whose acquaintance he had made through Sainte-Beuve—in propagating a highly personal doctrine of reformist and pacifist socialism. A one-time Saint-Simonian, he retained the friendship of Jewish members of the sect who in his last years helped him when he was in the direst straits. And yet, he had his share in making a certain form of anti-Semitism respectable. The lengthy essay on the Jewish question which he published in January 1846 in the *Revue Sociale* bore the same title as Toussenel's scurrilous pamphlet: *Les Juifs, rois de l'époque*.

Leroux was convinced, like Toussenel though for different reasons, that the Jews as a group were somehow identified with the phenomenon of capitalism. He thus shared the Fourierist obsession with the Jews as the incarnation of the spirit of Mammon. They were, he thought, doubly blameworthy, for they had once received the unique revelation of the unity of God and mankind. Thus it was all the more deplorable that they had given themselves up to materialism, which was indeed a very widespread evil but had struck the deepest roots among them. It was particularly noxious because of the social evils consequent upon the abandonment of Christian religious principles. What was blameworthy was not the Jewish people (Leroux was no racialist), but its spirit, "a spirit of greed and cupidity." In principle, Judaism asserted the unity and universality of mankind, but in practice the Jews lived by the exploitation of others. Historically, they had always been a nation of traders, even in biblical times, and in the modern age they had become the very incarnation of the commercial spirit. They were (according to Leroux) the inventors of the banking system, which they used as a means of revenging themselves upon the Christians, whose ancestors had ill-treated them for so many centuries. In short, they were a menace and a factor of disintegration. Notwithstanding all these alarming circumstances, Leroux did not despair altogether: as a good Christian he hoped for the conversion of the Jews, just as he awaited the coming of a Christian socialism. For the rest, he rejected anti-Semitism insofar as it was a racial doctrine: the Semites (he observed in a polemic with Ernest Renan) were by no means inferior to other races.[17]

THE THIRD MEMBER of our trinity, P.-J. Proudhon, is too well-known to need an introduction, nor is it necessary to go into details of his stormy career as a theorist of early socialism and the ancestor of at any rate one branch of the anarchosyndicalist movement. His celebrated quarrel with Marx in 1846–47 is not very relevant here either, save insofar as it gave him an opportunity to vent in private some rather surprising sentiments on the subject of Judaism: sentiments by no means congruent with the currently fashionable image of Proudhon as an amiable, if slightly eccentric, theorist of the early labor movement, confronted with a disputatious and dictatorial rival in the person of Marx. It is common knowledge that Marx (in his *Poverty of Philosophy* (1847)—originally published in French un-

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der the title *Misère de la Philosophie: Réponse à la Philosophie de la Misère de M. Proudhon*)—had taken issue at some length with Proudhon's economic theories. Proudhon never made a public reply, though he duly annotated his copy of Marx's book with critical marginalia. He did, however, in December 1847, commit to his private notebook a lengthy programmatic observation, the full text of which was only published in 1961. Here are some samples:

> **Jews**—Write an article against this race which poisons everything, by meddling everywhere without ever joining itself to another people.—Demand their expulsion from France, with the exception of individuals married to Frenchwomen.—Abolish the synagogues; don't admit them to any kind of employment; pursue finally the abolition of this cult.
>
> It is not for nothing that the Christians called them deicides. The Jew is the enemy of the human race. One must send this race back to Asia or exterminate it.
>
> H. Heine, A. Weil, and others are nothing but secret spies; Rothschild, Crémieux, Marx, Fould malignant beings, bilious, envious, acrid, etc., etc., who hate us.
>
> By fire or fusion, or by expulsion, the Jew must disappear. . . . Tolerate the aged who no longer give birth to offspring.
>
> **Work to be done.**—What the peoples of the middle ages hated by instinct, I hate upon reflection, and irrevocably.
>
> (*Notebooks of P.-J. Proudhon,* II, 337-38.)[18]

THESE EDIFYING SENTIMENTS were for private consumption only. In public Proudhon contented himself with the stock arguments already put into circulation by Toussenel and others. It was in his posthumously published writings that he really let himself go:

> The Jew is by temperament an anti-producer, neither a farmer, nor an industrialist, nor even a true merchant. He is an intermediary, always fraudulent and parasitic, who operates in trade as in philosophy, by means of falsification, counterfeiting [and] horse-trading. He knows but the rise and fall of prices, the risks of transportation, the incertitudes of crops, the hazards of demand and supply. His policy in economics has always been entirely negative, entirely usurious. It is the evil principle, Satan, Ahriman incarnated in the race of Shem, which has already been twice exterminated by the Greeks and by the Romans, the first time at Tyre, the second time at Carthage.

This is the Proudhon of *Césarisme et Christianisme,* published posthumously in 1883, eighteen years after his death in 1865. During his lifetime he observed a certain degree of circumspection, but his sentiments on the subject were never in doubt, and he left a rich legacy which gave rise to a fresh crop of hate literature.

FOUR YEARS AFTER the master's death, in 1869, his pupil George Duchêne set the tone for the next generation:

> Citizens, when you hear it said that in a notoriously barbarous country [Russia] the population treats the Jews roughly, do not believe one treacherous word. What you have is simply a case of honest people chasing rascals, usurers, exploiters of labor; religion has nothing to do with this act of high justice.[19]

As we shall see later on, utterances of this kind formed a link between the Proudhonist tradition and that founded by Bakunin. Here it may be noted that Proudhon differentiated himself from those writers of his time who believed in the possibility of a change for the better. The Jews, he thought, were hopelessly corrupt. They were —like the Poles, Greeks, Armenians, and other "vagabonds"—incapable of founding a state.[20] They were a race of sterile intermediaries, productive of nothing original, whether in commerce or in philosophy.[21] Nor had they really invented monotheism: the Hebrew language possessed no abstract concepts and thus could not have given expression to metaphysical ideas. "Monotheism is a creation of the Indo-Germanic spirit, and could not have arisen from any other

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source."[22] Proudhon is quite certain about this, just as he knows that Italy and Poland have no hope of recovering their national independence; that Negroes are inferior to whites, and that in the American Civil War right is on the side of the South; or that woman is "a sort of mean term between man and the rest of the animal creation."[23] On balance, Marx's characterization of Proudhon as a confused *petit bourgeois* seems to err on the side of charity. What he really represented was a fusion of backwoods barbarism with the mental chaos typical of the autodidact.

It is this streak of primitive barbarism—in the literal sense of hostility to civilization as such: civility being an urban accomplishment—that connects Proudhon with Bakunin and his progeny. In its origins this sentiment was quite natural. Proudhon had the countryman's instinctive dislike and distrust for that side of modern civilization which rests upon the subjugation of nature. He was not far wrong when he described the split between urban and rural life as a source of social malady, or when he asserted that in a fundamental sense industrial civilization was being created at the expense of the real producers, the peasants and workmen. This is the side of his teaching that links him to Marx and to the socialist tradition generally. What allied him with Bakunin, and in the end facilitated the division of his spiritual kingdom between Marxists and Bakuninists (for his followers in the 1870's split up between those two) was the strain of primitivism in his mental make-up.

His anti-Semitism was part of this inheritance. How close Bakunin was to him in this respect may be inferred from those passages in which the founder of Russian anarchism described the Jews as "an exploiting sect, a bloodsucking people, a unique devouring parasite, tightly and intimately organized . . . cutting across all the differences in political opinion"—adding for good measure that Marx and the Rothschilds were sure to hold each other in high esteem![24] This was something very different from Marx's private jokes about Lassalle, or even his public sneers about Jewish financiers. It illuminated a spiritual underworld which was to erupt in the following generation among Proudhon's and Bakunin's followers: paradoxically with the result that the French socialist and syndicalist movement, having at long last glimpsed Caliban in the mirror, made a successful effort to get rid of him.

III

THE THREE DECADES following the death of Proudhon in 1865 witnessed a major reorientation within the French workers' movement, which in the long run also affected its attitude to the Jewish problem. The most shattering event of the period, the short-lived Paris Commune of 1871, falls outside our theme, save insofar as it helped to speed the collapse of Proudhonism and divided Proudhon's spiritual legacy among the conflicting schools of anarchism and Marxism. The subsequent rise of an anarchosyndicalist movement—in part influenced by Marxist ideas but also embodying something of the Proudhonist inheritance—is more germane to our theme, since the orientation this movement inherited from Proudhon was a factor in determining its initial attitude during the Dreyfus Affair. Some account must also be taken, however, of the two other major currents within the French socialist movement before and after the cataclysm of 1871: the reformist trend associated with Louis Blanc and the "Jacobin" tradition, as exemplified by Auguste Blanqui.

Louis Blanc, who was an intellectual descendant of Considérant and Leroux, was an amiable Christian socialist, and his followers in the 1880's helped to promote reformist and "solidarist" ideas within the reigning bourgeois parties, notably the Radicals. Blanqui, a militant atheist, had always seen Catholicism as a much greater problem than Judaism; the latter he disliked

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chiefly because it had given rise to the Christian religion. His unpublished notes on the subject include the customary unflattering references to Jewish "swindlers" and "Shylocks," but this was a common habit in his age and did not make him an anti-Semite in the doctrinaire sense. His followers were another matter, notably Gustave Tridon (1841–71) whose pamphlet *Du Molochisme Juif* (published posthumously in 1884, but for the most part written while he was serving a prison sentence in 1866–68) rang the changes on all the specifically anti-Jewish themes of the age: not excluding the menace which the Semites presented to the "Indo-Aryan race."[25]

While Blanquism gradually faded out in the 1880's and 1890's, its more rational adherents amalgamating with the Marxist group founded in 1880 by Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue, the Proudhonist inheritance was taken up by Benoit Malon (1841–93) whose *Revue socialiste* from 1885 onward became the principal vehicle of reformist or "possibilist" socialism. At first sight, it is not obvious why this should have induced its editor to take an anti-Semitic line, but Malon—an autodidact who had learned to read at the late age of twenty—had been brought up on Proudhon and inherited the spirit of his master.[26] Malon also had reasons of his own for disliking the Marxists, who were then just beginning to make an impact upon the French labor movement. Like Proudhon and Bakunin, he was not enamored of "German socialists," especially if they also happened to be Jews.

This is usually overlooked by writers who have become enthralled with the theme of Marx's juvenilia, including his essay on the Jewish question: quite forgetting that his contemporaries saw him as a German Jew and were not unaware that his German and Austrian followers included a sizable number of Jewish intellectuals. In the France of the 1880's—a country barely recovered from the disastrous war with Germany in 1870–71—being a Marxist was no passport to popularity even among socialists. Marxism was associated with Germany—and with a German Jew at that. It was only toward the end of the century that this theme vanished from socialist literature. In the meantime, writers like Malon did what they could to keep it alive.

In our context it is noteworthy that Malon thought well of Regnard's *Aryens et Sémites,* that "scholarly and superb study" which breathed a spirit of genuine "Aryanism."[27] This was rather more than Marx's French followers were prepared to swallow, for although both Guesde and Lafargue permitted themselves occasional diatribes against Jewish financiers, they represented the nascent Marxist orthodoxy which refused to have truck with racism. Malon for his part was on cordial terms with Édouard Drumont whose celebrated pamphlet *La France juive* (1886) popularized the theme that France was being ruined by Jewish financiers who were corrupting the body politic. It was the time of the Panama scandal and the ensuing nationalist wave associated with General Boulanger: a movement soon joined by some of the more chauvinist Blanquists. Thus when Malon introduced Drumont to Parisian workingmen, he followed a consistent line, just as he did in throwing his *Revue socialiste* open to the notorious anti-Semite Auguste Chirac (1838–1903) who had revived Toussenel's old battlecry.[28]

It is true that in the 1890's a reaction set in: possibly because Socialist opinion had become alarmed by the anti-republican tendencies of the Boulangist movement, which climaxed (and collapsed) in 1889, the centenary of the Revolution. Thus when Regnard published *Aryens et Sémites* in book form in 1890, he was mildly censured by a reviewer in Malon's journal. In the same year Malon's old friend Gustave Rouanet publicly went back on his previous anti-Jewish utterances. By then, however, a good deal of damage had been done, as the public reaction to the Dreyfus Affair later in the decade was to show.

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While all this was going on, a countermovement was slowly taking shape which in the end was destined to prevail. The difficulty in describing it is that it came from quite distinct and uncoordinated parts of the political and intellectual spectrum. Respectable bourgeois liberalism (frequently represented by Protestants belonging to the *haute bourgeoisie*) had always been immune to the noisier and more vulgar forms of anti-Semitism. Democratic radicalism, of the variety represented by Georges Clemenceau, was opposed to racism, though not immune to propaganda directed against high finance. The Radicals (as any candid history of the Dreyfus Affair shows plainly enough) took their time before they entered the arena, and then they speedily converted the struggle for justice into a partisan campaign against clericalism and the military. Catholic opinion, with the exception of a handful of Christian socialists (eventually to find an eloquent champion in Charles Péguy), was traditionally unfriendly to the Jews on every possible count: political, social, religious. The monarchist Right was hostile for nationalist reasons, and because the Jews were associated with the Republic.

Socialist opinion was split. It is significant that the dividing line within and between the various groups (there was no unified Socialist party before 1905) corresponded in the main to the division between those who stuck to tradition, and the innovators of the 1880's and 1890's, whether Marxists, Syndicalists, or democratic Socialists of the Jaurèsian persuasion. Anti-Semitism thus became an issue in the quarrel between the "ancients" and the "moderns": between those who represented the tradition of a purely "French" socialism (whether Blanquist or Proudhonist), and a new generation brought up on the internationalist creed.[29]

In the circumstances it is remarkable that when in 1898 the Socialists finally decided to take a stand on the issue of "revision" (of the original sentence imposed upon Dreyfus), they were able, after some initial confusion, to find common ground, but only to the extent of declaring that the Jewish aspect of the *Affaire* was irrelevant. What was at stake was justice (according to Jaurès), or bourgeois legality (according to Guesde). The issue between these two factions had nothing to do with Dreyfus. It was fought out over the question whether the moral health of the Republic was a matter of concern to the labor movement. The Jaurèsists, as descendants of the Jacobin tradition, asserted that no democrat could stand aside on the issue. The Guesdists (with individual exceptions) adopted what they considered a Marxist position and what was in effect a sectarian one: namely that while Dreyfus was probably innocent, and racial anti-Semitism was rubbish, the whole affair was of no concern to the proletariat.

It is noteworthy that Paul Lafargue (1842–1911) dissented from this line: doubly noteworthy because, being married to Laura Marx, he incarnated in his person the Marxist tradition, so far as it was then understood in France. Lafargue had always stood out against anti-Semitism, and he deplored the policy of abstention practiced by his associates during the Dreyfus Affair. It was, he said, "inexcusable and inexplicable" that the *Parti Ouvrier Français* should have tried to wash its hands of the matter. Guesde's attitude was sectarian and had condemned the party to irrelevance "in a question concerning militarism, military tribunals, bourgeois legality, patriotism, anti-Semitism, etc." But this was a minority viewpoint. The bulk of the party followed Guesde in adopting a neutral stand, while its parliamentary representatives divided up individually between "revisionists," neutralists, and "patriots," *i.e.*, supporters of the governmental line that Dreyfus was a traitor. The "patriots" had to change their tune when the official case began to disintegrate, but there was always the "class standpoint": the whole *Affaire* was of no concern to the workers. Let intellectuals like Jaurès—with

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his following of university professors, school teachers, and students—fight for "abstract justice": the workers had more important matters to think about. Although decked out with Marxist slogans, this was really no more than a revival of the traditional disdain for anything not directly concerned with the "class struggle" in its narrowest sense. No wonder Lafargue thought his colleagues had taken leave of their senses.[30]

IF ONE DISREGARDS internal splits and tactical changes—not to mention the confusion caused by the gradual collapse of the official case against the accused—it is evident enough in retrospect that the *Affaire* made a deeper impact upon the intelligentsia than upon the working class. In itself this is understandable and no discredit to the workers, many of whom barely grasped what was at stake, while others probably thought that it was something for the bourgeois to fight out among themselves. It is hardly surprising that those Socialists who dissented from this attitude were themselves intellectuals, or that Jaurès acquired a larger following among school teachers and students than among manual workers. All this was normal and to be expected. What needs some explanation is that an entire section of the labor movement, led by the Anarchists and the Anarchosyndicalists, at the start of the *Affaire* affected indifference to the issue, or even adopted a frankly anti-Semitic tone.[31]

After what has been said about the Proudhonist tradition, this in itself should occasion no surprise, but two points are noteworthy. In the first place, Proudhon's lifelong obsession with the idea of "justice"—however absurd it might appear to the Guesdists—formed a counterweight to the anti-Jewish mania he had transmitted to his followers. Unless they were prepared to go the whole distance with the racialists, they could not, on their own principles, reject the demand that justice should be done to an individual unfairly charged with an act he had not committed. To that extent the Proudhonist tradition (ultimately an outcrop of the medieval attachment to Natural Law doctrine) provided a foundation for the "revisionists."

A similar consideration applies to the Jacobinism of Jaurès and Clemenceau, though in their case it was concern for the spiritual health of the Republic that drove them into battle. But "the Republic" meant a great deal more to them than a particular form of government. It stood for a principle (equality before the law) which had been compromised by the travesty of justice imposed by the original court-martial. Lastly, there were the "revisionists of the Right," including professional Army officers like Picquart—a Catholic, a conservative, and a nationalist—who quite simply felt that the honor of the Army had been besmirched by the behavior of their superiors in the military hierarchy. In their case, too, the appeal was to normative principles, not to political considerations.

It was precisely for this reason that to many Socialists the invocation of "class solidarity" rang hollow. Lafargue sensed this but was unable to assert himself effectively, thereby laying bare a flaw in the Marxist position: there was no way of formulating a position on the issue except in terms of simple, ordinary, human solidarity. But this —while acceptable to the Anarchists, as well as to Jaurès, or to Christians like Péguy—was not specifically Marxist. It was indeed compatible with Marxism, but it did not necessarily *follow* from anything Marx had said. To put it differently, there might be a socialist ethic, but there was no Marxist ethic, unless the Marxists were prepared to claim the inheritance of traditional humanism. But in that case what became of the "class standpoint"? So far as the Jews belonged to any stratum of French society, it was primarily the middle or lower-middle class. To the extent that this was the case around 1900, the Jewish issue was of no concern to the labor movement. The way out of the dilemma was that adopted by the

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Anarchists in 1898-1900, when (after some soul-searching) they sided with the Dreyfusards in the name of liberty, while refusing to pay special attention to the Jewish issue. But "abstract liberty," like "abstract justice," was not a Marxist slogan. The crisis thus disclosed what some contemporary writers had already begun to sense: that orthodox Marxism (as then understood) had nothing to say about ethics: it was a theory of the revolution, but not a philosophy of life.

The *Affaire* also disclosed something else: that in an emergency most Frenchmen would stand together on the principles proclaimed in 1789 and 1793. If the nationalist anti-Semites of the extreme Right challenged the statement that a Jew could be a French citizen in the full sense of the term, then they would have the bulk of the nation against them: precisely because "the nation" had been created by men who believed that all Frenchmen were equal citizens. Not that France was without its share of racists—they were present even on the Left. But *in principle* it was not possible for adherents of the Republic to deny that citizenship was open to all.

This kind of universalism was lacking in Germany, where there was not even a suitable concept to designate a "citizen." The term *Buerger* had altogether different connotations. It signified a *Stand* (an estate) or rather the tax-paying subject of an authoritarian state whose government would presumably protect the citizens' rights, but did not regard them as the ultimate source of its own authority.

The distinction between "citizen" and "burgher" (which made it possible for French socialists to address each other as *citoyen* while abusing the *bourgeois*) did not exist in Germany. Likewise, the nation was not conceived in politico-moral, but in racial terms. One was a German if one belonged to the *Volk*. If one did not—and the Jews plainly did not, even if they took the extreme step of having themselves baptized —one was indeed a *Staatsbuerger,* with all the usual political and civil rights, but not (to the nationalists) a *German*. This was the rock against which German liberalism beat in vain. The best it could offer the Jews was the hope that by assimilating German culture they would be recognized as members of the German *Kulturgemeinschaft*: a feeble solution which went to pieces after 1918. For that matter, Germany is still a country where the basic distinction between "people" and "nation" is not understood. *That* problem at least the French had solved —thanks to the Revolution.[32]

IV

IT CANNOT BE THE PURPOSE of this essay to go into detail about socialist attitudes on the Jewish problem before and after 1914, but something must be said about that strain in the tradition which ultimately contributed to the fascist movement: the school of thought associated with the name of Georges Sorel. Consideration of this topic brings one down to the crisis of 1914–18, the Russian Revolution, and the rise of reactionary countercurrents.

This was the moment when liberalism began to disintegrate as the cohesive doctrine of European society. In retrospect one sees why Jewish emancipation—one of the principal achievements of the Enlightenment—should at such a time not merely have been called into question, but actually reversed in practice. That some writers who formed part of the general tradition of socialism should have made their contribution to this peculiar achievement need not surprise us if we remember that the antiliberal strain had from the beginning involved a certain ambiguity about the principles of 1789: they were treated with reservations whose meaning disclosed itself when it was no longer "bourgeois democracy," but democracy as such, that came under fire after 1914.

But first a word about anarchosyndicalism, and here it is important to distinguish what this concept signified to its originators

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from the meaning it later assumed for literary bystanders like Sorel. Syndicalism had emerged from a fusion of the Proudhonist tradition with the reviving French workers' movement of the 1880's. This movement, which had arisen on the ruins of the Paris Commune (and freed itself from at least some of the illusions which had helped to promote that historic disaster) was necessarily eclectic in its outlook. In contrast to its sectarian predecessors of the 1860's, it did not worship blindly at the shrine of some doctrinaire: a change which led Marx to observe in 1880 that France was at last beginning to get a real labor movement.[33] The disputes, splits, and reunions, which made up much of the story of the next two decades, were tiresome enough. But at least they involved real issues, were conducted in public, and were decided in a democratic manner: by counting heads at delegates' conferences attended by genuine representatives of an authentic labor movement, not by secret conclaves of self-appointed liberators of mankind.

It was this change of atmosphere—an aspect of the democratization of French public life under the Third Republic—which made it possible for democratic Socialism to develop. In this respect the Guesdist *Parti Ouvrier Français* was just as democratic as its various "reformist" rivals. More or less the same holds good for the Syndicalist movement, although its aims were more revolutionary, Syndicalism having turned its back on parliamentary democracy as being a bourgeois institution. The founders of the movement were indeed closer to the industrial proletariat than were most Socialists, and their demand for what today would be called "workers' control" anticipated a key issue of the future. But if they counterposed working-class autonomy to bourgeois democracy, and the unions (*syndicats*) to the political party, they did not for this reason revive that part of Proudhon's legacy which was pre-Marxist and indeed pre-industrial. Insofar as they had a theory of bourgeois society, it was that of Marx—as they were quite willing to recognize.[34]

When therefore Georges Sorel—after a brief career as an expositor of Marx's doctrine between 1893 and 1898—came forward around 1900 as an exponent of Syndicalism, he was inventing nothing new, but rather latching on to a movement founded years before by men who, unlike himself, were genuine representatives of the working class. And when from 1905 onward he began to give a nationalist and anti-Semitic coloration to his utterances, he was simply reverting to the shadier aspects of the Proudhonist tradition, though without the excuse available to Proudhon. For by the beginning of the 20th century it was no longer plausible to make an issue of "Jewish bankers." *That* stage had been passed, and "Jewish finance" was no longer a topic for writers with any pretension to being taken seriously. Talk about the Rothschilds still went down well with *petit-bourgeois* audiences, especially in the provinces, for Jewish financiers had taken their share of speculative gains, from the first railway boom of the 1840's to the Panama scandal of the 1880's. But French industry did not depend on Jewish merchant-bankers and the French labor movement confronted quite different problems.

Sorel, who (unlike Proudhon) had read and assimilated Marx, knew all this well. It did not prevent him, however, from prefacing a collection of writings in 1905 with an introduction in which Jaurès was accused of having betrayed the Syndicalist utopia for the sake of his friendship with what Sorel, in a typically disagreeable phrase, called the *"Dreyfusards de la Bourse."*[35] Jaurès had in 1904 founded the Socialist daily *l'Humanité* with the help of Jewish sympathizers (including the well-known sociologists Lévy-Brühl and Marcel Mauss) who had been impressed by his courageous, unpopular stand during the Dreyfus upheaval. This was enough for Sorel (who years before had already complained about Saint-Simonian

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tendencies among the parliamentary Socialists) to employ the standard vocabulary of anti-Semitism.

In the current literary fashion one might speculate over the personal motivations which impelled a respectable, middle-aged, middle-class, retired engineer—with the *Légion d'honneur* in his buttonhole, money in the public funds, and an ex-servant girl to look after him (his relatives saw to it that he did not marry her, though she served him faithfully until her death)—to take up first Syndicalism, then nationalism, and finally anti-Semitism. Nothing could be sillier or a more complete waste of time. Sorel was part of a well-established tradition: particularly well-established in the solid provincial middle class from which he stemmed. If he was better educated than Proudhon, he still shared his predecessor's desire to find a formula which would do justice to France's national (and religious) heritage, while accommodating the new working-class movement.

When Sorel, at the age of 45, took up the study of this movement, he did so in the spirit of a learned bystander—a "metaphysician of socialism," as Jaurès called him. Sorel did not change his way of life and never suffered even the most trifling inconvenience for his inflammatory writings. In short, while preaching violence, he remained a typical bourgeois. It is hardly surprising that the actual leaders of Syndicalism regarded him with a good deal of skepticism. Pelloutier, the founder of the movement, had been of middle-class origin too, but he was a martyr who literally killed himself in the service of the cause. No one ever expected Sorel to make the smallest sacrifice for the sake of anything or anybody; nor did he, for all his endless talk of Nietzschean heroism.

A comparatively recent American study of Sorel, in which the Jewish issue comes in for brief mention, sees an extenuating circumstance in his private friendship with Jewish intellectuals, and in his evident absorption in the philosophy of Henri Bergson.[36] The author concludes that, taking Sorel's work as a whole, "anti-Semitism remains a private, minor motif, existing in large measure apart from the foundations of his philosophy or sociology."[37] This is hardly borne out by the same writer's citations from Sorel's polemical tracts during and after the Dreyfus upheaval, from which it emerges quite plainly that his feelings about Jewish emancipation were, to put it mildly, very mixed even at a time when he still considered himself a democrat and had not yet formed a tactical alliance with Charles Maurras and the *Action française*.

Sorel was particularly alarmed by the separation of Church and State in 1905: perhaps the most important consequence of the Radicals' recent triumph. (This, incidentally, was a surgical operation that in the long run facilitated the emergence of a Christian-democratic movement.) As Sorel saw it, French nationalism was in danger of being severed from its medieval roots—though he was (like Maurras) an atheist and did not believe a word of the Christian story. What he liked about French Catholicism was the legend of Jeanne d'Arc and its mythical folklore. It was this side of the national tradition that stood in danger, for *Jewish rationalism was the mortal enemy of myth.* The Jews, with the help of neo-Jacobins like Clemenceau and Jaurès, had won a victory over the Church, hence over the mystical side of French patriotism. But France could not live without myths—the truth would kill it, for truth was the enemy of life![38]

This was also the view of Maurras, a conservative Royalist for whom Catholicism was a necessary fiction: not literally true, but vital for the continued existence of Latin civilization and therefore to be defended against Jews, Protestants, and foreigners. It was on this basis that Sorel and Maurras—the former anarchist and the consistent monarchist—were able, on the eve of 1914, to enter into a spiritual alliance against liberalism, democracy, and the Jews.

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Sorel also discovered, as part of this conversion to irrationalism, that the proletariat needed a "myth." And since the Marxist "myth" seemed to have lost its power (this was before the October Revolution which was to turn Sorel into an enthusiastic, if naive and uncomprehending, admirer of Lenin), he was ready to oblige with a confection of his own: the myth of "the general strike." This, as it happened, was the real faith of the Syndicalist movement before 1914. The idea of the general strike was no one's invention, but something that had grown spontaneously out of the collective imagination of an elite of French workers. That it turned out to be impractical is neither here nor there. As conceived by the true founders of the movement, it had a rational core that embodied the authentic strivings of a real labor movement. To Sorel it was a heroic prefiguration of the revolutionary dawn: not to be taken literally, but to be treated as an imaginative metaphor, prophetic of a coming social transformation. In short, the truth did not matter; nor would it ever matter to Sorel's progeny. His heir was to emerge on Italian soil (for Sorel had a following there too), and it was not to be the saint of Communism, Antonio Gramsci, but his murderer: Mussolini.

SOREL IS IN A FUNDAMENTAL SENSE one of those writers who were responsible for the temporary triumph of Fascism in Italy, and for its virulence in France during the 1930's and 1940's. The meeting ground between his disciples and the more radical adherents of Maurras in the Paris of the years 1908–14 was furnished by a study group known to the initiated as the *Cercle Proudhon.* It was here that nationalist writers and pupils of Sorel elaborated the key elements of what in later years became the French, Italian, Spanish, and Latin-American variants of Fascism.[39]

The *Cercle* issued its own *Cahiers*, the first of which stated the basic principle of the creed as follows:

> Democracy is the greatest error of the past century . . . in economics and politics [it] permitted the establishment of the capitalist regime which destroys in the State that which democratic ideas dissolve in the spirit: namely the nation, the family, morals, by substituting the law of gold for the laws of blood.

Democracy, of course, was a Jewish invention, or at any rate the Jews profited from it, since it enabled them to go about their nefarious business unhindered. Sorel was far from being innocent of this ideological concoction and its murderous consequences; he was directly responsible for it, inasmuch as it was his patronage that made possible the fusion of nationalism with the old doctrines of Proudhon. Sorel's favorite pupil, Édouard Berth, subsequently claimed with good reason that *le fascisme avant la lettre* had come to birth in the *Cercle Proudhon.*[40] This did not prevent Sorel from hailing the advent of Bolshevism in 1917, for he saw it as a triumph over what he hated most—liberal democracy.

Sorel, like many others, misunderstood Lenin's successful *coup* as a spontaneous uprising which would establish a "government of producers."[41] This in itself was simply orthodox Syndicalism and was then generally accepted in France and Italy by the men and women who were soon to found the Communist parties in these two countries. But what of the Jewish element in the Russian upheaval, which by all accounts had been considerable? Sorel had an answer to this too: the constructive side of the October Revolution (he said) was the achievement of Lenin, a true Russian; its unfortunate terrorist aspects were due to the Jews.[42]

The link between Sorel's irrationalism and his anti-Semitism was furnished by his dislike of positive science: a typical *fin-de-siècle* attitude, much in vogue among Parisian intellectuals after 1900 as a result of Bergson's teachings. Unfortunately, Bergson was a Jew, but Sorel was able to accommodate this exception to the general rule, as were

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other anti-Semites of the philosophical kind, e.g., the Jewish writer Bernard Lazare (1865–1903), who before his conversion to Zionism proposed a metaphysical distinction between "Jews" (bad) and "Israelites" (good).[43] This was just the kind of nonsense that appealed to Sorel. Practically it made no difference to the more vulgar anti-Semites, since their objection was to East European Jewish immigrants (mostly proletarians), while Sorel and his circle disliked the Parisian Jewish bourgeoisie: people like Léon Blum or Marcel Proust. One could be a Jew-hater for different reasons: either because the Jews represented liberal rationalism, or because they had helped to pioneer capitalism, or because they were the carriers of that new abomination, international socialism.

In practical terms the whole issue was trivial, since around 1900 there were fewer than 100,000 Jews in France: about half of them in Paris and of these about half were recent immigrants from Russia and Poland. The fact that most of these immigrants were workers and came from countries where a Jewish labor movement had begun to form, naturally caused some reappraisal of the Jewish problem among French Socialists, some of whom began to sympathize with Zionism, while others maintained that the problem had to be solved by the countries concerned. In either case, the traditional image of the Jew as exploiter had been dented, although the more consistent anti-Semites had an answer to that: the Jews were a menace whatever their social origin or political creed.

To say that Sorel's writings around 1914 lent support to this theme is merely to state the obvious. None of this is to suggest that the Jewish problem was of major importance to Sorel. Quite clearly it was not, any more than it was to his pupil Mussolini, until the latter for tactical reasons adopted racial anti-Semitism on the German pattern in 1938. (And even then the execution of the new policies ran into considerable opposition among leading Fascists and was passively sabotaged by the Italian bureaucracy during the war years.) Sorel thought of the Jewish question as an aspect of what he regarded as the decomposition of traditional European culture under the combined impact of capitalism, liberalism, and secular rationalism. If individual Jews, such as Henri Bergson, broke away from the pattern, he was ready enough to praise them. What appealed to him in Bergson's philosophy was the anti-mechanist orientation and the critique of scientific positivism.

It can also be argued that Sorel was guided by a sound instinct when he asserted that a socialist morality must be "an ethic of producers," in the sense of being a morality appropriate to cooperative enterprises carried on by autonomous groups of people who run their own affairs. Only there was nothing original in all this: it was simply the doctrine of Pelloutier and the other founders of Syndicalism. The injection of an anti-Semitic note into this program had nothing to do with it, but was an outcrop of Sorel's personal adherence to the more reactionary aspects of the Proudhonist tradition.

IN JUSTICE TO SOREL it should be noted that he did not explicitly urge the adoption of doctrines known to be false. When he called the "general strike" a necessary myth, he meant that it was something in which the labor movement had to believe if it wished to transcend bourgeois society. Myths were essential because they helped to shape the future, which was always open and undetermined. "Violence" was simply a fact of life, and had to be accepted as such. It did not necessarily imply bloodshed, but rather the uncompromising assertion of one's will to alter the existing state of affairs. Violence was something from which no really serious political movement would shrink. But how did one distinguish one kind of violence from another? Sorel was never able to specify a criterion that would

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have enabled his followers to make a sensible discrimination between necessary and unnecessary violence, or between the rational application of force and the self-destructive glorification of bloodshed. It was just this ambiguity that made it possible for some of them to switch from Syndicalism to extreme nationalism: both movements were antidemocratic, hence welcome. The later career of Mussolini—and the Spanish Falangists who helped to precipitate the civil war in 1936—is an object lesson in what happens to a movement that turns itself over to thinkers of this type.

For the political implications of the doctrine, in the form Sorel gave it from 1907 onward, are evident. If political life was regulated by myths (a notion for which Sorel found support in the writings of Gustave Le Bon), the next step was to inquire whether myths might or might not be manipulated. To this question there were two possible answers: one, that it was possible but undesirable, because truth and decency forbade it (the traditional democratic position); two, that it was dangerous but permissible in the interest of leading the movement in a direction perceived by the elite (or the leader), though not by the masses. The instructive thing about Sorel is that while in his early writings he still took the classical rationalist line (the truth shall make you free), he later became the prisoner of his own irrationalism: if the crowd could be moved by myths (whether religious or political), then it was the responsibility of the leader so to act as to bring the goal nearer, even if he himself had seen through the mythical character of his own slogans.

We all know what became of those who swallowed this line. What matters in our context is the link between Sorel's irrationalism and his growing antipathy to the Jews: they would not go for myths (this was before he had come across Zionism, which anyhow he did not take seriously), and those Jewish intellectuals who were beginning to influence the French Socialist movement were (with individual exceptions) either Marxists or adherents of traditional Cartesianism. In either case they had no use for Sorel, nor he for them.[44]

V

IF, IN THE LIGHT of what has here been said, one were asked to describe the situation in France since 1945, one might venture something like the following: whereas until that date there existed a specifically socialist variant of anti-Semitism, both within the French labor movement and on its intellectual fringe, this is today no longer the case.

The reasons can be summarized under various heads:

- the experience of the German occupation, which drove Frenchmen of all political beliefs (and some who had none) into the Resistance movement;
- the moral shock delivered to the conscience of most Frenchmen—not least the respectable section of the Right typified by the Gaullists—by Hitler's "final solution";
- the corresponding, though less violent and dramatic, reaction of Communists and other left-wingers to the anti-Semitic aspects of Stalin's reign during the dictator's last mad years;
- the revelation that the Jews—or some Jews—were after all capable of founding a state, and even of defending themselves unaided or practically unaided;
- last, the discovery by Frenchmen of the Right and the Left that the longed-for fusion of patriotism with socialism had actually been effected in, of all places, Israel.

Sentiments of this kind—along with occasional echoes of the ancient complaint about "Jewish bankers"—even affected the outlook of the Communist *militant,* as anyone who followed the internal upheaval within the French CP during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war could not help noticing.

All this, in our context, is clearly of importance. It is arguable, however, that while

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the situation has thus changed, certain underlying problems have not been touched upon. Conceivably, some of them are of a kind that defies anything in the nature of a solution. It may well be that the "Jewish problem" as such is inherently insoluble, at any rate within a culture that is still nominally Christian. Yet, something can perhaps be said about the specific theme of this study—the relationship of socialism to the process of Jewish emancipation. It is, after all, arguable that anti-Semitism (or anti-Judaism) will continue to persist within Western culture, and that it must necessarily represent a problem for socialists. That a particular form of socialist anti-Semitism arose in 19th-century Europe may have been due to transitory factors which are no longer operative. On the other hand, it may also reflect a problem permanent enough to warrant some consideration.

Mention has already been made of the paradox which the "principles of 1789" constituted for Frenchmen who, in the generation following the Revolution, discovered that their ancestors had emancipated not merely the *citoyen* but also the *bourgeois*. The awkwardness of this discovery was tempered for a while by the hope that bourgeois society would somehow transform itself peacefully into something else, or that the old agrarian and communitarian values could still be preserved. When these expectations had to be abandoned, it became popular, even among socialists, to blame the Jews. Toward the end of the century, these resentments found expression in more or less rational doctrines, which have been described here in outline. The crisis having passed, there is a natural temptation to conclude that the whole issue is dead. Even so, it may still be pertinent to ask what made it a moral issue for men like Proudhon and Sorel. When we have answered this question, we shall, I think, also have cast some light on a problem in modern society for which the Jews are in no way responsible, but which their collective existence has somehow thrown into sharper relief.

THE DISSOCIATION OF PERSONAL FROM communal values is surely a basic feature of the kind of society in which we live. One may also call it the liberation of the individual from constraints not specifically laid down by law. This is an arrangement which liberals regard as an important achievement of Western society, and even Communists (at any rate in some parts of Eastern Europe) are now beginning to treat as desirable. Unluckily, it is this very dissociation which is at the root of a great deal of the unease caused by the apparent lack of any kind of generally acceptable social morality. And by a further stroke of bad luck, the problem has somehow become entangled with the issue of Jewish emancipation.

To say this is not in any way to suggest that the first generation of newly emancipated Jews, or their successors, were responsible for what was in effect a crisis of modern society. It was not their fault that they were among the beneficiaries of an upheaval which *inter alia* resulted in an enormous enlargement of personal freedom (including the abolition of actual serfdom or slavery). Nor were they to blame because, in a predominantly Catholic and agrarian society such as 19th-century France, they rivalled the (far more influential) Protestant minority in spearheading a new type of economic development. The fact remains that their individualism enabled them to get to the top faster than other groups of society. Moreover, it brought out some of their less lovable traits and gave these public sanction.

To grasp what is at stake it is necessary to stand back a little from the surface configuration of modern society and ask oneself what exactly it is that its citizens take for granted. It will then appear that what they take for granted is something very odd indeed: namely, that there ought to be some kind of social morality—whether of a religious or a secular kind—but that it

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should not interfere with the personal freedom of the individual. For the citizen of modern society conceives of himself as an autonomous person owing no obligations to others or to the community, save for duties that are either contractual or specifically laid down by law. The assumptions underlying this state of affairs have entered the common language, so that it is no longer regarded as reasonable to inquire whether what people "ought" to do as individuals may not be prescribed for them by what they are in fact doing as members of a particular community. Yet any glance at a traditional culture shows that such a condition is most unusual. In medieval society, people knew for certain how X or Y ought to behave, because it was known what sort of position—that of nobleman, clergyman, peasant, etc.—they occupied. Their moral duties did not have to be discussed in abstraction from their social roles. How they behaved (or were supposed to behave) followed ineluctably from who or what they were. *Is* and *ought* had not yet been sundered.

It is the peculiar distinction, but also the peculiar curse of modern society that these circumstances no longer obtain. A person's moral obligation can no longer be defined in terms of his or her social role; in any event, not over an entire range of activities in which certainty had previously been possible because ethical rules applied both to individual and to communal existence. Instead, what we have is an atomization of society into self-propelled individuals held together by legal or contractual ties. What lies beyond these arrangements is an area of free choice, where each individual is on his own. Choice here is "free," not in some metaphysical sense, but in the concrete sense that it is a matter of private judgment. It is for myself to decide how far I am prepared to exert myself on behalf of my neighbor, beyond the constraint inherent in the prohibition to set fire to his house. In principle his problems do not concern me. What I do about them is "my own affair," and in no way dependent on communal standards or shared values. This is what we call freedom. In a traditional society—and the early French socialists had come out of a traditional society which was being disrupted by the market economy—it would have been regarded as madness.

We have become so accustomed to this state of affairs that few people even think it odd, although it is in fact very odd indeed and quite without precedent. It is one aspect of what liberals call "civilization" and what socialists since Marx have called "bourgeois society." It also describes a way of looking at the world which the early socialists quite particularly disliked about the Jews, or at least about those Jews whom they regarded as typical.

Liberal individualism was indeed not specifically Jewish, but it could be represented as being in some way particularly favorable to the Jews, especially in a country like France where the Reformation had failed and where the prevalent mores were still more or less medieval. That capitalism and individualism were both immoral—or rather, that capitalism was immoral insofar as it implied the new individualist ethic—was something a great many Frenchmen in the 19th century were very willing to believe. The liberal bourgeoisie, of course, did not believe it. Precisely for this reason it lacked a mass following in France, whereas it had no difficulty in acquiring such a following in England or America. The French bourgeoisie read Voltaire, but the masses instinctively felt with Rousseau. For the essence of Rousseau's teaching lay in a conception of morality as something both public and private, anchored in a particular way of life: one in which people cooperated instead of competing with each other. To the extent that they took this notion as their conscious or unconscious starting point, virtually all 19th-century socialists (including Marx) based themselves on Rousseau. By the same token they were not dis-

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posed to think highly of people for whom private property and free enterprise established the external framework of moral discourse. A community that was no more than a collection of private individuals was something they did not care for. Moreover, they did not believe that it was more "natural," in the sense of being in conformity with "human nature," than some other type of arrangement. On the contrary, they were inclined to think that it was a perversion that ought to be corrected.

When the war of 1914–18 inaugurated the crisis of liberal civilization, the Jews were among the first and worst sufferers. It was part of the achievement of liberalism that it had for so long protected an unpopular minority from the accumulated resentments surrounding it. The experience of the 1940's showed what could happen if these restraints went by the board: notably in Central and Eastern Europe, where the position of the Jews had always been weaker than in the more civilized West.

Since 1945 a reaction has set in—so much so that it has become difficult to understand the intellectual climate of an age in which anti-Semitism constituted an actual menace to democracy, and even extended into the Socialist movement of the most highly civilized and sophisticated country of Western Europe. Although this particular situation is unlikely to recur (if only because history never repeats itself), the problems from which it arose still await a solution.

Notes

I

[1] Although Silberner discusses this topic, it seems to me a decided weakness that he remains consistently at the historical level, while ignoring the philosophical dimension. It is of course extremely important to know what was actually being said at the time by writers either friendly or hostile to Jewish emancipation, and in the case of Fourier there is perhaps some excuse for treating his anti-Jewish outbursts as personal deviations from the "progressive" norm. But this will not do with later writers who did not suffer from Fourier's psychological quirks, and who had no particular reason for identifying the Jews collectively with habits of lying and stealing. Even if Fourier was in some respects a crank, most of his followers were not. They must have had *some* reason for echoing their master's sentiments, even if in the course of time they abandoned his more extravagant notions: e.g., that the Hebrews were hopelessly debased as a people, or that they ". . . have achieved nothing in art and science, and . . . are distinguished only by a record of crime and brutality which at every page of their loathsome annals makes you sick!" (Fourier, *Oeuvres complètes,* 2d ed. [Paris, 1846–48], I, 61; cited by Silberner in "The Anti-Semitic Tradition in Modern Socialism," p. 1.)

[2] For the philosophical implications of the clash between the ancient Aristotelian-Thomist and the new liberal-individualist view of society, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* (New York: Macmillan, 1966). This is by far the most illuminating treatment of the subject known to this writer. Among others, it clears up a number of widely current misconceptions concerning the role of Hegelian and Marxian thinking in the evolution of socialist ethics.

[3] Silberner, *loc. cit.,* p. 2. See also the same author's "Charles Fourier on the Jewish Question," *Jewish Social Studies,* VIII (1946), 245–266. Although a rationalist himself, Fourier in these passages clearly reflects traditional Catholic attitudes widespread even among people who on grounds of principle favored Jewish emancipation as being the best means of integrating the Jews within the general French community (and incidentally improving their moral character). What made Fourier an anti-Semite was that he denied the likelihood of such a change for the better.

[4] Silberner, *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage,* pp. 22–23. Fourier seems to have anticipated Disraeli and Moses Hess, though it does not follow that he had any influence on them. The idea had been in the air since Napoleon's Egyptian expedition of 1798–99, when the future Emperor affected an interest in, of all things, the Moslem religion. If Islam, why not Juda-

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ism? The Saint-Simonians expected a revelation from the East, to be mediated by a Jewish woman-Messiah. Fourier's project of 1835–36 was more practical:

> Palestine, with its neighboring regions—Damascus, Palmyra, etc.—will become a valuable country when the deserts between Lebanon and Sinai have been irrigated and re-forested by industrial armies, and when the Jordan and the Dead Sea have obtained a navigable access to the Red Sea, the gulf of Etzion-Geber, or Solomon's port of Ophir.

With the help of some Jewish millionaire (who might also incidentally do something for the socialist cause by financing a Fourierist phalanstery, or communal settlement, in Palestine), the kingdom of "Judea or Lebanon" could be re-established and turned over to the Jews, currently exposed to persecution in Germany, Poland, and other parts of Europe. Cf. Fourier, *La fausse industrie* (Paris: 1835–36), I, 224; II, 783–84.

[5] Henri de Saint-Simon, *Le nouveau christianisme* (1825); cf. *New Christianity* (London: 1834); cited in J. L. Talmon, *Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase* (1961), p. 70. See also the same author's discussion of Jewish participation in the Saint-Simonian movement, in *op. cit.*, pp. 77 *ff;* Silberner deals rather briefly with this subject (*Sozialisten zur Judenfrage,* pp. 12 *ff.*). Considering the tremendous impact of Saint-Simonian propaganda upon public opinion in the 1830's, it is arguable that he underrates its importance.

[6] Lechevalier, *Exposition du système social* (Paris: 1832), p. 73.

[7] *Eugène Rodrigues,* in *La religion saint-simonienne* (2d ed., Brussels: 1831). Rodrigues, like Gustave d'Eichthal, belonged to the group of youthful Jewish intellectuals who joined the sect around 1825 or a little later. But they never set the tone: it was the gentile leaders of the school, principally Enfantin and Saint-Amand Bazard, who laid down the basic principles of Saint-Simonism, including the doctrine that Jewish monotheism foreshadowed the coming unity and solidarity of mankind. See Bazard's formulation of the official *Doctrine saint-simonienne* (1829), reprinted in Saint-Simon, *Oeuvres* (Paris: 1865–78), XLII, 145.

[8] Talmon, *op. cit.*, pp. 122–24.
It is notorious that Enfantin and Barrault in the 1830's led an expedition to the Orient, and that its eventual outcome was not the discovery of the *femme-Messie,* but the construction of the Suez Canal. Such ironic transformations were the stuff of history in the age of Romanticism. What needs to be retained is that, in the eyes of the Saint-Simonians, the historic role of the Jewish people was not yet exhausted.

[9] Walter Ullman, *A History of Political Thought: The Middle Ages* (London: 1965), pp. 58 *ff.* and *passim.*

[10] Silberner, *The Anti-Semitic Tradition,* p. 2. Cf. *Publication des manuscrits de Charles Fourier* (Paris: 1851–58), III, 35.

[11] This is not to say that the subject was of overwhelming importance to Fourier: he had a great many other and more pressing things on his mind. All the same, it seems a trifle odd to dismiss the topic with the remark that he "tried to bribe the Rothschilds with the Kingdom of Jerusalem if they would finance his projects." (Frank E. Manuel, *The Prophets of Paris.* New York: Harper, 1962, p. 204.) It is more to the point that, as the same author observes, "An authentic and complete history of Fourierism and its influence would have to cover much territory, settlements ranging from the prairies of mid-nineteenth century America to the *kibbutzim* of modern Israel." (*Ibid.*, p. 209.) For it is one of the ironies of the subject that Israel was in the end the only country where a large-scale and successful experiment along Fourierist lines was undertaken: by Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe brought up on the socialist tradition which Charles Fourier had helped to found.

II

[12] A. Toussenel, *Les Juifs, rois de l'époque: histoire de la féodalité financière* (Paris: 1845, 1847). Considérant's rejoinder to the polemical preface to the second edition appeared in his journal, *La Démocratie pacifique,* of January 31, 1847. For details see Silberner, *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage,* pp. 32–34. Toussenel had *inter alia* poured abuse upon the Protestants, a circumstance unlikely to endear him to the numerous Fourierist sympathizers in the United States. This may have been among the reasons why some of his former colleagues were glad to be rid of him.

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[13] Victor Considérant, *La Destinée sociale,* 2d ed. (Paris: 1849), II, 43.

[14] Silberner, *The Anti-Semitic Tradition,* p. 2, citing Toussenel, *op. cit.,* pp. 73–74.

[15] For the original text see Marx-Engels, *Werke* (Berlin: 1960), VII, 15. Marx cites the correct title of Toussenel's pamphlet, whereas the two-volume English-language selection published in Moscow in 1958 (Marx-Engels *Selected Works,* I, 143) gives the title as "Usurers Kings of the Epoch." In the same passage, "Das Frankreich der Börsenjuden" is translated as "the France of the Bourse jobbers." A tactful concession to the spirit of the post-Stalin era?

[16] Silberner, *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage,* pp. 44 *ff*; see also the same author's "Pierre Leroux's Ideas on the Jewish People," *Jewish Social Studies* VIII (1946), IX (1947), XII (1950). For the general background see H. J. Hunt, *Le Socialisme et le romantisme en France* (Oxford: 1935), *passim.* Leroux's editorship of the *Revue encyclopédique* from 1831 to 1835 forms an interesting chapter in the history of French literary criticism, but the subject cannot be pursued here. In 1841–42 he edited the *Revue indépendante,* together with his friend and disciple George Sand, who shared his ideas and projected them in her novels.

[17] Silberner, *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage,* pp. 46–51. Leroux's publication of a dramatized version of Job, in 1866, initiated a controversy with Renan who, in a study of the Semitic languages, had assigned to the Semites an inferior rank among the races of mankind. Leroux disputed this judgment, while Renan for his part questioned Leroux's competence as a Hebrew scholar. The controversy afforded Leroux an opportunity to emphasize his disagreement with Renan's thesis that the Semites were in every respect inferior to the Indo-Europeans. It is not irrelevant that Renan, who expressed such views in the 1860's, was a doctrinaire rationalist and politically a moderate liberal.

[18] *Carnets de P.-J. Proudhon. Texte inédit et intégral,* ed. Pierre Haubtmann (Paris: 1960–61), II, 337–38. For the pre-history of this incident see also Haubtmann, *Marx et Proudhon* (Paris: 1947). Georges Gurvitch, in his otherwise very scholarly and balanced *Proudhon. Sa vie, son oeuvre* (Paris: 1965), cites a few polemical shafts directed against Marx by Proudhon in his marginalia to Marx's book, but is silent on the topic of Proudhon's maniacal Jew-hatred. It is true that Proudhon was in the habit of fulminating in similar fashion against other opponents, and against entire peoples as well. Thus in the same passage, after the Hitlerian outburst just quoted, one may read the grotesque sentence: "La haine du juif, comme de l'Anglais, doit être un article de notre foi politique." (The hatred of the Jew, as that of the English, must be an article of our political faith.) Proudhon could also cite the authority of Voltaire for the notion that the Jews should be sent back to Palestine. Thus in the summer of 1847 one finds him writing: "Je hais cette nation [juive]. Il faut accomplir le voeu de Voltaire, la renvoyer à Jerusalem." (*Carnets,* II, 150.) But Voltaire's proposal (like most of his utterances) was no more than a jest, and it proceeded from a spirit of frivolity quite foreign to the mentality of Proudhon. Whatever Proudhon wrote or said, he was always in deadly earnest. See Daniel Halévy, *La vie de Proudhon 1809–1847* (Paris: 1948), *passim.*

[19] Duchêne, *L'Empire industriel* (Paris: 1869), p. 196; cited by Silberner, "The Anti-Semitic Tradition," p. 5. Duchêne was perhaps not in every respect representative of the Proudhonist movement, but his pamphlet followed a line of reasoning suggested by Proudhon in his writings of the 1850's, notably his *Philosophie du progrès* (1853) and his *Manuel du Spéculateur à la Bourse* (1857). One of Proudhon's pet hates under the regime of Napoleon III (1852–70) was what he called the *Empire industriel:* in other words, the association of the Imperial regime with the growth of industrial capitalism; and he hated it all the more bitterly because it was being promoted by former Saint-Simonians. To him these men were "initiators of the new feudalism," and he did not think any the better of them because some (though by no means the most important) were Jews.

[20] Proudhon, *France et Rhin,* p. 260. See also *Carnets,* I, 133: "Les juifs n'iront jamais à Jerusalem."

[21] *Césarisme et christianisme,* I, p. 139.

[22] Proudhon, *De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'église* (Paris: 1858), I, 445. This is

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one of the links between the older religious form of Jew-hatred and the new racialism which replaced it from the 1850's onward. Proudhon, the confused autodidact, adhered to both doctrines simultaneously. In *Jésus et les origines du christianisme* (published posthumously in 1896) the Jews are blamed for having rejected the religious reformation associated with Jesus (in whose divine mission Proudhon, being an atheist, did not believe). But this failure is attributed to their generic incapacity for sound morality and political common sense: had they been more sensible, they would have followed Jesus and thus promoted the peaceful reformation of their own community and of the Roman Empire, instead of clinging to their supposed uniqueness (*Ibid.*, p. 122). On the other hand, Proudhon gives them no credit for the Jewish ancestry of Jesus and his disciples. On his assumptions it was indeed scarcely conceivable that Jesus should have been a Jew.

[23] "L'être complet . . . c'est le mâle. La femme est un diminutiv d'homme . . . une sorte de moyen terme entre lui et le reste du règne animal." (*De la justice,* IV, 134–35). Elsewhere he established the mathematical rule that the *valeur totale* of men to women was in the proportion of 27 to 8, woman being immoral by nature. "Par sa nature, la femme est dans un état de démoralisation constante." It is true that he might have cited the Church Fathers in support of this thesis. In reading Proudhon one must always bear in mind that, for all his fiery atheism, he was basically the product of a Catholic peasant culture.

[24] *Archives Bakounine* (Leiden: 1963), Vol. I part 2, pp. 124–26. See also A. Lehning, Introduction to *Michel Bakounine et les conflits dans l'Internationale, 1872; op. cit.,* II. For Bakunin's general anti-Semitism see Silberner, *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage,* ch. 18. Bakunin never tired in his denunciation of Hess, Marx, and other "Jewish leaders" of the German labor movement. Writing to Albert Richard in 1870, before his dispute with Marx had broken into the open, he observed that the leading German socialists were largely Jews "that is, exploiters and bourgeois." All his enemies belonged to the accursed race. "All these mountebanks are Jews: Marx, Hess, Borkheim, Liebknecht [sic!], Jacoby, Weiss, Utin, and many others, they are all Jews. By tradition and instinct they belong to this restless, intriguing and exploitative bourgeois nationality." (See Bakunin, "Lettres à un Français" [1870], in *Oeuvres,* IV, 69.) In the passage already cited (dating from the end of 1871 or the beginning of 1872) in which it is asserted that Marx and the Rothschilds are linked by secret sympathies, Bakunin continues:

> This may seem strange. What can there be in common between communism and high finance? Oh, the communism of Marx wants a mighty centralization by the State, and where this exists there must nowadays inevitably be a central State bank, and where such a bank exists, the parasitical Jewish nation, which speculates on the labor of the people, will always find a means to sustain itself. ("Rapports personnels avec Marx," in *Oeuvres,* III, 208–09.)

In the light of such utterances, the notorious appeal of the *Narodnaya Volya* on September 1, 1881, for a pogrom against the "Jewish Tsar," the Jews, and the nobles, is hardly surprising. It is true that this particular line of conduct eventually went out of fashion among the Russian Populists, but that was *after* Marxism had won a foothold among them. In 1881 the Executive Committee of the *Narodnaya Volya* still took its line from Bakunin's spiritual heirs, though even then some of its members objected.

III

[25] For Blanqui see Alan B. Spitzer, *The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 80 *ff;* R. F. Byrnes, *Anti-Semitism in Modern France* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1950) I, 156–58 and *passim.* In his writings, Blanqui adopts the then customary identification of French capitalism with high finance, and of the latter with Jewish bankers, but he does not make much of it, apart from some standard abuse of the Rothschilds. What he thought of the Jews in general may be inferred from an unpublished reference to them as "the type, the ideal and the incarnation of swindling, usury and rapacity. They are the horror of the nations because of their pitiless cupidity, as they had once been because of their enmity and war to the death against the human race." (Blanqui mss., 9587, p. 305;

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cited by Spitzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–82.) This is clearly an echo of Tacitus' characterization of the Jews as *odium generis humani.*

Blanqui's anti-Semitism was of the 18th-century variety. Tridon, who came later, had already soaked up the new racialism. *Du Molochisme juif* (Paris: 1884) is full of rant about the Semites as the "evil genius of the world. All their gifts are pestilence. . . . To fight the Semitic spirit and ideas is the aim of the Indo-Aryan race." (*Op. cit.*, p. 5). The same theme is sounded by another Blanquist, Albert Regnard (1836–1903), a publicist briefly prominent in the 1871 upheaval when he helped to run the Commune's police. His article series "Aryens et Sémites," first published in the *Revue socialiste* in 1887–89 and later expanded into a book, rang the changes upon the topic of Aryan superiority to the Semites, as did his later writings. Capitalism, according to him, is largely a Jewish invention, whereas socialism is "a Franco-German creation, *i.e.*, Aryan in the fullest sense of the term." (*Op. cit.*, p. 517, quoted by Silberner, "French Socialism and the Jewish Question 1865–1914," *Historia Judaica,* XVI [April 1954], 6–7.) But then what of Marx? This indeed became an insoluble problem for those Blanquists who were racists; in the end they drew the logical conclusion by quitting a movement which had become, at any rate nominally, Marxist.

[26] For Malon's writings, see Silberner, "French Socialism and the Jewish Question," pp. 8 *ff.* Most of his citations are culled from Malon's essay "La Question juive," *Revue socialiste,* III (1886) and later articles in the same periodical which was then engaged in a running fight with the Marxists.

[27] Malon, in *Revue socialiste,* XI (1890), 349.

[28] Chirac, *Les Rois de la République* (Paris: 1888). The Jews were of course ruining France—that went without saying. But they were also working with the Russian nihilists and other conspiratorial sects. Indeed, Jewish "international finance" was behind the attempts on the Tsar's life. (Chirac, in *Revue socialiste,* IV [1886], 975.) There is hardly a theme of modern anti-Semitism not already sounded by this pamphleteer of the 1880's.

[29] This topic is neglected by Silberner, although he notes, reasonably enough, that the Marxist *Parti Ouvrier Français* of Guesde and Lafargue took the lead in warning the workers to pay no attention to the anti-Semites. Guesde indeed went so far as to tell them that the trade name of the firm exploiting them was "not Moses and Co., but Christ and Co." ("La Question Juive," *Le Socialiste,* June 26, 1892). This was hardly the most tactful way of weaning the workers from religious fanaticism, but then tact was never Guesde's long suit. His original attitude to the Dreyfus Affair was cast in a rigidly doctrinaire mold: it was a subordinate quarrel between two bourgeois clans in which the proletariat had no interest. However sterile (he later modified this stand), this sectarianism at least had the effect of focusing the attention of his supporters on what mattered most to them: the class struggle. Inversely, Jaurès—who now and then fell into the ancient habit of denouncing Jewish rapacity as a particularly disagreeable form of capitalist profit-mongering—took his stand on principle too: the difference being that what mattered to him was *justice.*

[30] Claude Willard, *Les Guesdistes* (Paris: 1965), pp. 410 *ff.* The issue was complicated by the conflict between the Guesdist group and the followers of Jaurès, who stood further to the Right and on occasion cooperated with the bourgeois Radicals led by Clemenceau. It is noteworthy that the Guesdist P.O.F. did participate in the general left-wing campaign against militarism, clericalism, and anti-Semitism. The Guesdist election manifesto of April 1898 (when the *Affaire* was nearing its first great climax) made considerable play with the theme that the ruling classes were undermining democratic legality; it also asserted that the working class must defend the Republic, "this instrument of your emancipation." Three months later, following another batch of official charges against Dreyfus (the last), the Guesdist parliamentarians refused to sponsor a "revision" of the original trial, while a formal declaration by the party's national council sounded the sectarian note: what mattered was the social revolution, not an alleged injustice committed against an individual. It was this declaration that evoked Lafargue's protest, as well as an outcry among Socialist student

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groups favorable to "revision"; see Willard, *op. cit.*, pp. 414–15. The legal case against Dreyfus began to collapse in August 1898, with the confession and suicide of Colonel Henry, but this did not affect the substance of the dispute between the Guesdists and their Jaurèsist opponents. To the end, the argument turned upon the issue of "abstract justice" versus the "class standpoint." The Guesdist party congress in September of that year sought a compromise by passing a unanimous resolution against nationalism and anti-Semitism, while refusing to pronounce judgment on the "individual case" of Captain Dreyfus. This at any rate committed the P.O.F. to a line consonant with the tradition of "republicanism," although it did not satisfy the "revisionists," for whom a matter of principle was at stake.

[31] See Jean Maitron, *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste en France (1880–1914)*, 2nd ed. (Paris: 1955), pp. 311 *ff.* This is the standard work on the subject, written by a scholar of distinction who himself represents what is left of the tradition of "libertarian socialism." It is the more significant that his chapter on the crisis of the 1890's ("Les Anarchistes et l'Affaire Dreyfus") makes no attempt to gloss over the embarrassing aspects of the subject. Pure Anarchism (as distinct from Anarchosyndicalism, which was at least semi-Marxist) was then a dying movement and no longer possessed an important following among the industrial working class, but it still had a hold upon some elements of the intelligentsia and the proletariat. Its journals—notably *Le Père Peinard, Le Libertaire* and *Les Temps Nouveaux*—at first either affected to ignore the *Affaire*, or else blew the anti-Semitic trumpet. For a revelatory specimen, see the following (unfortunately not translatable) passage from an article by the veteran Anarchist Emile Pouget in No. 72 of *La Sociale* of September 20–27, 1896:

> . . . le youpin Dreyfus est un galonnard, patriote jusqu-au bout des orteils, qui, gratte-papier au ministère de la guerre, maquignonnait les secrets de polichinelle qu'on gard précieusement dans cette sale boîte. . . Son commerce malpropre prospérait, lorsque, il y a deux ans, on découvrit le pot-aux-roses. . .
> (Maitron, *op. cit.*, pp. 312–14.)

In fairness it should be added that in 1898 a campaign in favor of Dreyfus began in the most important of the Anarchist journals, S. Faure's *Libertaire*. A prisoner in chains on Devil's Island appealed to the Anarchist temperament which had after all consistently championed the cause of prison inmates. From 1899 onward most Anarchists (including Pouget) became active in the "revisionist" campaign, although an Anarchist congress in 1900 still heard some warnings against unthinking philo-Semitism: the proper line for the libertarian movement (it was said) lay in ignoring racial and religious considerations altogether. At any rate one can say that by 1900 the poisonous legacy of the past had been shaken off.

[32] For the 19th-century German background to the Emancipation see Nicholas Lobkowicz, "Marx's Attitude Toward Religion," in *Marx and the Western World*, Lobkowicz ed. (University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, p. 303 *ff.*) This is not the place to engage in the tangled issue of Marx's paradoxical and rather self-contradictory utterances on the Jewish question. From a theoretical viewpoint, his personal psychology—which was quite simply that of an emancipated German Jew of his generation—is considerably less important than his failure to work out a satisfactory doctrine of citizenship. For this he had to thank his Hegelian inheritance, plus the fact that his personal commitment was to a kind of secular messianism which made sense only on assumptions he never spelled out, save here and there in his early writings: and his French followers around 1900 knew nothing of the *Paris Manuscripts*. On Marx's attitude to Jewish emancipation see Silberner, "Was Marx an anti-Semite?" *Historia Judaica*, XI (1949); Solomon F. Bloom, "Karl Marx and the Jews," *Jewish Social Studies*, IV (1942); Nathan Rotenstreich, "For and against Emancipation: The Bruno Bauer Controversy" (*Yearbook IV* [1959] of the Leo Baeck Institute, London). There is no evidence that Marx's essay of 1844 on the Jewish question played any part in disposing the French socialists to reconsider the topic. When Drumont on one occasion referred to it in print, Jaurès (in the *Petite République* of December 13, 1898) retorted that Drumont had misunderstood Marx, although he added that the Jews, "accustomed

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by centuries of persecution to practice solidarity," had indeed developed an excessive fondness for the precious metals and for capital accumulation in general. In the context of the debate then raging, this line of reasoning was not discordant with Jaurès' frequently expressed admiration for "the Jewish race" (a term then in general use), and especially for such of its representatives as Maimonides, Spinoza, and Marx.

IV

[33] Marx to F. A. Sorge, November 5, 1880. See *Selected Correspondence* (Moscow: 1956), p. 404. The first French "Marxists" of the 1880's were largely innocent of any real understanding of Marx's theories: a circumstance which did not bother him, since—unlike some of his later followers—he was convinced that an adequate grasp of the subject would eventually evolve from the maturation of the movement.

[34] For this subject see among others Edouard Dolléans, *Histoire du mouvement ouvrier 1871–1936* (Paris: 1946), especially pp. 33 *ff.;* Maitron, pp. 249 *ff.* and *passim;* Pierre Monatte, *Trois scissions syndicales* (Paris: 1958), *passim.* This is not the place to go into the history of Syndicalism. Let it simply be said that the movement's real founders—Fernand Pelloutier, Victor Griffuelhes, and the others who came together in the 1880's and 1890's—deserve a better fate than being treated as precursors of Sorel. Their veritable legacy is to be found in the writings of Antonio Gramsci, who helped to organize the works council movement in Northern Italy in 1919–20, before he was deflected into the leadership of the newly-founded Italian Communist party. Syndicalism from the start turned upon the idea of autonomous producers running their own affairs without interference from anybody (not even from a revolutionary party). Whether this is feasible is immaterial: at any rate, it is what the movement was about.

[35] Sorel, Preface of 1905 to *Matériaux d'une théorie du prolétariat* (Paris: 1919). Silberner, in "Anti-Jewish Trends in French Revolutionary Syndicalism" (*Jewish Social Studies,* XV, No. 3–4, 1953) dates the change in Sorel's attitude from 1912, when he published an apology of the anti-Semitic writer Urbain Gohier, who had recently broken with the Socialist movement. But the Preface of 1905 already prefigured the subsequent drift of his thought in a direction later exploited by Mussolini's followers (though not by the German "National Socialists," for whom Sorel was not racialist enough).

[36] Irving Louis Horowitz, *Radicalism and the Revolt Against Reason* (London: Routledge, 1961, New York: Humanities Press), p. 41.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] Horowitz notes that Sorel began to formulate his viewpoint on this topic in the *Cahiers de la Quinzaine* from 1901 onward. This is a useful corrective to Silberner's account of the subject which emphasizes the nationalist and anti-Semitic agitation in France between 1910 and 1914. In April 1911 two prominent Syndicalist agitators, Pataud and Janvion, sponsored a mass meeting in Paris which was advertised in advance as "a great anti-Jewish and anti-Masonic" demonstration. An audience of some 2,000 people—including numerous *Camelots du Roi, i.e.,* followers of Maurras and the *Action française*—heard anti-Semitic tirades which reminded a Russian visitor who was present of the pogromists in his native county. (Silberner, "Anti-Jewish Trends," p. 196.) The lead taken by prominent Syndicalists on this occasion drew violent protests from Jean Longuet (Marx's grandson) in the Socialist *l'Humanité,* and from Gustave Hervé and Sébastien Faure in the Anarchist *Guerre Sociale.* The culprits were, however, quite unrepentant. And, what is more, their assertion that socialist internationalism only benefited the "kikes" (*youtres*) at the expense of honest Frenchmen clearly struck a popular chord: otherwise they would not have continued their agitation in the Anarchist *Terre libre* which ran a simultaneous campaign against capitalism, philo-Semitism, Jewish immigrant workers, and "the Judaized gang of Jaurès." (Silberner, *ibid.,* p. 198.) This was the popular, or populist, side of a movement to which Sorel shortly afterwards became a convert: on January 1, 1912, when he published a lengthy and violent anti-Semitic tirade in support of Gohier's demand that the French learn to defend their traditions against the Jewish inva-

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sion. Sorel, "Urbain Gohier," *Indépendance,* (January 1, 1912), p. 320. See also his article "Quelques prétentions juives," *Indépendance,* III (1912), where the Jews are collectively accused of subverting Christian civilization, undermining decent moral standards, and encouraging the spread of pornographic literature.

[39] Ernst Nolte, in *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York: Holt Rinehart, 1966), p. 71, gives a brief account of this fusion of nationalism with pseudo-socialism. Nolte also suggests that "the precipitating factor was the collaboration on the newspaper *Action Française* of the highly gifted son of the working class, George Valois." Maurras himself had no use for national-socialism. He was a traditional conservative, and at bottom a paternalist in the fashion common among upholders of the Monarchy and the Church since the early 19th century. But if Maurras was to find disciples in Franco and Salazar, Sorel can claim Mussolini—the ex-socialist turned nationalist. As for Valois (whose real name was Alfred Georges Gressent), his doctrine has been called "a strange mixture of Nietzsche, Maurras, Sorel, and Christianity," though the Christian content is barely visible. He appears to have started a fascist group called *Le Faisceau* in 1925, deliberately modelled upon Mussolini's regime. In later years he became reconciled to democracy. Nolte, *op. cit.,* p. 473.

[40] *Ibid.,* p. 71. It is not quite clear why Nolte regards this claim as unfounded. After all, the first step is the one that counts, and the decisive step in the intellectual pre-history of Fascism was taken in the *Cercle Proudhon:* appropriately named after Marx's old enemy.

[41] Sorel, *Matériaux d'une théorie* (postscriptum of 1918 to the unpublished Preface of 1914). Here the October Revolution is welcomed for having revealed to the proletariat that its mission cannot be accomplished otherwise than by doing away with "formal democracy" and establishing a *gouvernement de producteurs.* The rational core of this idea later entered into the doctrines of Italian Communism. Its irrational glorification of violence and terror was duly inherited by Stalinists and Fascists alike, and to this day forms a common bond between them.

[42] Gaëtan Pirou, *Georges Sorel* (Paris: 1927), p. 50. See also the fourth edition of Sorel's *Réflexions sur la violence* (Paris: 1919), p. 450, where he dwells upon this theme. The *Réflexions*—originally published in 1907—made Sorel famous. In retrospect the book appears as a bridge from his earlier pseudo-Marxism to his subsequent conversion to Bergson-cum-Nietzsche. Sorel fancied himself a philosopher. It would have pained him had he known in 1918 that Lenin held a poor opinion of his essays on the philosophy of science in which he had tried his hand at metaphysics in the Bergsonian manner. (*Cf.* Lenin, *Materialism and Empiriocriticism,* in *Collected Works,* XIV, 292.)

[43] For Lazare and the beginnings of pro-Zionism among French Socialists see Silberner, "French Socialism and the Jewish Question," pp. 27 *ff.* Before 1914 this was hardly an issue. After 1917 Léon Blum and others became active in pro-Palestine committees, though they dissented from the Zionist position that Palestine could offer a solution to the Jewish problem. Lazare was unusual in that, having become a Jewish nationalist under the impact of the Dreyfus Affair, he attended Zionist congresses and maintained that "there is a Jewish nation" and that it must have its own territory, so as to accomplish its collective regeneration. This regeneration would have to be social as well as national, for Lazare had no use for the Jewish bourgeoisie. Neither did those East European Jewish Socialists who pioneered the Palestinian land settlements after 1906. By an agreeable paradox, most of them were admirers of Fourier and Proudhon.

[44] For the French development during the 1930's see Georges Lefranc, *Le Mouvement Socialiste sous la Troisième République* (Paris: 1963); especially pp. 286 *ff.,* on the internal crisis of the Socialist party which in the end led to the departure of the so-called neo-Socialists in 1933. The reason why some of them eventually turned to Fascism cannot be discussed here, and the same applies to the parallel development in Belgium. See *Beyond Marx: The Faith and Works of Hendrik de Man,* by Peter Dodge (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), *passim,* for a rather apologetic treatment of this important topic.

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Bernard Rosenberg

Mass Culture—a Cri de Coeur

IS MASS CULTURE AN ABOMINATION, a harmless anodyne, or a blessing? These are the real, if often merely implicit, questions in an interminable and ferocious debate. No one yields. Even now, when most of us are tired of each other's polemics, the issue will not go away. And why should it when so much is at stake?

I was once chided by an eminent art critic for sullying myself with this subject matter. He said to me and people of my captious disposition, as though addressing himself to sex censors who privately revel in pornography, "If you don't like the goods, stop handling them." (Days after his printed attack, we met by chance at Cinema 16 where he and I had gone, for our delectation, to view *Gold Diggers of 1936.*)

Of course you can stop handling the stuff, but it won't stop handling you. We are all implicated in a phenomenon which continues to revolt some of us as much as it pleases others. Many, like Marshall McLuhan and his followers, have managed to find peace in the electric wonderland, celebrating what used to sicken them. After a few years of courtship McLuhan *married* the Mechanical Bride, a lady whose every gesture used to repel him. Anachronistically, he now *writes* in a psychedelic delirium comparable only to that of Timothy Leary. (Will they collide and embrace as inner and outer space converge?)

Here we confront the champions of two debilitating and hazardous drugs: TV and LSD. TV, which probably helps to derange the nervous system through constant interruption and certainly hastens the onset of glaucoma, also turns out to be radioactive (and not just from cultural fallout). LSD in good solid cubes can induce psychosis. Each is hallucinogenic in its own way. These are the media we are asked to exalt. To what end? To the end that we should have a transcendental experience hitherto denied the species—and find God. Can anyone in his senses, a human being who despite Leary's advice has not fully "blown his mind," help resisting when these Ad Alley physiotherapists lay their hands on him?

So back we go, and damn the opposition. Above all, damn that part of it according to which mass culture does not even constitute a problem.

The pose of objectivity is precluded. Rational discourse cannot take place when one group of passionate defenders claims scientific detachment for itself and dismisses every detractor as hopelessly subjective and emotional. Facts must be gathered and analyzed, but every one of us is, at bottom, engaged in a battle over values. Literary intellectuals are licensed to express their preferences, but social scientists, if governed by positivist dogma, are supposed to remain disinterested. Whether there are more television sets than bath tubs in the land (there are) can be statistically determined. Whether this ratio is desirable is a question about which moral judgment must come into play.

It was never otherwise. August Comte, that brilliant neologist, coined two durable terms and unnaturally joined one to the other. They are: sociology and positivism. Comte's first publication was *A Program of Scientific Work Required for the Reorganization of Society.* The founder of sociology saw a world out of kilter and, quixotically, proposed to set it aright. Here and abroad, Comte's successors

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have followed in his footsteps. Social scientists, hip-deep in the values they ritually forswear, cannot help being "problem-centered." Given race prejudice, overpopulation, suicide, or juvenile delinquency, they commit themselves to studying the problem in hand, with a view to ameliorating it. Only to mass communications do some social scientists apply the pretense of utter detachment. Actually, on this topic, everyone is prejudiced. We had better own up to that simple truth.

If illusory objectivity is inadmissible, so is the contention that critics of mass culture are *ipso facto* hostile to "the masses." Some are, *e.g.*, Ortega, the later incarnation of Dwight Macdonald, and Ernest van den Haag. They speak from an "aristocratic" point of view best elucidated over a century ago by Alexis de Tocqueville. I side with that earlier Macdonald who saw the masses (which is to say, everybody) as victims of a merciless technological invasion that threatened to destroy their humanity.

TO REJECT "MASS-CULT" AND "MID-CULT" is to espouse high culture—and to do that is to be put down in certain circles as a snob. Very well; there are worse epithets. Shakespeare really does seem to me a better playwright than Arthur Miller and a better writer than Mickey Spillane. That they—and Homer and Faith Baldwin—are all popular is irrelevant. Such enormous qualitative differences separate them that no common frame of reference is broad enough to encompass their works.

But there is a more vicious snobbery which converts "masses" into "slobs" feeding on cultural garbage prepared for them by their betters. Mad Avenue chefs "know" that finer fare should not be wasted on ordinary men and women. The communications industry drips with this contempt. Tough executives brutally assert the complete disdain they feel for their audiences. When a Frank Stanton or a Leo Rosten phrases these feelings with greater elegance, we are still only slightly shocked. Intellectuals inside the business world may deserve a measure of compassion: Mr. Gilbert Seldes of CBS must walk more softly than Professor Gilbert Seldes of the academic world. It is really distressing, however, that so many philosophers, historians, psychologists, and other academics should also be irremediably contemptuous of the people at large.

The same distinguished social scientist who acts as a prime consultant to the ad industry is capable of writing a book which purports to demonstrate that ads have no appreciable effect whatsoever.*
While advising his clients on how to improve the efficacy of advertising, he tells his colleagues that it has none, that the mass media are powerless to form or change opinion. Competitive if indistinguishable products—like variously packaged political candidates—are said to be bought on the basis of personal influence. Those who propound this theory, when they are not subverting it, believe that direct face-to-face confrontation is really decisive: parishioners look to their priests, wives to their husbands, an army of susceptible followers respond to the "influentials" in their midst. Very interesting, but only small children and total amnesiacs could mistake this grotesque picture for reality.

Let us not overtax our memories. You will recall that in 1942 China was our noble

* A friendly critic objects that I have been less than fair in presenting Paul Lazersfeld's famous thesis. But no one protested in 1963 when Joseph Bensman and I put the matter as follows: "The public is unequally exposed to mass communications, and quite often, as the sociologist Paul Lazersfeld has shown, those more exposed influence others who have trouble deciding between candidates and commodities. A personal element is present in what Lazersfeld and Elihu Katz call 'the two-step flow' of mass communications. A heavy consumer of mass culture watches Ben Casey, listens to Chet Huntley, or vibrates via old movies to Clark Gable, and perhaps influences others to smoke Camels, buy Ever-Ready Batteries, prize dimpled masculinity, and abandon the undershirt. That messages originating in television, radio and films circulate this way—in a kind of aquatic mazurka, taking two steps instead of one—has misled some students into believing that personal influence is more powerful than the mass media. Yet, on the evidence so far adduced, opinion leaders who learn what to think from *Time* magazine, from *The Defenders*, from David Brinkley, merely magnify the power of these institutions by incorporating and transmitting their judgments to a still wider circle. I may buy Richard Nixon as my candidate at your suggestion, but if your suggestion comes from the firm of Batten, Barten, Durstine and Osborne, the advertising agency for the Republican National Committee, *there*, and not in your persuasive skill, lies the locus of power."

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Far Eastern ally. Now the only good Chinaman (unless on the island of Formosa) is a dead one; the Chinks are little yellow bastards. And Japan is our noble Far Eastern ally. Suppose the year is 1938: Stalin is a butcher, the U.S.S.R. is a police state, its people are slaves. By 1943 "Uncle Joe" is an amiable autocrat. If the U.S.S.R. is politically undemocratic, it is economically democratic and getting to be politically democratic, whereas the U.S. is economically undemocratic but politically democratic, and getting to be economically democratic. At that time "everyone" understood how these disparate societies were actually very much alike. Income disparities seemed to be greater in Russia, and didn't that bode well for it?—as Henry Wallace, Henry Luce, Samuel Goldwyn and General Sarnoff kept telling us. A demurrer from this nonsense in those days rendered us politically suspect, "premature anti-Communists."

By 1948 it was okay, or rather it was mandatory, to repeat what had been said in 1938. Later, as President Eisenhower made a move toward *rapprochement* with Russia soon after settling the Korean War, it looked as if the infinitely flexible media would be mobilized yet again, this time to make Khrushchev into Uncle Niki. When *détente* comes, regardless of whether the Soviet dictatorship is more or less bloodthirsty, America will accommodate itself. We have learned as well as any people on earth that vice and virtue are interchangeable terms. Pollsters recently discovered that 25 per cent of the American public believe Chiang Kai-shek still holds sway over mainland China. 30 million Americans represent a large reservoir of superfluous goodwill: Red China could as easily be glorified tomorrow as it is reviled today. The trick consists of turning faucets, or just blowing, hot and cold.

TYRANNY PLUS TECHNOLOGY is the formula for totalitarianism. In this context, technology refers to modern means of communication. In Communist countries, as in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, this general circumstance is perfectly clear. Why not here? Is it unreasonable to fortify ourselves against such a danger?

How to fortify ourselves? I think the answer, in one word, is to take a more respectful attitude toward our fellow man. I have never heard the disrespectful attitude more offensively presented than at a conference on mass culture some years ago, to which a wide assortment of scholars and artists were invited. Edward Shils contended that "brutal culture" perfectly suited the masses.

To the fore stepped Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. He pointed out—with no mention of their notorious inadequacies—that IQ tests show an uneven distribution of intelligence in the population. Additionally, he suggested the existence of an AQ, or aesthetic quotient. Some few people are naturally responsive to art: the masses are not; everyone gets exactly what he is capable of absorbing. Neat, equitable, democratic—provided only that most people are natural inhabitants of Slobbovia. Are they? I would suggest several lines of evidence to indicate they are not.

My position is that the antidote to mass culture is high culture, that high culture means art and learning, and that these goods are potentially accessible to every person not suffering from severe brain damage.

Almost all introductions to sociology contain a brief list of "universals," or institutions found everywhere. Religion and the family nearly exhaust the list. Anthropologists are likely to add art. From Frazer to Kroeber and beyond, anthropologists have been fascinated with primitive art, archeological finds, exotic artifacts, and the like. No human society, however miserable its environment, is devoid of art.

Small children everywhere spontaneously express themselves with whatever art materials they find. Youngsters react to pictures and to music with a measure of authenticity rarely attainable later on in their lives. What happens? It is like what happens to American taste buds. Frozen and packaged foods, above all bread (the staff of life—that compost of air and glue), those oats which only horses ate until Mr. Kellogg sold them as dry cereal: a diet like this from infancy onward can deaden anybody's palate. With gruel today and gruel tomorrow, who can savor gourmet meals?

Similarly, extended pseudo-sexual behavior produces fixation at that level. In precisely the same way, kitsch and instant education, if ingested for long enough, lead to cultural and intellectual dyspepsia or anesthesia.

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IN THE THEATER OF THE ABSURD Martin Esslin describes an unusual presentation of *Waiting for Godot*, a play that flopped on Broadway after the daily reviewers declared it to be excessively obscure. The production mentioned by Esslin took place in a maximum security prison before a truly captive audience—which was enthralled by a play it found perfectly intelligible. The Freedom Southern Theater does vanguard drama successfully before rural Negroes who dig the message a meaningful contemporary play somehow cannot convey to jaded middle-class theatergoers seeking expensive entertainment. The *Teatre National Populaire* performs in tents outside Paris, proletarian theatrical enterprises have been revived in England, Shakespeare clicks in the Park or on the street. What does this enthusiasm signify if not the capacity of common men to surmount the trash heaped upon them? They, too, are able to have aesthetic experiences.

One per cent of the public views living drama with any regularity on the stages of North America. An ambitious and no doubt unrealizable goal is to double that number—all the way to 2 per cent. Those who go are homogeneous: overwhelmingly upper-middle-class, professional, disproportionately Jewish. Blue-collar workers shun theaters and bookstores all over the Western world—which does not prove that they are constitutionally unresponsive to the drama or incapable of reading good books. Workers in Buenos Aires buy Argentine classics (deliberately priced low on an experimental basis) at kiosks instead of bookstores which they would never dream of entering. A change of locus, for instance theater in union halls and not in ever more lavish "cultural centers," is frequently all that we need to re-animate the aesthetic impulse which lies dormant in every man.

Dedicated artists and teachers realize all this. The custodians of mass culture and their academic satraps do not. By their gross underestimation of human potentialities they drug us beyond any hope of redemption. We must continue to do battle with them or become willing accomplices in the creation of "joyous serfdom."

If Godard can do three or four low-budget films a year and make money-producing art, albeit not necessarily great art; if Pacifica can operate a network of FM stations, broadcasting views that may be politically repugnant but are usually dissident and provocative, and all this on a shoestring; if even Hollywood, after destroying much of its best talent (Welles and Huston in our time, Griffith, von Stroheim, and Keaton long ago), can offer directors enough leeway to be creative without forcing them into exile or into obsequious submission, and Warsaw or Budapest can do the same; if little magazines with limited circulation can survive; and if subscription TV finally emerges as something less than a disaster—then, the direction in which we must try to move is clear.

Art does not have to be swamped by machines—provided the machines are used to foster pluralism, diversity, and decentralization. However Sisyphean a job it may be, the present process which involves depersonalization, concentration, and deracination must be reversed, and as rapidly as possible. For, just as only the young can effortlessly learn a second language, so there is a chronological point after which generations bred on TV cannot assimilate the best that has been written and said. Sub-art systematically unfits a person for art, and vice versa. You cannot have a lot of both.

If art is long, sub-art is longer and life remains incredibly short. I would rather miss a flower in the jungle of mass culture (perhaps the Beatles really are such a flower) than lose myself in that jungle.

The artist is basically an anarchist who should have as much withdrawal from commercial or political clamor as society can provide. He and we desperately need his creations. As things stand, I can only agree with Herbert Read that Shelley chose his epithet well in calling poets *unacknowledged* legislators of the world. Read goes on, "The catalyst

The editors of DISSENT *are pleased to announce that* MARTIN PERETZ *has joined our roster of Contributing Editors. A member of the Harvard faculty, Mr. Peretz has been active in a wide range of political and peace movements, most recently, in the McCarthy campaign.*

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is unchanged, unabsorbed; its activity therefore not acknowledged. It is peculiarly difficult for the artist in society to accept this thankless task: to stand apart, and yet to mediate, to communicate something to society as essential as bread and water, and yet to be able to do so from a position of insulation, of disaffection."

Joseph Bensman

Who Writes What in the Bureaucratic University?

IN MASS SOCIETY, problems related to plagiarism and authorship can take on bizarre characteristics. Where large-scale organizations prevail, the head man is presumed to be too busy, too engaged, and too important to write his own speeches, policy papers, books, or letters to the editor. Instead, he has a staff of information specialists, aides, consultants, and public relations men who write for him. His name on the title page symbolizes his temporary acceptance of a document concocted for him. Convention requires that the nominal author be treated as the actual author —unless, after receiving an unfavorable response, the nominal author denies responsibility for "his" unfortunate statements by claiming that he has not read them.

In one highly publicized case, a university president was exposed for lifting a speech verbatim from a learned journal. He successfully defended himself by claiming that he had not written his speech.

Among politicians, ghost writers are so nearly universal that special virtue attaches to a man who writes some of his own speeches (Adlai Stevenson) or edits them, like John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

THE PROBLEM looks somewhat different in research organizations attached to universities. There, the "principal investigator" is usually a specialist in securing funds. He knows where the money is and he knows how to lay his hands on a grant. He is a capable and sometimes a super-salesman who effectively promotes his proposal both to the funding agency and to his own university. He must know how to write a proposal or has to hire someone who does. Beyond this, it is desirable that he be a good administrator, able to employ competent researchers and reasonably articulate writers.

Grantsmanship is time-consuming. It leaves the academic entrepreneur with little energy for the day-to-day operations of his project. His own ignorance may be a major source of anxiety to the entrepreneur. Subordinates frequently implement policies that never have been communicated to them. These policies are often comprised of unspoken or half-forgotten understandings, not to speak of misunderstandings, between sponsors and project heads. Subordinates may consciously or unwittingly sabotage agreements to which they are not privy.

Since, however, the principal investigator is the visible director of "his" project, outsiders treat him actually as if he did the work. Protocol requires that he be sole or principal author of the final report. This is so even though the principal investigator has not written a line or is incapable of writing a line. Failure to list the principal investigator as an author may be construed by the sponsor (who has occupied all the work time of the principal investigator) as neglect of duty. As a result, the principal investigator forces himself to accept authorship of work initiated and completed by others, in an environment where to have written something is to have validated oneself.

Hence, it is possible for quasi-illiterates to become the authors of innumerable speeches, papers, monographs, articles, and books, written by variegated specialists whose only relationship to each other is that they are financed by the same agency. The sheer volume of unrelated studies attributed to a single research broker serves best to indicate the nature of his authorship.

Nor is this ectoplasmic output necessarily condemned. To many sponsors, subliterary, incoherent (or elegant and cogent, but always ghostly) fecundity is evidence that they have a responsible administrator. He gets work done. His name on a bibliography or a

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title page then justifies the convention which allows it to be there.

MORE ANXIETY is in store for such an author. He knows that in an academic community authorship leads to prestige and promotion. Since he takes on authorship by usurpation, he tends to feel acutely uncomfortable in the presence of a genuine author. To maintain his social and occupational position he must act as if he really writes—which will make him uneasy and if he is capable of it, cause him to experience a sence of guilt. He is forced to accept the fraudulent role that would no doubt have seemed obnoxious to him when he initially embarked upon a career in research.

On top of all this, the putative author must find some device by which to convince his writers that he, not they, deserve authorship. In business and government, the employed journalist-author is used to accepting anonymity as a basis for employment. He does not mind; in fact, he derives personal pleasure (and professional recognition from his fellow writers) based on the amount of work done and the position of the nominal authors who use him.

The problem is, of course, more complicated when one conventional author has a stable of "ghosts," all contributing works, ideas, or lines to a given piece of work. In this case, the stable of writers becomes a brotherhood, with each writer competing for acceptance and praise from the patriarch.

When the conventional author writes a book that does not require the legitimacy of his official position, he can be magnanimous by including his actual author as a co-author, usually under the designation, "as told to ———" or "with the help of ———." This technique has its advantages for the professional writer.

In the academic community this situation results in greater conflict if only because the actual author needs to validate and advance himself through authorial credits. He is unsympathetic to the publicity needs of the conventional author. He has his own needs. In addition, by pressing his claims for authorship he evokes guilt in the conventional author who thereupon feels obliged to justify his own claims. Because he is an academic, providing the money and the job is not enough.

He has to make a positive contribution. If he is able to dredge up an earlier essay written by himself or written under his name, he can insist that it be inserted in a later work the better to buttress his present pretensions. Thus the ghosts of past authorship haunt the ghosts of contemporary authorships.

More typically, the conventional author can justify his claims to that title by becoming an editor. He receives the manuscript of the actual author and makes suggestions. If he is competent, or feels that he is, he will actually rewrite part of the material. Some of this editing is necessary. The project head may edit the work from the standpoint of its political implications.

BECAUSE THE CONVENTIONAL AUTHOR is the "outside man," he knows or thinks he knows how the work is likely to be received by sponsors. He can excise "unnecessary academic complexity." He can eliminate recommendations or evidence that implies a recommendation that might run counter to what he thinks is the sponsor's policy. Moreover, he is expected to censor copy that may offend the school or institution that "houses" the grant. The writer may unknowingly provide the evidence for a policy that suggests budgets or programs unacceptable to the institution "housing" the project.

More fundamentally, when much of the background for a study is based upon tacit understandings and subliminal or implicit agreements, the principal investigator may become only aware of the nature or implications of these agreements by discovering their unwitting violation by actual authors who were not aware of these agreements since they had no part in them. In correcting these violations, the editor-author justifies his conventional authorship, even though it was his inability or failure to communicate to the actual author that made this editorship necessary.

If all of these justifications fail, the conventional author sits down with blue pencil and "corrects" or otherwise alters the English, punctuation, and all. If pressed for time, he finds a professional writer to make certain corrections and simplifications. In doing so,

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he distributes the authorship to as many individuals as possible. With this tactic, his own claim is strengthened as the actual author's is correspondingly weakened. It is one form of distributive justice.

The actual author, unless he is a "pro," will resist such attacks on his manhood, and fight tooth and nail not only for the credit, but also for what he regards as the integrity of the manuscript. If he is intractable he will be fired, or he will resign. In that case the problem is solved; upon his departure, he can be assigned a junior authorship.

IN MOST CASES, the issue will be resolved by splitting authorship among a handful of co-authors, all under the senior authorship of the illiterate or non-writing senior conventional author. But even in such cases, the problem is not resolved without bitterness. In a large-scale project, literally dozens of people will have worked on the research, some as staff members and others as consultants brought in to rescue a phase of a floundering study.

If the project manages to pull itself together and "gets out a report," convention demands that all contributors be acknowledged. Authorship is only one form of acknowledgment. But as yet, convention outlaws joint authorship by more than six persons. Others must be acknowledged by other means. Convention again allows for a list of acknowledgments to as many as 20–30 contributors, some of whom may be writers of preliminary drafts. The problem remains of discovering some means of distributing recognition between acknowledgment and authorship. In general, this problem is resolved by power, by statesmanship, by bargaining, and by occupational mobility. Those individuals who are still around at the time of completion of the manuscript are most likely to become authors. The continued need for a principal writer in subsequent research guarantees at least a junior authorship for the writer. The possibility of a scandal also serves to guarantee authorship. If the actual writer is a graduate student who needs the approval of his professor-employer for his Ph.D. dissertation, his vulnerability weakens his bargaining position. It is understandable why graduate students see themselves as the most exploited class in America.

If there are numerous reports, the principals agree to rotate authorship. A number of names affixed to any one report is reduced, and each project member can be a principal or sole author. From the standpoint of jurisdictional disputes, this solution is the most efficient. It is even better than the solution adopted by commercial agencies which do not list authors but only names of the agencies or departments in lieu of authors.

ALL OF THESE COMPLEXITIES are generally known and understood by the participants, by university administrators, by sponsors, and by faculty not engaged in project research. The net result is to devalue research authorship. Since no one knows who actually wrote what, conventional authorship is more an attribute of rank in an organization, which implies the ability to attract funds and to fulfill contractual requirements. The whole artifice contributes to an inflation in the number of publications, and to the devaluation of publication itself. But good writing does not drive out bad writing, which it merely inundates. For in the flood of "objectively necessary" but imminently useless paper work, the real thing, conceived and recorded by one man or a pair of scholars, continues to be produced. Simply because there is a presumption of actual authorship in such work, it *is* valued. Moreover, where there are no funds, no staff, no apparatus to intervene between the author and his work, this presumption is probably correct.

Because the book, the article, or the essay is valued over the mimeographed report or the government-sponsored monograph, many contract researchers are driven to get their reports or articles printed by book publishers, and/or by scientific journals.

To transform "practical" research with concrete recommendations into a "scientific" report is a delicate matter. A "theorist" and a theory are needed to "reframe" the report. Theory operates to take the particular, specific data of a report and reset it in a general "scientific" framework. It adds the dignity of footnotes, concepts and definitions—after the fact. Thus "theory" becomes public relations,

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and the theorist an indispensable aide to dignified project researchers. It is wise to have a "theorist" on the staff, or at least, to add one as a consultant. The theorist earns his keep by assisting in academic publication, and by legitimizing otherwise not respectable research. He becomes a writer.

At the other extreme, professional writers are employed simply to make the work intelligible. Ordinarily only a few key people read research reports. As pillars of the sponsoring agency and as readers, they are known to have sharply defined tastes. Moreover, their vocabulary is likely to consist of professional jargon. Writing for them requires a special kind of literacy, far removed from generally recognized standards of literary English. Haste in meeting deadlines and the fact that project researchers are hired for their technical not their literary skills make for more pedantic gobbledygook.

Once the professional writer goes to work, a new set of battles begins. The technical staff feels all too frequently that the professionl editor is falsifying its results. The writer feels that technicians are illiterate barbarians, infatuated with their own words, stubborn and intractable. The principal investigator who is destined to be the conventional author serves as mediator between technicians and professional writers, usually siding with the professional writer, but restraining him when his literary imagination provokes the threat of resignation or sabotage by the technical staff.

THE FLOOD OF REPORTS of contractual research then reaches the "publisher," a writer or would-be writer, who generally is forced against his better judgment to act as businessman. He must estimate the sales potential of a specific book for either a particular audience or that mysterious body, the general public. Usually, the editor is handicapped by his fondness for a well-made and well-written book that has something to say, even if it doesn't sell. But the number of prestigious books he can publish is severely limited.

Thus the highly literate editor is inundated with specialized, badly written manuscripts which have as their principal reason for existence the need of their conventional authors for promotions, and the fact that a government agency or foundation financed the research upon which a non-book is based. In many instances, this problem is solved by subvention. The government agency or private foundation finances the cost or part of the cost of publishing the book. Some publishers or departments of publishing firms receive a substantial part of their income by such publications, and others are virtual branches of an agency or a foundation. Sometimes they reject or accept unsubsidized manuscripts by judging whether they are compatible with their subsidized publications. When this happens, subsidized publication comes to be a form of information control.

If the publisher accepts the project report, the editor at the publishing house is enlisted as co-author of the conventional author and his anonymous editorial consultant. The publisher's editor increasingly resents both the illiteracy of the academician in general, and that of the conventional author in particular. But if he can succeed in making the report into an intelligible book he takes pride in his virtual authorship.

This process reaches a culmination when the editor-publisher begins to resent the author for being inexpert in the field in which the book is written, or for depriving him of credit for his own secret authorship. The editor tries to avoid competing with his own authors. His greatest pleasures in authorship, so long as he remains an editor, must be secret pleasures. If he claims credit for his authorship, the actual or conventional authors might seek a more self-effacing editor. Editorship is thus, in the world of bureaucratic writing, a thankless task. But so is authorship.

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Warren O. Hagstrom

Science & Public Policy

THE POLITICS OF PURE SCIENCE, by Daniel S. Greenberg. New York: New American Library. 303 pp. $7.95.

> . . . what was it that, in 1963, led Philip Handler and Frederick Seitz . . . not to shudder and recoil from the horror, but happily to envisage that, by the end of the century, the nation might devote to research and development as much as half of its gross national product? . . . I would like sometime to impanel a group of scientists' wives . . . have them briefed together with their spouses, and see just what scientific allocations would emerge. Could such lay allocations be any less rational and more adventitious or political than those under which science now prospers?
>
> —*Harold Orlans*[1]

> In some ways one can compare the huge machines in Geneva and Brookhaven with St. Peter's, Rome. Each represents the greatest technical triumph of its age. Each was built as a flamboyant gesture—for purposes which one can fairly describe as spiritual rather than material. . . . Physicists should recall that St. Peter's was built at the end of the age of faith, that it cost so much that it nearly bankrupted the Church, and that it provoked the wrath of Luther and inspired the rise of the Reformed Churches.
>
> —*Lord Bowen*[2]

> Q. Dr. Swinger, this may be a delicate matter, but how can these activities be justified to the public authorities?
> A. Oh, I think that an examination of the historical record shows that we are well over that hump. But the advice of our Committee on Research and Publications is that, if questions arise, they usually can be settled with a few brief references to hybrid corn, penicillin, atomic energy, and serendipity . . .
> Q. What future do you see for the Center [for the Absorption of Federal Funds]?
> A. Quite obviously it can only grow bigger. We have adopted the motto, "As Long As You're Up Get Me a Grant." I think we can only grow.
>
> *—Dr. Grant Swinger, Chairman of the Board for the Center for the Absorption of Federal Funds, as interviewed by Daniel S. Greenberg*[3]

ALTHOUGH AMERICAN BASIC SCIENCE has been spectacularly successful, and its rate of discovery shows no sign of slackening, it would not be hard to conclude that American science policy is in crisis. Immense sums of money have been wasted on aborted basic research projects—more than $50 million on a big-dish radio telescope that was never built, more than $30 million on a Mohole that was never dug, and more on many smaller projects. Even larger sums have been wasted on applied research and development projects. (Let me give just a few figures, since this review is concerned primarily with the politics of pure science. The Defense Department estimates that between 1943 and 1966, $4.8 billion was spent on various missile systems that were abandoned while in progress or upon completion.[4] About $10 million was spent on a nuclear propelled rocket

[1] "Developments in Federal Policy Toward University Research," *Science*, February 10, 1967, p. 665.

[2] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Problems of Science Policy* (Paris, 1968), p. 35.

[3] "Questions and Answers with Grant Swinger," *Science*, March 11, 1966, p. 1201.

[4] Daniel S. Greenberg, *The Politics of Pure Science* (New York: New American Library, 1967), p. 229.

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before the decision was made to abandon it,[5] more than $1 billion is likely to be spent on a supersonic space transport that may not really be needed,[6] and more than $600 million will be spent in the next fiscal year on an antimissile defense system that will probably do more harm than good to the nation's security.)

Even when money is not totally wasted, projects of great value remain unfunded while projects of less importance are well subsidized. For example, many years after it has become technically feasible, we still lack an adequate large astronomical telescope in the Southern hemisphere; all but one of our large nonprofit social survey research organizations face recurrent financial crises; and biological ecologists have been able to conduct very few large-scale field studies—all in a period when high energy physicists could confidently request more than $8.2 billion for the construction of new particle accelerators between 1962 and 1982.[7]

The procedures for deciding the allocation of resources to research often lead to irrational decisions. There is no systematic procedure for setting priorities, and there are no systematic procedures by which those who make decisions are informed about their consequences. As a result, the institutional structures involved in science policy-making can only be described as chaotic. Within and among institutions there is competition for resources with no clear responsibility at any place. Congressional committees compete for jurisdiction, and similar competition occurs among agencies within the executive branch of the federal government. The importance of private foundations has declined. Universities have lost much of their ability to control their own destinies, partly as the result of federal research support. But universities and other organizations compete strenuously in the political arena for funds, and much of science is now pork-barrel science.

All of this may lead to a crisis of public confidence in science. Part of the reason for the apparent crisis in science policy is the scientists' strenuous defense of their autonomy, yet the crisis may have the paradoxical result of depriving scientists of that autonomy.

WHAT REALLY GOES ON in the politics of pure science? A good and very readable introduction to the topic is Daniel S. Greenberg's *The Politics of Pure Science*. Greenberg is perhaps the best reporter of science policy matters we have. He begins his book with a brief overview of the scientific community and its stance with relation to the larger society, a strange blend of "chauvinism, xenophobia, and evangelism," as he puts it. While Greenberg is concerned mostly with the elite of this scientific community, he quickly attempts to disabuse us of the notion that there is a monolithic scientific establishment:

> . . . there is in fact no clear-cut Scientific Establishment in the United States. There is a scientific community with its elites and its lower classes, with a functional division of labor, and with organizations that both structure the community and define its relationship to the nation at large.[8]

While Greenberg doesn't do much to distinguish an "elite" from an "Establishment," one could support his conclusion with a kind of *reductio ad absurdam* involving himself. If there were a scientific establishment, then *Science* magazine, the publication of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, would be its major propaganda organ. If this were so, then Greenberg, as the news editor of *Science*, would be one of the establishment's chief propagandists. But Greenberg is one of the most outspoken critics of the establishment: he has publicized unpleasant errors in policy-making, he has been unafraid to publicly accuse important agencies of wrong-doing, as in his reports of the National Science Foundation's actions in the case of John Smale, the Berkeley mathematician, and he has written devastating satires on the pretensions of some scientists in his interviews with Grant Swinger. Therefore, there is no scientific establishment.

Greenberg describes the development of federal involvement in pure science since 1940. He gives a fascinating treatment of the development of the contract system by Vannevar Bush and others in the Office of Scientific Research and Development —a system which has proven very flexible and has so far helped preserve the autonomy of our science and some degree of independence for our universities. This section of the book ends with

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[5] Freeman J. Dyson, "Death of a Project," *Science*, July 9, 1965 p. 141.
[6] Richard J. Barber, *The Politics of Research* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1966), p. 167.
[7] Greenberg, *The Politics of Pure Science, op. cit.*, p. 243.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

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a description of the formation of government agencies for science in the years following World War II, agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Science Foundation. The latter had a very difficult time getting support in Congress, despite the hopes that many members of scientific elites had for it. This history has an ironic denouement:

> . . . a great incongruity accompanied the ideological defeat [of the National Science Foundation]. For in the years following the war relatively great prosperity came to the American scientific community. Through complex motivations, the military—particularly the Navy, with its long scientific and technical tradition—became the subsidizer of American basic research. And the military assumed this role largely on its own initiative, for the leadership and unity of purpose that had bound American sciences throughout the war no longer existed. The American scientific community had escaped a return to its prewar poverty, but it was rudderless in its affluence.[9]

If we have a scientific establishment, in "the old and proper sense of that word: a set of institutions supported by tax funds, but largely on faith, and without direct responsibility to political control,"[10] it is probably because science has been linked to an even more powerful set of institutions, also largely unaccountable to the public for its vast expenditures: the military establishment.

Greenberg then presents us with three case histories of policy-making. There is the rather pleasant story of how the chemists were able to show that they received too little from the government, largely because no specific agency or congressional committees were responsible for research in chemistry, and to do a little to alleviate this lack of support by way of rational persuasion.[11] Then there is the sad story of the atempt to drill a hole to the Mohorovicic discontinuity; this story reveals how things can go wrong in the complex relations among informal groups of scientists, the National Academy of Sciences, the National Science Foundation, and congressional committees. Finally there is the story about competition among physicists and their institutions for vastly expensive particle accelerators; the unhappy fate of MURA, the Midwest Universities Research Association, had the consequence of explicitly involving partisan and regional politics in decisions about the construction of scientific facilities. Greenberg could have written a longer book by including other case histories from his articles in *Science,* for example histories of the big dish radio telescope, of the National Academy of Sciences, and of the relations between the National Institutes of Health and the U.S. Congress.

The book closes with some rather modest suggestions for improvement in science policy-making. Perhaps Greenberg's major point is that *scientists* ought to concern themselves with overall scientific priorities; he clearly shows their great reluctance to do this, and he describes the great importance placed on the "equality" of all fields of investigation in the ideologies of scientists. He rather gently criticizes the National Science Foundation for its failure to concern itself seriously with this policy-making function, although the originators of the Foundation envisaged this as one of its major activities. Greenberg also exhorts scientists to raise their ethical standards, suggesting that there is "a good deal of scientifically nonproductive chiseling that flourishes under the color of scientific freedom" and that there is waste of money, "not because there is a scientific purpose to which it is to be applied, but because money, usually federal money, is available." He does, however, carefully distinguish between this fraud and waste and "what is referred to as 'grantsmanship,' i.e., the ability to draw money out of the public authorities. Grantsmanship, to my mind, is ethically neutral . . . The issue is not the ability to get money; rather, it is the use to which the money is put."[12]

GREENBERG DOES NOT PERCEIVE a "crisis" in American science policy, nor do most of the growing number of scholars who concern themselves with science policy affairs. In the proper sense of "crisis," they are correct. A crisis situation is one in which decisions made now will be especially fateful for the future, one in which bad decisions will bring lasting damage to an institution. This is probably not true for science policy now. At worst, we can expect somewhat lower

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 122.
[10] Don K. Price, *The Scientific Estate* (Cambridge: Harvard Univerity Press, 1965), p. 12.
[11] The Westheimer report, summarizing the chemists' work, is a model for efforts of its kind: Committee for the Survey of Chemistry, *Chemistry: Opportunities and Needs* (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1965).
[12] Greenberg, *The Politics of Pure Science, op. cit.*, p. 289.

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federal appropriations and continued irrational misallocations of funds, but no radical reduction in federal funds is likely, for science has proved that it can pay. At worst, we can expect continued military dominance in funding research, continued waste in research grants to profit-making organizations, and a continued erosion of the organizational integrity of universities.

These are clearly serious problems, and there is a variety of ways to approach them. Those who contrast American science policy with the science policies of European governments are likely to take a conservative approach, stressing what is best about American procedures. Thus, J. Ben-David contrasts the "entrepreneurial" character of U.S. science with the relatively "hierarchic" character of science elsewhere.[13] American scientists, working in a decentralized university system with multiple sources of funds, are given incentives to innovate both scientifically and organizationally. The organization of science in the U.S. is much more flexible than elsewhere, and the articulation of basic science and applied research and development is superior.

Other writers, among them Greenberg, have advanced what might be called "liberal" remedies. They suggest that the executive branch of the federal government ought to have an explicit, continuous, flexible science policy; policy decisions ought not to be left by default to the Bureau of the Budget. The U.S. Congress ought to set policy, but in science as in many other areas it fails to do so. All too often Congress is concerned not with policy but with administration. Congressmen pay close attention to postmaster appointments, little to postal policy. They express great concern about the contents of Voice of America programs but, as with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, abdicate critical foreign-policy decisions to the executive. They spend much time on matters such as the F-111 airplane but little time on policies of limited war vs. massive retaliation. And they have shown more concern for where research facilities will be built than with the kind of research to be done. The failure to formulate policy has not been for want of trying on the part of a series of able legislators, from Carl Elliot to Henry Reuss and Fred Harris. The failure rests in part upon the weakness of the legislative branch relative to the executive, in part upon the corruption of the Congress. The weakness of Congress leads it to guard jealously the power of annual appropriations; in science as elsewhere the annual battle for appropriations makes it difficult to plan.

There are other proposals for liberal reforms.[14] It is necessary, and should be possible, to develop far better ways of giving governmental decision-makers information about the results of their past decisions. Similarly, it should be possible to devise ways of giving federal support to university research without unbalancing the activities of the universities or weakening their capacities for self-direction.[15]

Whatever reforms are envisaged, it is necessary for us to have a clearer conception of the criteria to be used in planning scientific activities.[16] Basic research can be justified as a kind of overhead on various kinds of practical activities; thus, each agency or set of agencies devoted to a practical mission, whether it be improving health, improving communications, or remedying pollution, ought to devote some portion of its resources to basic research related to its mission. Basic research can also be justified as a kind of general social overhead, contributing to the total productivity of the society but not necessarily uniquely to any particular aspect of productivity; thus, the society ought to devote a more or less fixed portion of its income to general basic research. Basic research can be justified, and is justified, as a way of enhancing national prestige. And it can be justified as a kind of consumer good, or a

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[13] Joseph Ben-David, *Fundamental Research and the Universities: Some Comments on International Differences* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1968). See also C. H. Waddington, "A British Perspective on American Science Policy," *Science*, April 5, 1968, pp. 46-48.

[14] Richard J. Barber, *op. cit.*, presents a well-documented argument for many reforms, ranging from changes in governmental structures, to ways of encouraging small business to do government research and development, to changes in procedures that give patent rights to firms for research and development done under government contract.

[15] Proposals of this sort have been advanced for many years, for example by Clark Kerr in *The Uses of the University* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

[16] A good review of discussions of this topic is in Harvey Brooks, "Can Science be Planned?" in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Problems of Science Policy, op. cit.*, pp. 97-112.

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cultural product, not different in kind from art or music, and like art and music in expressing some of the basic values of the society.

These "justifications," if they are to mean anything, require either reliable empirical knowledge of how basic research influences the productivity of society in general and specific sectors of society, and/or a clarification of the values of society with respect to scientific knowledge as a cultural expression. In recent years students of science affairs have made some progress in clarifying the influences of science on productivity; such progress makes it possible to evaluate the rates of return on investments in research compared to rates of return on other investments. Possibly we are also moving toward a consensus on the merits of supporting basic research as a cultural product. The further development of such a consensus requires more than empirical knowledge.

Greenberg approaches scorn in his description of scientific "evangelists," and such scorn is justified for those scientists, unsympathetic with the aspirations of laymen, who wish to inculcate others with their own all too narrow passions. But we need a radical vision for science policy. Such a radical vision must be democratic, not seeing science only as the province of an intellectual elite; and it must be concerned with the discovery of empirical order throughout nature and human nature, not only with discoveries in laboratories almost totally withdrawn from common experience or in narrowly defined "scientific" technologies. A largely esoteric science has profoundly changed society, but these changes might be small compared to those that could be effected if men in general possessed scientific skills and values. We need scientists of general knowledge and broad sympathies to give us visions of what can be done.

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Robert L. Hoffman

The Travail of French Intellectuals

THE OBSTRUCTED PATH: FRENCH SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE YEARS OF DESPERATION, 1930–1960, by H. Stuart Hughes. New York: Harper & Row. 295 pp. $6.95.

THOUGH FRANCOPHILIA REMAINS COMMON among American intellectuals, few are at ease with the intricacies of French intellectual life. We enjoy the clarity, logic, and verve of contemporary writing in France, but much of it remains obscure to us because we are not pricked by many of the nettles that so persistently plague the French intelligentsia. We applaud where they speak to our own condition or in a language common to men of ideas everywhere, but much of what they say is a puzzle—or is taken for what it is not.

The Obstructed Path ought to relieve this situation. It is a quite remarkable book, in form a history of the development of ideas, yet not systematic in its exposition either of a history or of the ideas themselves. Lacking conventional elements of continuity, the book should be disjointed but in fact is tightly knit. An abundance of biographical material contributes not only to its entertainment value but also to exposing the preoccupations of French intellectuals which often are not clear to observers elsewhere. What emerges from Hughes's neatly constructed treatment is more than a synthesis of ideas: it is a sensitive understanding of the French intelligentsia.

Hughes states his central theme simply at the outset. "The *motif* of an 'obstructed path,' of blind alleys and blocked vistas, of faltering and stalemate, and of an increasingly desperate search for a way out, pervades the thinking of Frenchmen of all types and intellectual interests through nearly a half century following the outbreak of the First World War." France's classical literary and philosophical traditions remained strong in the decade after the war, and among intellectuals self-satisfaction with the country's cultural situation corresponded to more general illusions about the strength of the nation. Too often elegance of expression belied vacuity of content or disguised fruitless trips over well-worn routes—and that ele-

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gance no longer so readily attracted admiration of audiences outside France.

In Hughes's treatment the renewal of French social thought derived early and potent stimulus from the work of such historians as Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre. Both erudite and unwilling to keep to established scholarly methods, they attempted with much success to achieve a more imaginative, more *human* resurrection of the past —and in so doing made possible a deeper understanding of society and culture in all times. Much of their work seems narrow in scope: Bloch wrote a book on the medieval belief that kings had a miraculous abilily to heal scrofula, Febvre wrote a work on the religious disbelief of Rabelais. Yet such highly specific themes were employed by them to discover major sociological insights. Similarly, Claude Lévi-Strauss has used anthropological studies of South American savages to extend knowledge of man's most fundamental attributes, and to provide a foundation for systematic development of social theory. By another path, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin also went from specific scientific investigations to broad social philosophy.

All of the men Hughes examines are moralists above all; he prefers the social scientists—especially the social historians, with their redefinition of history as "retrospective cultural anthropology." In a humane science coupled with deep moral concern, having "poetry at its core," he sees the most hopeful direction in quest of a "way out" from obstructed paths. He does not find that the way has been discovered, but that French writers had by 1960 broken from their confining traditions. Yet, in sketching the process by which those bonds were broken, Hughes exposes a struggle which may well have been worth more than the substantive accomplishments he points to. He gives no great weight to his concluding emphasis on French social science, but his hint of a yearning for something solid to grasp suggests something of the plight of intellectuals everywhere. Faced by the insoluble dilemmas of the human condition, they seize upon substantive scientific results, as morsels of partial satisfaction, with more eagerness than on reflection they might think suitable. At least this is preferable to avoiding the dilemmas through exclusive concentration on morally neutral matters, or by adopting a total ideological system; but perhaps in the ambiguity of unresolved issues and the pain of confronting them lies more of the essence of human experience than ordered knowledge and rational theory can ever convey.

THE CRISES and calamities which beset France provided the needed stimulus for reformulation of ideas; they also made it impossible for subtle, self-critical intellects to be easily satisfied. The middle chapters of *The Obstructed Path* deal with men who discovered answers but went on in restless searching. Jacques Maritain and Gabriel Marcel found a religious center through conversion to Catholicism. Divine ordinance in authoritative doctrinal interpretation provides a comfortable foundation for the philosopher. Yet they were not content to rest there, going on instead to take part in a Catholic intellectual revival which contributed to massive changes in the Church's position on social issues.

Roger Martin du Gard, Georges Bernanos, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, and André Malraux figure here in the moralists' endless quest for sustenance through some kind of heroic ethic. Formerly most French writers, whatever their other differences, had been confident that there is logical order in human affairs, with reason making men masters of their history. In the despair of the 1930's this confidence was dissipated, and the world seemed incoherent, incomprehensibly in random movement and perpetually tragic. Clashes of opposed values and forces, never far from center stage in so divided a nation, themselves assumed primary significance. To salvage something from the shambles of conflict and the absurdities of a life's experience could be the chief goal. Here life becomes an adventure without final objective; the immediate is graspable while the ultimate ends are indeterminate. Then what matters most may be the personal style with which one confronts such experience: the ethic of heroism finds renewed validity. These writers made anguish into adventure and uncovered simple truths and virtues, but offered no exit from obstructed paths.

Heroic ideals came into play most substantially in the World War II Resistance movement, in which many French intellectuals were deeply involved. The legacy of the Resistance for national life overshadowed everything in the first postwar decade; "fraternity" and "moral commitment" assumed new definition and significance in consequence, and the former standards and arbiters of a moral universe were repudiated. Both

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Vichy traitors and exploiters of the poor were condemned, while the need for social justice took on renewed urgency.

Moved by the Resistance experience, men of ideas went on to further development of embryonic prewar philosophical tendencies. Left Catholicism was strengthened and there the tolerance for Marxism was extended, Emmanuel Mounier's Left Catholic review *Esprit* becoming a major focus of intellectual activity. Moral despair and commitment despite ambiguity, so important to the heroic ethic, also had a natural place in the Catholic tradition. As this moral stance in combination with prewar tendencies in phenomenology evolved into what was to be called existentialism, revived Catholic thought found the newly fashionable philosophy congenial.

The major area of intellectual involvement, however, was Marxism, almost invariably through association with the Communist party. No other force seemed to many intellectuals so totally committed to the cause of social justice. Its militant stance was particularly well-suited to the times and the men involved, given the background both of France's Jacobin and Blanquist tradition of popularly-based revolution and of that tradition's reaffirmation in the Resistance. Thus the Party and its members' aspirations could be both universal and authentically French, a combination of qualities itself characteristic of French tradition.

The Communist party was bound by Stalinist rigidity and so, in varying measures, were its intellectuals. Cold War hostility, dogmatic declarations, and justifications of Stalinist policy made the work of these men incomprehensible to or neglected by non-Communists. Yet we can see from Hughes's essay, which concentrates in particular on Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, that there is much more in their Marxism than partisan polemic and apologia. They continued the moralists' quest, with Stalinist doctrine creating only limited hindrance to their main efforts. Upon liberation from restraints in the post-Stalin era, these initial explorations in existential phenomenology have made possible a revitalization of Marxist philosophy. Neo-Marxists think of their ideology less as instrumental doctrine than as the basis for fresh understanding of the possibilities for man's growth.

Inevitably judgments will differ on how far French intellectuals have moved toward "a way out," but there can be little doubt that they have broken down many of the barriers which at one time seemed virtually insurmountable. It is no small achievement that the "new" Catholics, Marxists, and still more heterodox men of ideas have come close enough to share in mutually profitable intellectual exchanges.

Whatever their doctrines or despair, they have refused to evade moral dilemma and ambiguity, in this living by the ethics of the existential philosophy to which their searches gave popular, though perhaps transitory, currency. The general import of existentialist ideas may be in doubt, but *The Obstructed Path* serves as further evidence for the supposition that for sustaining vigorous intellectual life this kind of restless, unfettered search is more important than is attaining final answers.

Joseph Clark

Weird Career of a Weird Committee

THE COMMITTEE, by Walter Goodman. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 495 pp. $10.00.

AFTER A WHILE, a long while, there was hardly any distinction attached to a subpoena summoning a witness to the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In my case, as in many others, the summons confirmed what the author of this engrossing history of the Committee terms the "close and mutually rewarding relationship" between the Committee and the FBI.

On my first day of freedom after 30 years of self-imposed bondage in the Communist movement, the inevitable FBI agent was tailing me. He accosted me with a pleasant smile and the suggestion that my country needed me as an informer. I told him off and the next day the inevitable marshal was at my door with a subpoena indicating that now the Committee needed me. In some ways it was a very pleasant experience. Here was a chance (which I seized) to tell the Committee members what I thought of them as promoters of subversion, not its opponents. Above all, here was a chance to affirm radical and socialist beliefs without naming names and without invoking the Fifth Amendment.

That enjoyable experience was possible, without paying the penalty of contempt, for various reasons. For one thing it was a great advantage to

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wave a little pamphlet containing the Supreme Court's Watkins decision before the faces of the Committee members, staff, and the inevitable FBI agents. John T. Watkins, an officer of the Farm Equipment Workers Union, had testified in 1954 before the Committee, without pleading the Fifth Amendment; he also refused "to discuss the political activities of my past associates."

Goodman emphasizes the point that the decision upholding Watkins "was merely procedural." The Court ruled in 1957 that the Committee could compel witnesses to reply to questions providing they had been made aware of the pertinency of the information the Committee was seeking. But perhaps Goodman's discussion of the Watkins decision underestimates the value of Chief Justice Earl Warren's prose. Warren had written for the majority that "there is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure." More important, Warren had gone to the very essence of the Congressional authorization of a search for un-American ideas and activities.

When Congress set up the Dies Committee in 1938, it gave the Committee authority to investigate "un-American propaganda activities" and attacks on "the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution . . ." In the Watkins decision of 1957 Chief Justice Warren wrote: "It would be difficult to imagine a less explicit authorizing resolution. Who can define the meaning of 'un-American'? What is the single, solitary 'principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution'?"

Goodman, in his unsentimental history, points out that after the Watkins decision, Warren's ringing declarations notwithstanding, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Committee in the 1959 Barenblatt decision.

Another reason why it was possible to refuse to name names without invoking the Fifth Amendment and going to jail was that this was 1957. Communists were doing a far more effective job of demolishing Communism than dedicated anti-Communists of the Committee stripe could ever hope to do. This was a consequence of the 1956 "revelations" about Stalin and the breakup of the Communist monolith. It followed upon the revulsion against the sanguinary suppression of the revolt of Hungary's workers and students by Soviet tanks. Above all, it followed upon the belated discovery by so many Communists in so many countries that it wasn't Marx they were abetting but a 20th-century Caligula, and that the "ism" they were defending could more correctly be defined as totalitarianism than socialism. So, perhaps at that moment there were some in the counsels of the Committee who decided that anti-Communism might not be served too well by still another contempt citation.

But, confronted by the erosion of Communist ideology and its end as a single world movement, the Committee and the chief of the FBI sensed a common danger to them both. How many jobs and sinecures would be lost, to mention but a single consequence of the decomposition of American Communism and the breakup of the world Communist organization into differing and often warring national components? "The Committee's reports and declarations during this period," Goodman writes, "had one overriding message: 'the menace of Communism remains unabated.' " After Khrushchev's attack on Stalin, Chairman Walter of the Committee brought together "a group tilted heavily to the Right," as Goodman puts it. These warriors included James Burnham, Clarence Manion, William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Whittaker Chambers, Louis Budenz, Francis McNamara, and the national commander of the American Legion. They produced a report entitled *The Great Pretense;* and, as the name implied, they found that Communism, although now with fewer adherents, and those at odds with one another, was more dangerous than ever before. Besides, the Communists were only pretending to be falling victim to dry rot. Rep. Walter concluded that "anti-Stalinism is but a political artifice, fraudulent and more dangerous than any other produced by the Kremlin thus far." Goodman notes that J. Edgar Hoover gave this his official blessing.

A world of diverse and differing ideologies and systems, living in peace, was not the kind of world which anti-Communists of the Right were ready to accept. Those "experts" who had found and concluded for Walter—and for J. Edgar

To Contributors

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Hoover—that anti-Stalinism was the most dangerous ism of all, believed "there could be no change in U.S.-Soviet affairs, barring defeat for one party and victory for the other." Goodman adds perceptively:

> Their careers were built on the immutable menace of Communism. The anti-Communism which, for most of them, had begun in honest disillusion and justified outrage had hardened into unquestioning faith; having given themselves to one truth, they could tolerate no other, and now nothing that happened in the real world could shake their belief in the less complicated world whose gates they guarded.

Goodman's study is effective, balanced, and commands interest not just because he did painstaking research and because he happens to be a very good writer. His history is both objective and entertaining because he is never bemused by, and indeed he eschews, totalitarianism whether on the Left or the Right. Goodman demonstrates that the failure of so many liberals in the Thirties resulted from their inability to identify Communism as a grievous enemy of freedom and progress.

THE OPPOSITION of many liberals to the Un-American Activities Committee was weak and ineffective because they understood so little about Communism. For example, Goodman cites a group of prominent lawyers who in 1939 petitioned the House of Representatives to abolish the Dies Committee. Surely, that was an admirable aim. But these lawyers went on to instruct Congress about the Communists as follows: "A reasonable construction of language compels the conclusion that the members of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. have the right, power and authority to make their own decisions precisely as members of any other American organization." The lawyers found no evidence of Moscow domination over the American Communist party. And this was 1939—the year of the Party's dizzying summersault from demands for collective security and war against fascism to endorsement of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Nazi-Soviet invasion of Poland which started World War II.

In a negative sort of way, the House Committee on un-American Activities played an important part in the transformation of American youth from the "silent" generation of the 50's to the "active" generation of the 60's. There was a turning point when some 5,000 students demonstrated against the Committee on the last day of its hearings in San Francisco in May, 1960. With considerable aid from the police a riot ensued. To J. Edgar Hoover (and to the Committee) it was all a Communist plot and a "Communist success in San Francisco." Goodman is eminently worth quoting in rebuttal:

> . . . the policeman Hoover had no inkling of what was really happening. In 1960 students had already been moved to action by the civil rights struggle; in a few years they would be holding teach-ins on Vietnam. Their protests would take diverse and sometimes puzzling forms—Caesar is supposed to have remarked on first hearing Brutus speak in public, "I know not what this young man intends, but whatever he intends, he intends vehemently"—but no Party line could accommodate them. Though the radicals of the thirties might march along with the radicals of the sixties when conditions seemed suitable, their dreams were not the same. The new activists spared no particular affection for the Soviet paradise; nor were their emotions locked up with the Moscow trials or the war in Spain. Their discontent was formless and pervasive. They saw after eight years of Dwight Eisenhower what the young have often seen, their destinies in the hands of old, cautious, unimaginative, unfeeling men, and they needed to break out. The campus at Berkeley became a testing place of this remarkably non-ideological, even anti-ideological movement, and the arrival of the Un-American Activities Committee, which had been engaged in the harassment of teachers, students, and political non-conformists for twenty years, was galvanic. "Nobody incited us, nobody misguided us," declared fifty-eight of the arrested students after the charges against them were dismissed. "We were led by our own convictions, and we still stand firmly by them."

One might carp about Goodman's argument that The Committee is decidedly American. This is the land of the demagogue and the Ku Klux Klan, as well as of Lincoln and Jefferson, he reminds us. One might point out that the latter are in consonance with the libertarian traditions of the 18th-century founders, while the former are destructive of those traditions. But this is a minor point. One might also say that in places the great detail palls, and that possibly if the author were not aiming to be definitive, the history might be even more satisfying. But overall one can agree with Richard Rovere who writes in his introduction that those of us who favor Jefferson's America "will find guidance and a fortifying good humor in this admirable book."

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LETTERS

Civil Disobedience

Editor:

The recent discussion of "Civil Disobedience and Resistance" in DISSENT magazine was provocative and helpful. I think however that there was a sense of the academic about the discussion and a tendency to define civil disobedience in terms that are so pristine as to be removed from the contemporary situation.

When I was a kid at UCLA in the early 1950's we were living in a period where there was so little resistance of any kind and to anything that to challenge the government by refusing to obey orders (primarily on the matter of miliary service) took a great deal of thought and analysis and was carried through with profound responsibility. The same applied to the early experiments of CORE where their civil disobedience actions were characterized again by the kind of responsible behavior that would meet the definitions laid down by Bob Pickus.

Times have changed and I think we must adjust our thinking with that change. It is, for example, interesting to note that most of those who cautioned against irresponsible civil disobedience were not disturbed by the last teachers' strike in Manhattan when school children were deprived of an education for the period that the strike lasted and when a state law, clearly supported by the majority of New Yorkers, was deliberately violated. The issues in the strike were not really that important. The teachers were relatively well paid, they worked relatively decent hours, nobody was sending them abroad to be killed, nobody was containing them in ghettos with police brutality. I supported that teachers' strike, but I am suggesting that if teachers can deliberately violate state laws over what are essentially trivial matters then one must recognize the right of young men in large numbers to refuse service in the draft and even to organize efforts to close down induction centers. The issue in that case is life and death, not a matter of salary. In the same way I think that the students at Columbia University were fighting over far more significant issues when they invaded the buildings there, and while they were not totally nonviolent they were certainly a good deal more nonviolent than the police who were used to take them out of the buildings.

The problem is that in a period of profound social change where masses of people are moving, things are not done as we would like them done, quietly and responsibly. I certainly will continue to agitate for polite and responsible behavior on the part of the black community, the student community, and draft-age young men. But I also understand how deeply they are involved with the issues they confront and I realize that the choice may be between a somewhat impolite and not totally responsible form of disobedience to law, and violent mob behavior. Certainly those of us who are Socialists did not turn our backs on the trade-union movement in the thirties because of the violence that was so often associated with strikes of that period. We recognized that the issues were profoundly more important than the occasional violation of the legal forms.

What I really am urging is that DISSENT readers not draw tidy lines that would cut them off from the student movement but recognize that the points raised in the symposium, while valid, need to be argued within the context of the movement as it occurs around us.

DAVID MCREYNOLDS

More Problems of "Legitimacy"

Editor:

In the spirit of Michael Walzer's plea that we not give up analysis for rhetoric, I would like to draw attention to aspects of the problem of "illegitimate authority" which neither he nor Paul Goodman touch upon in their exchange. I agree with Paul Goodman that "the actions of the Administration . . . are not merely immoral or unjust" (though that term "merely" has connotations I would certainly prefer to avoid) while I agree with Michael Walzer that "the U.S. government meets the minimal standards of democratic legitimacy. . . ." What we are faced with in fact is a government which is in an important sense a legitimate government, but which at the same time is engaged in actions that seem quite clearly (to many of us at least) to be illegitimate. Those of us who believe these actions to be illegitimate are therefore led to contest the authority of the government to demand that we in any way cooperate with or take part in these actions.

The nuances of this situation are of course somewhat difficult to express in the title of a manifesto and call to action. The title "A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority" is not quite precise. (Here I disagree with Paul Goodman.) Yet I do not agree with Michael Walzer's correction, namely that it is "a call to resist the immoral acts of legitimate authorities." The authors of the call wished to draw attention not only to moral beliefs and to moral traditions, but also to important recently established legal precedents, in particular to the principles laid down at Nuremberg and the principles embodied in the United Nations Charter. The authors of the call asserted not only that every man has a "moral duty," but also that every man has a "legal right . . . to exert every effort to end this war, to avoid col-

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lusion with it, and to encourage others to do the same." But one cannot have a legal right to do what is illegal, that is, illegal according to some sort of "final" analysis. Therefore the call is not a call to civil disobedience (if one accepts Richard Wasserstrom's contention that "if an act is performed under a claim of ultimately legal, that is, constitutional, right, it is simply not an act of civil disobedience . . . "), but instead a call to what I would like to label "civil challenge." The resisters to the draft whom the call pledges to support are not simply draft refusers basing their refusal on private claims of conscience. They are at the same time draft *challengers* basing their challenge on international law which they believe reflects in a significant way the conscience of mankind. What they challenge is the validity of orders which directly or indirectly contravene international laws and treaties alreay explicitly accepted by the United States.

The distinction is important because while it is true that the rights and claims of individual conscience are precious and worthy of protection, it is also true that any sort of decent world order can arise only on the basis of the demands of some sort of collective conscience. One would like to believe, or at least to hope, that those who resist the war in Vietnam even at the cost of disobeying the orders of their own national government are acceding to the demands of a growing collective conscience. And one would like to hope that such actions will help to strengthen the fragmentary and imperfect body of international law which deals with aggressive wars, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

In fact I think the real problem confronting the American resister involves not so much a case of illegitimate authority as it does a case of nonexistent authority. Theoretically the Supreme Court may have the competence to declare the war unconstitutional (on the grounds that Congress has not declared war, for example), but it is questionable whether even from a theoretical point of view it has the ability to determine the war's status under international law. It would seem that only a properly constituted international court would be sufficiently free from bias to decide this issue. Of course, no such court exists. So far mankind has feared to grant authority to determine issues of this magnitude to any kind of permanent world court. Thus the principles established at Nuremberg continue to exist in a kind of limbo.

Finally, although the notion of sovereignty is a complex one, it seems to me that there is a certain contradiction involved in Paul Goodman's espousal of a "weak concept of Sovereignty" and his coexisting belief that the war is illegal. It is rather futile to talk about the illegality of certain actions, unless one is willing to grant authority to some "sovereign" institutions to determine when those actions have been committed and to impose sanctions on their perpetrators. That is, I find it somewhat contradictory for an anarchist or semi-anarchist to appeal to legal concepts.

BEVERLY WOODWARD

Bund on Poland

Editor:

I would be grateful if you publish the following statement on recent Polish events adopted by the World Coordinating Committee of the Jewish Labor Bund (the Jewish Socialist party of Poland, now in exile).—E. SCHERER

As a political party which played a significant part in Polish affairs through all the changes of the past half-century and more—from Tzarist rule to independence between the two world wars, through the hell of Nazi occupation and into the first few years after World War II, until we were liquidated as a party by the Polish Stalinist regime; as a party of the Jewish working class always loyal to socialist internationalism; and as a party which left behind on Polish soil the ashes of millions of our people and by far the majority of our members, spokesmen, and leaders—we feel compelled and particularly entitled to state our position on recent events in Poland.

We declare:

(1) The strikes, demonstrations, and other actions by Polish students and intelligentsia are well-founded protests against their dictatorial government. Protest has broken through to the surface in the political life of all the countries of Eastern Europe; and for all its variety of forms, the movement aims at a common goal—that their entire social and cultural life be liberalized and democratized.

We welcome the democratic and Socialist strivings of Polish students.

(2) The population of Poland today is virtually 100 per cent Polish. Thus, all these protests and demonstrations have also been purely Polish and actually began as a reaction to a specific suppression of Polish national culture. To represent Jews as organizers of the ferment, for Jewish purposes, contradicts evident facts. This misrepresentation plays upon anti-Semitic sentiments within a part of Polish society and in the ranks of the ruling Communist party.

To perpetrate such a fraud, especially in the Poland of today where the Jewish population was slashed from 10 per cent to the present ratio of 1 Jew to 1,000 Poles, is a deeply debased manipulation in the internal Communist power struggle. The Communist leadership of Poland has unleashed the age-old device of anti-Semitism and reaction to shift attention from the true causes and goals of the student protest movement, and to "compromise" it by inventing a Jewish origin.

(3) A systematic campaign against Jews is be-

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ing conducted in the Polish Communist press and at various Communist gatherings. Facts are distorted and lies disseminated to put Jews in an improper light. In this campaign Communist propagandists employ the pseudonym "Zionists" to create an impression that they are only anti-Zionists, not anti-Jewish. Regardless of any attitude toward Zionism as an ideology and movement, it is clear that the issue of Zionism is being used here as a cover to facilitate an anti-Semitic campaign. We emphasize: the Jews are not aliens in Poland. They have lived there for many generations and, like the Poles, they are entitled to live there without any conditions whatsoever.

(4) Shameful statements have been published with regard to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and the millions of Jews annihilated by the Nazis. It should be recalled: the Jews in the Ghetto, imprisoned by the Nazi invaders behind walls of brick, also suffered the indifference of broad circles of Polish society and, apart from the Polish labor movement and other humanist groups, even of many within the underground organizations. Even when faced with the fact of the total annihilation of the Jews, those of the underground who were anti-Hitler but also reactionary and anti-Semitic remained unmoved.

We strongly reject any effort to denigrate the memory of the martyred millions of Jews and to minimize the historic significance of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising against the mighty and murderous Nazi war-machine.

WORLD COORDINATING COMMITTEE
OF THE JEWISH LABOR "BUND"

New York *April*, 1968

A New Program

Editor:

Your readers might appreciate some information about an Interne Program in the field of public opinion and international conflict, sponsored by the World Without War Council of the United States, for which applicants are now being sought.

An interne in this program is expected to commit at least one year of full-time work to developing knowledge and experience in three fields: the nature of international conflict; techniques for influencing American public opinion and foreign policy; and professional means for dealing with these problems in the public arena.

The program is conducted by the World Without War Council of the United States, a cooperative effort by organizations and individuals who share the goal of a disarmed world under law in which free societies can grow and flourish. Among the members and consultants of the Council are: Roger Baldwin, John C. Bennett, Norman Podhoretz, Bayard Rustin, Leon Shull, and Norman Thomas.

Internships are being offered in New England, New York City, the Midwest, the Pacific Northwest, and California. Anyone wishing application forms should write to: Interne Program, World Without War Council of the United States, 218 East 18th Street, New York, New York 10003.

PENN KEMBLE

On Marcuse

Editor:

Allen Graubard has made a useful beginning in subjecting Herbert Marcuses's seductive views to philosophical criticism (DISSENT, May–June '68), but I think he has not by far gone far enough, nor quite in the right direction.

The trouble with Marcuse is not, as Graubard thinks, that he is a utopian; to the contrary. Therefore, the medicine to prescribe for him is not meliorism but rather genuine radicalism. Graubard's view of the matter is in fact to fall for Marcuses's as well as his hostile playmates' game: the former will just wave you off as another fink, and his opposite counterparts, the Niebuhrians, Hannah Arendt, Jacob Talmon, etc., will resume their old chant: "Utopianism is an expression of man's inveterate, sinful *hubris*; it leads inevitably to failure and fanaticism. We must, instead, be satisfied with 'small favors.'" In this rhetorical game radical humanists are squeezed to death in the middle.

The truth of the matter is that it is Marcuse who is the very opposite of a utopian. He completely accepts the Hegelian and later-Marxian view that change and revolution, if they are to take place at all, must be dialectically contained in the reality which is to be overcome. Thus he writes a whole book, *Reason and Revolution—Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, which has exerted great and baleful influence, in which he tries to rehabilitate that classic reactionary Hegel who, unlike social democracy, is among the modern god-fathers of the doctrine that "the real is the rational." Thus also he ends up advocating the Stalinoid view that social freedom must be limited to those who essentially agree with him. (See the recent discussion of *Limited Tolerance* in DISSENT.) For Marcuse the revolutionary antithesis contained in the established thesis is "the second dimension," and in its absence he laments the one-dimensionality of contemporary reality, and the impossibility of radical change. His envisioned revolution, and that of orthodox Marxists, is a real slave to reality.

When Hegel proclaimed "the death of God" he laid the foundation for Marx's and Engels's attack on "the utopians." They programmatically wanted, and want, to be "realists." Now their realistic chickens have come home to roost.(Actually, they have been doing so for a long time.) Radical utopians, on the other hand, hold that there is a third dimension, genuine transcendence,

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which is not limited by the real. Out of this dimension they derive the values, impetus, and even the tactics of revolutionary change. Under this dispensation, change, or at least the demand and striving for it, are not dependent on existing conditions, nor are they fundamentally subject to prudential considerations. Now I don't have to care whether Marcuse or Graubard is right that there is or is not the potential of improvement in the existing situation; I will strive for it in any case. Now the establishment will not dictate the direction or conduct of my revolution, but I will. And now also the "realists" (C. Wright Mills called them "crack-pot realists") of Niebuhr's stripe and the empiricist liberals of Arendt's and Talmon's cannot accuse me of arrogating to myself divine powers, since I am in fact submitting to them.

STEPHEN S. SCHWARZSCHILD

FRANCE—A NEW KIND OF REBELLION (continued from page 292)

sudden projected itself before all eyes as an element of order, just like the Minister of the Interior or the CRS.*

By exercising what it called its authority, the Gaullist government had gradually and deliberately suppressed all forms of institutionalized democratic life. At no level was debate allowed; temporary legal measures forbade it. The government had the power to act in a void and this is precisely how it did act, while increasingly losing touch with a social reality it would have liked to ignore, since that reality could not fail to express itself politically—and political expression was inadmissible. In the same way de Gaulle refused to let anyone tell him that the reform of the Sécurité Sociale was a mistake or that the situation at Nanterre was absurd and untenable.

Nothing is more contagious than the exercise of authority. At all levels throughout the country there has developed, not authority, but a kind of authoritarianism that some perhaps did not see for what it was, even when they came to exercise it. And at the same time there was growing irritation with such methods and with the contempt, and sometimes the cynicism, they bespoke. The rector's irresponsible and ill-advised decision to call the police into the Sorbonne demonstrates this authoritarianism. But the sudden and violent reaction against his decision also reveals a state of mind that an act of this sort by itself could not have set off.

THINGS BECOME even more confused once we leave the political realm and try to discover the underlying causes of the upheaval. No one really expected the revolt of the Parisian students, not even the students themselves. It began because there had been a spontaneous outbreak, not the other way round. For the protest this rebellion expressed found its justifications in the course of the act of rebellion rather than in ideology or previous politics. Although the government had created the political atmosphere that made this revolt possible, there had been no statement of either the rebels' goals or other grievances before the uprising. Only the *enragés*—the supporters of Cohn-Bendit and the Maoist, Trotskyist, and Guevarist *groupuscules* (the smallest radical splinter groups)—came out with a program, but in such a way that none of them could win more than the handful of supporters that can be found on any campus to support extremist factions.

During these weeks, while the riots were spreading, a number of things became clearer in the course of the battle. And one must say that this battle was waged by all students—be they *enragés, groupuscules,* or the mass of the protestors and those who gradually came to join them—with admirable generosity, sincerity, and courage.

First of all, on the question of university reform, which extends beyond the problems of higher education to include all types of instruction, the students definitively destroyed those institutions dating back to the twin heritage of Jesuit instruction and Napoleonic administration that still ruled our universities. The authoritarian form of instruction—based upon paternalistic relations between master and pupil and the centralized, authoritarian and militaristic (particularly in its discipline) administration—was once and for all abolished. And all this was achieved with the support of the teaching staff, which for the most part helped the students secure a victory that the administration had done all in its power to prevent.

Another aspect of the student rebellion was

*Compagnie Republicaine de Sécurité; the security police and riot squad.

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to become more prominent in the course of the battle: the students did not want their studies merely to equip them to become the leaders of a society they oppose. The strictly political formulation and the traditional terminology in which they expressed this demand consists of denying their instructors the right to teach them how to become exploiters.

And so we come to the characteristic of this revolt that seems least understandable at first glance: the students' opposition to a consumer society. Although the most unclear and confused, this form of opposition seems to be the most important. What the students are rejecting is not really, as they claim, the consumer society but rather certain characteristics of industrial society from which they feel as alienated as their fellow students in Berlin or New York. Industrial society, whatever its form or the course of development by which it is achieved, has created new forms of alienation which have to be examined. The rebellion of the young is proof that alienation exists. It exists in this society, no matter what advantages people enjoy. One need only recall that this kind of consumer society was first opposed in the Scandinavian countries, where people enjoy the greatest advantages and the highest degree of security.

The consumer society places young people in a most ambiguous position. To a great extent it is made for them; they are one of its essential economic supports and greatly benefit from it. The various fashions, the theatre, films, records, radio, and leisure industries depend on their purchases and thus convey the impression that, through their choices, tastes, and habits the young dominate part of society. At the same time, however, many of the young feel that these choices, tastes, and habits are imposed on them. The fashionable slogan that "all be done for the young" is a case in point; boys and girls no longer imitate adults; adults now imitate them. But this apparent power is contradicted by an increased dependence in other areas.

Access to various commodities is, of course, unequal. Films, newspapers, records, and advertisements display goods to all, as if they were presenting real choices, whereas in fact most people can only dream of obtaining such things as cars, travel, and the like. Besides, whether they rule or are persuaded that they do as consumers, the young must still continue to live in the factory or at the university, in the framework of an oppressive and paternalistic authoritarianism that does not even correspond to their position in their own families.

This is above all a revolt for freedom, a revolt concerned with the role of the individual in society. One of the walls on the Rue d'Ulm carried this inscription: "L'unique existe." It is striking, although this reference to Stirner is no doubt the work of some isolated group or individual. But right from the beginning, and for all those who did not eventually succumb to the prefabricated molds of classical revolutionary thought, the protest of the strikers and the students against society, against their masters, and against the rules they worked under and the work they did, was seen as a protest against depersonalization in a hierarchical and compartmentalized society, an unwillingness to regard material demands as the only important ones. The right to dissent and to assume responsibility for one's own decisions, to reject predigested opinions—this was the demand of individuals who wanted to assert themselves as more than just members of a class.

One day it would no doubt be instructive to undertake a serious study of the revolutionary "texts": the anonymous graffiti, tracts and poems. No one will forget how the inevitable wall inscriptions "No posters, as of the 22nd of July, 1881" were replaced by the now famous "No prohibitions, May 1968." Demands expressed in this manner reflect a desire for happiness rather than for destruction: "If you are a revolutionary, be joyous." "I take my dreams for reality because I believe in the reality of my desire." "Create." These and similar slogans expressed the spirit of the riots. This spirit gave to the revolution of May 1968 a special character that has not been generally understood. It was easy to dismiss the slogans of self-management and joint management put forward by the students in purely economic and social terms as utopian. The apparent lack of realism of these demands has led to the suspicion that the young rebels were only playing among themselves at the comedy, or drama, of revolution, remaining pure and uncontaminated by reality. The days of May were thus in part,

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if not exclusively, what Raymond Aron has called "a revolutionary psycho- or pseudo-drama."

But, even if these demands are utopian (something I shall neither affirm nor deny), at least, they gave forceful expression to a state of mind that will not soon disappear and will have to be taken into account. It will not be possible, without incurring great risks, to drive the students from their newly acquired position in the running of their universities. And it would be imprudent not at least to consider giving a similar role to the workers in the management of their factories—even if they no longer demand it. At a joint action committee meeting of workers and students, I heard a young worker express this state of mind very clearly. He belonged to one of the groups that went to the factories in defiance of the efforts of the CGT, in order to "politicize" the strikes. He had told the strikers simply this: "Today the red flag is flying over your factory, you occupy it, you are responsible for it, and you run it. But tomorrow you will be given a pay hike and you will put your red flag in your pocket, return every morning to the factory, and *nothing will change*." But if the society does not wish to be subjected to new uprisings, it will have to satisfy these demands. As for the rest, when Raymond Aron says that this revolutionary psychodrama is nothing but an enormous "exorcism" ("défoulement"), he obviously thinks that the causes for these events are important—exorcism must have an object and a purpose.

But we cannot reduce to one simple psychological and psycho-social element a phenomenon whose full implications and consequences we are still unable to foresee. Having been involved in these events—although, like many others, only slightly—what struck me as most remarkable, both about the students and the workers, was how quickly they learned to keep away from the clichés of revolutionary thought and from the *groupuscules*. The latter, however, were perhaps among the initiators of the revolt who came up with a concrete program for university reform which, in spite of some excess, is the most intelligent and serious ever seen. It has paved the way for a new and fresh analysis of society with some original ideas that for the first time in many years take into account concrete realities which are a part of everyone's experience.

Today one can only hope that this enormous effort will be neither destroyed by a government tempted to seek revenge nor minimized by a class of intellectuals who will find it difficult to forgive the students for having surprised them and disproved their prophecies. They must learn to accept and take at its face value what they still regard as the invasion of the irrational in a rational society. That the irrational is making inroads on the rational is possible, but what is important here is the reassertion of the human personality in a depersonalized society, the affirmation of the need for society to assume responsibility for and do something about the trivialization and fragmentation of work. There is a general protest against a society that forcefully maintains institutions which at the same time betray it.

The fact that many of the young workers who joined the revolt were relatively well off should suffice to prove that—contrary to what the government, the Communist party, and the CGT seem to think—it is not enough to provide the largest number of people with access to comfort and wealth in order to remove all signs of revolt. And attempts to explain this uprising as nothing more than an outbreak of irrationality in a rational society are incorrect and dangerous.

THE REVOLT in France cannot develop into a classical revolution, with one class assuming power at the expense of another. It cannot end this way because it is inevitable that sooner or later there will be a conflict between the student organizations and the worker organizations as well as between the young student and worker rebels and the adherents of the existing order, which are quite numerous among the workers.

While their studies, on the one hand, and the ambiguous and uncomfortable system of instruction, on the other, have made the students more conscious than others of the new forms of alienation produced by industrial society (an alienation that is also spoken of among some of the younger workers), this awareness is not shared by the majority of the workers. Many of them regard what we call the consumer society as their achievement. Refrigerators, TV, regular vacations, movies, and picture maga-

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zines—these were things that they achieved only after long, hard struggles. There is even a sort of egalitarian aspect to this society: both workers and bourgeois see the same films and TV, listen to the same radio programs, read the same newspapers, and often meet each other on the same beaches.

The workers (especially older workers) are much less aware of the depersonalization that such a society creates than they are of the advantages it confers. And they are not prepared, for the sake of a rather hazy ideology that does not really affect them, to sacrifice these advantages. Even if "worker government" could be secured without sacrifice, it is not at all certain that the workers would want it. The demand for worker participation in the running of business enterprises has long been eliminated from union platforms. Indeed, it is an open question whether, under a system that remains capitalist, any form of "codetermination" would not be a hoax—like, for example, that old war horse of the Left Gaullists, the partnership of capital and labor (*association capital-travail*) which has long ago been exposed as so much wind. Under capitalism, giving the workers a responsible voice in the running of their enterprises might limit their ability to press their demands. But this does not mean that *all* forms of codetermination must have this result; it only means that the unions' distrust of this demand is not without justification. For adult workers, who are set in their work and have long been accustomed to limiting their demands to bread-and-butter issues, the whole idea of "worker government" is disturbing, incomprehensible, and suspect.

That is why this latest French uprising could not lead to a real revolution. The majority of workers reacted to this new kind of revolution much as they reacted to the early unions. It took a long time then for the worker to overcome his fear of society's overt or implied threats against unionized workers and strikers. It will take even longer to convince him that these new forms of worker management and codetermination will enable him to change his working conditions even more drastically than did the birth of unionism.

IN ORDER to understand why it has been clear from the beginning that the revolt in France would not develop into a classic revolution, one need only look at the role that the Communist party has played and no doubt will continue to play. Remember that the current explosion started with the student revolts, in which the Communist party took no part; the revolts were accomplished not only without the Party's support but often against it. While it is true that some of the *groupuscules* participated in the revolt from the beginning (and were quickly absorbed into the general revolutionary movement), these all belonged to groups outside of orthodox Communism: they were Maoists, Trotskyists, Guevarists. That is why the Communist party and *L'Humanité* spoke of this uprising with distrust, scorn, and contempt.

Only after the street battles of May 10 and Cohn-Bendit's strike call was the CGT prepared to authorize the creation of a solidarity movement among the workers and these (especially the younger ones) were probably more inspired by indignation at police brutality than by a consciousness of common revolutionary interests. The next day the CGT did switch tactics and proclaimed its solidarity with the students. This resulted in the joint proclamation of May 13 and in a 24-hour general strike. But when wildcat strikes broke out in factories all over the country, the CGT again parted company with the students, whom it called "irresponsible and adventuristic," because it wanted to regain control over a movement which, from the start, had slipped out of its grip. Again and again we saw the CGT change its position and condemn in the morning groups it had endorsed the previous evening. And the more the contagious student rebellion spread, the more displeased was the CGT.

On May 24, in order to prevent the workers from mixing with the students, the CGT organized its own demonstration. At the suggestion of the students, many young workers joined it at the Gare de Lyon. Later, one part of the Communist procession rejoined the general demonstration, after the Communist demonstration had been dispersed. Next day's dismissals of leaders of the CGT and the dissension that reached even into the Central Committee of the Communist party showed the seriousness of the crisis. On the evening of May 27 a large number of workers attended a protest meeting at the Charléty Stadium, organized by the stu-

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dents and attended by Pierre Mendès-France.

In time, the government, the unions, and the employers signed an agreement that gave the workers unprecedented benefits. But the continuing paralysis of the country, the uneasiness of the mass of workers, the confusion of the parties, and the even greater confusion of the government—all this created during the days of May 28 and 29 a political void in which all power seemed to have disappeared. Since everyone realized that the government had lost all control over the situation, two proposals were made that can now be seen for what they were. Pierre Mendès-France declared himself ready to head a transitional government, on condition that this government received the support of all the forces of the Left, which obviously would have included the Communist party. This proposal was to prevent the collapse of the regime from leading to complete chaos and the absence of all responsible governmental authority. Pierre Mendès-France is without doubt the one political figure in France who could be accepted by the whole Left, including the students (with the exception of the revolutionary *groupuscules* whose political influence was, however, insignificant).

The Communist party immediately answered this proposal with one of its own (although it was not a real proposal), offered for the sole purpose of eliminating all possibility of a government of the Left, thus defusing the revolution and putting the Gaullist government back in the saddle. In effect, the Communist party rejected Mendès-France's proposal and kept to its demand for a *"gouvernement d'union populaire et démocratique,"* that is, a Communist "people's democracy." It knew that this plan had already been rejected by the conservative half of France and by most of the Left and was therefore unacceptable. In pressing for it, the Party gave the Gaullists a chance to denounce, with justification, Communist subversion. This denunciation had two consequences. It allowed *"le Parti de la Crainte"* (party of fear) to rally behind de Gaulle and thus made possible the demonstrations of May 30. And it made the whole French revolutionary camp look like a vast movement controlled by the Communist party, at least among the uninformed and those eager to swallow this interpretation.

WHAT FOLLOWED was a complete break with the student movements and the abandonment of all the political objectives of the strike. The revolution was over. What the CRS and police had been unable to do with their grenades and truncheons, the Communist party accomplished with ease by persuading the mass of workers that their demands had been amply met and that the idea of revolution was not a very tempting one. For many reasons, among which one should not forget the interests of the Soviet Union, the Communist party is once again giving de Gaulle its full support. Without this support, the demonstration of May 30 would perhaps never have succeeded. The Party reunited the employers and the petits bourgeois who, their confidence regained, felt free to march on the Champs Elysées to shouts of "To Dachau with Cohn-Bendit" and "Renault for office."

From one day to the next, the country's revolutionary forces were demobilized, with the exception of the students who found themselves more and more alone. Whatever difficulties may still stand in the way of ending the strike in particular areas, these obstacles are no longer political. The Gaullist government, seriously threatened only a few days earlier, is not only accepted as a legitimate spokesman, but is actually helped in its work. The hardening of worker demands merely reflects the fact that the time is opportune for pushing these demands as far as possible. In the political sphere, the unions, especially the CGT, have pronounced themselves satisfied with the decision to dissolve the Chamber and have placed no obstacles in the way of elections. Order and tranquility are returning. The only possible cause for anxiety relates to the Civic Action Committees the government and the Gaullist parties have set up. What form, one wonders, will they take? Auxiliary police, storm troopers, or peaceful associations of old and new Gaullists? The fact that they are headed by Roger Frey, who as Minister of the Interior either organized, or allowed, or at the very least covered up the Charonne massacre, is not reassuring.

The presence in the new government of a few "leftist Gaullists," put there, one suspects, more as hostages than to signal some inconceivable shift in policy, provides no basis for hope. And everyone knows that the ministers who were

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sacrificed in the general cabinet reshuffle paid for errors they committed under orders, and not as the result of initiative—an initiative which their servility toward their boss makes hard to believe they would ever exercise.

Is it all over then and will nothing remain of those days of May 1968? While prophecies in this area are dangerous, this is a question one should at least try to answer. At the very least, the days of May will leave behind more important traces than a few cut trees and a few torn up streets, more important even than the often serious scars left on the bodies of some young people. The revolt has touched institutions that will never be the same. And a whole section of French society has discovered that its easy conscience and self-satisfaction merely served as a cover for blindness and selfishness.

No matter what the government may do to erase the traces left by those May days, it will have to undertake educational reforms that must follow the model that students of the university and the lycées are now proposing. Of course it will try to distort the reforms and will try to avoid carrying them out in their entirety. Even so, the efforts of the past weeks, at least, will remain a source of inspiration both for a recasting of the educational system and for further demands in this area.

After so much effort and inventiveness, it is difficult to picture the students next October in barrack-like lycées and silent universities. No one can foresee what will come of the newly formed contacts between students and workers. These continue to flourish, in Nanterre, surrounded by the slum dwellers, and in the Sorbonne, which has become for the students and for many of the young workers a sort of forum, seminar, canteen, and dormitory rolled into one.

Young men and women for the first time are speaking to one another of the serious issues that concern them. Do we fully understand what this rediscovered communication means? For years philosophy and literature have taught us that man is alone and that all communication is impossible. If all that the revolutionaries of May 1968 had accomplished had been to break, even for a few weeks, this circle of silence in which every individual in our society lives and dies, they would already have provided an unforgettable example.

But the students also have put an end to an old and dusty system of education. This revolution, whether one approves of it or rejects it, is secure. In very little time it will reach all youth—a quarter of France's population. A revolution that transforms the style of life of one out of four of a country's inhabitants has not failed.

As for the demand for greater responsibility which took the form of a call for "power," it will either be met or we shall soon have to prepare ourselves for new uprisings. If we do not quickly bring democracy to the university, and not only to the university but also to business, local communities, and the trade unions, then who will dare imagine the future? For the choice is between the kind of reforms that would crown the revolution of May 1968 with victory or a repression and reaction which would lead in the same direction that Greece, Spain, and Portugal seem to be heading. The choice today is between the living revolution and the regression to a murderous anachronism.

This article was written early in June—several weeks before the French elections.

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